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ABSTRACT
Many states have turned to PMSCs for help defeating rebels, yet we lack a broad
understanding of the causes and outcomes of this choice. I build upon insights from principalagent theory and utilize statistical analyses to explain when states delegate tasks to PMSCs
during civil conflicts, and what conditions affect when PMSCs help states achieve victory. I also
examine the Nigerian government’s decision to hire the PMSC Specialized Tasks, Training,
Equipment and Protection International (STTEP) in 2015, in order to identify factors that cause
states fighting civil conflicts to hire PMSCs that my statistical analysis cannot detect. The results
from both types of analyses suggest that the reasons states hire PMSCs vary depending on what
types of tasks PMSCs perform, but factors associated with threat levels from rebels and state
capacity appear to be the most important. In addition, the results suggest that working with
PMSCs tends to delays state victory. Overall, my analyses suggest that states fighting civil
conflicts tend to hire PMSCs after their own forces have shown that they cannot stand up to rebel
forces, which is when PMSCs find it easiest to exploit states and prolong conflicts in pursuit of
their own interests.

vii

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
For the past thirty years, states have increasingly outsourced military and security
services to Private Military and Security Corporations (PMSCs) to help maintain order
domestically and to advance their interests abroad. As the name suggests, PMSCs are private
corporations, and while they often work for states, they are not under the direct or permanent
control of any government or national military. Rather, they are independent actors with their
own interests and capabilities that specialize in performing military and security related services
for clients. The very existence of such actors, let alone the willingness of states to delegate
authority over their military and security affairs to them, does not fit well with much of the
conventional wisdom in International Relations regarding the fundamental interests of modern
states.
According to this conventional wisdom, modern states are largely defined by the
institution of state sovereignty, which is generally understood to have its roots in the Peace of
Westphalia (Krasner 1988; 1993; 1995/96; Reus-Smit 1999; Ruggie 1983; 1993; Teschke 2003).
European politics prior to the Thirty Years War are characterized as being defined by
“crisscrossing relations between heterogeneous feudal actors capped by the hierarchical claims
of the Empire and the Church” (Teschke 2003, 2). After the war, the Peace of Westphalia
formally enshrined state sovereignty as the new organizing principle for European politics. The
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principle of state sovereignty, “resting on the internal monopolization of the means of violence,
translated into rulers’ exclusive control of the instruments of foreign policy – the army,
diplomacy, and treaty-making” (Teschke 2003, 3). Over time, sovereign states became the
world’s dominant political actors, largely because they managed to consolidate the global means
of coercion under their control (Tilly 1985; 1990; Herbst 1990; Olson 1993). Eventually, their
command over the world’s military resources allowed states to establish themselves as the only
actors with the legal right to use force.
While it is now common for International Relations scholars to argue that state
sovereignty is eroding or that the state’s status as the world’s dominant political actor is slipping
(Agnew 1994; Strange 1996; Ruggie 2004; Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006; Avant et al. 2010;
Brenner 2017), that states seek to consolidate power and are defined by their formal monopoly
over the legitimate use of force remains the conventional wisdom. Realism, the theory most
associated with national security issues, still largely ignores non-state actors. Realists start from
the assumptions that states are the fundamental actors in international politics and that they
generally want to increase their share of the world’s military capabilities (Morgenthau 1948;
Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). Other International Relations theories pay more attention to
non-state actors, but most still acknowledge the primacy of states, especially when it comes to
military and security issues. As such, the idea that states would willingly outsource military and
security services to private corporations contradicts the conventional wisdom regarding states’
fundamental nature and interests. If modern states are defined by the fact that they seek to
consolidate military power and assert their authority over other actors within their territory, why
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would they ever delegate the right to use force to private corporations and allow them to manage
aspects of their national security?
Yet states are indeed hiring PMSCs to assist with many of their military and security
needs. This trend began in the early 1990s when western states needed a cost effective and
politically safe way to manage post-Cold War conflicts (Kinsey 2006; Stranger 2009; Dunigan
2011; Kruck 2014; McFate 2014; Krahmann 2016). With the threat from communism and the
Soviet Union gone, citizens in the west lost their appetite for sending troops to die in foreign
wars. In order to continue to maintain a presence in much of the world, western states needed to
find an alternative to putting their own forces in harm’s way. In this environment, armed with
weapons bought from ex-Soviet states and taking advantage of prevailing neoliberal norms,
PMSCs emerged to satisfy demand. Powerful democracies like the U.S. and U.K. helped develop
this new industry, relying heavily on PMSCs for security and logistical support in the Yugoslav
Wars, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Powerful states outside the west also use PMSCs. Russia hired security contractors to
protect navy installations and assets in Crimea in 2014 (Rogin 2014), and worked with the
Wagner Group to support the Syrian government in 2018 (Durso 2018). In China, corporations
such as the Chinese Overseas Security Group, Control Risks, G4S, and Frontier Services Group
work closely with the government to protect its economic interests in Africa, Latin America, and
along the planned “Silk Road” (Catallo 2015; Goh et al. 2017). In the Middle East, a coalition of
Arab states led by Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. hired Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater, to
raise an 800-member battalion of foreign troops to fight Houthi forces in Yemen (Mazzetti and
Hager 2011; 2015). Even Israel, which mandates that nearly all citizens serve time in the
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military, allows corporations like Modi’in Ezrachi and Sheleg Lavan to man checkpoints in and
around the West Bank (Deger 2016; Kennard and Lowenstein 2016).
Developing states also often hire PMSCs. Branović asserts that twenty-eight states that
experienced state failure between 1990 and 2007 hired or worked with PMSCs during that period
(Branović 2011). Neu and Avant found 1299 PMSC related events in Africa, Latin America, and
Southeast Asia between 1990 and 2012 (Neu and Avant 2019). The newly formed government of
Croatia hired the PMSC Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) to train its army after
suffering multiple defeats by the Serbian army and was so effective that the Bosnian government
later hired them to train their own army after the signing of the Dayton Accords (Avant 2005;
Singer 2008). The Colombian government works with American based PMSCs to help combat
drug trafficking (Perret 2012; Eventon and Bewley-Taylor 2016). In 1997, the government of
Papua New Guinea hired Sandline International to eliminate secessionist leaders on Bougainville
Island. Africa in particular has proven to be a popular region for military and security
outsourcing (Musah and Fayemi 2000; O’Brien 2000; Branović 2011; McFate 2014). The
conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone during the 1990s are notable because in both cases
governments hired PMSCs to support, train, and even lead their troops into battle (Avant 2005;
Kinsey 2006; Singer 2008; Dunigan 2011). In 2005, the new government in Liberia worked with
the PMSC DynCorp to restructure and retrain its entire armed forces (McFate 2014). In 2015, the
Nigerian government hired the PMSC Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection
International (STTEP) to train its army and offer logistical, intelligence, and at times combat
support in its fight against Boko Haram (Freeman 2015).
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Although no comprehensive dataset that tracks state utilization of PMSCs exists, the data
and examples outlined above demonstrate that states all over the world, from western
democracies, to powerful non-western states, to developing states are becoming comfortable
with the practice of delegating authority over military and security services to private
corporations both at home and abroad. In light of this trend, and given the conventional wisdom
regarding states’ interests, scholars need to answer two questions: (1) why do states hire PMSCs,
and (2) does hiring PMSCs actually advance states’ security interests? These two questions
cannot be answered separately. If PMSCs generally help states advance their security interests,
then this fact would go a long way toward explaining why states hire them. Alternatively, if
PMSCs do not help states advance their security interests, or worse, create more security
problems, other explanations need to be found. Moreover, the probability that PMSCs help or
hurt states’ security interests likely depends on the conditions under which they are hired. Thus,
regardless of whether PMSCs can sometimes help states advance their security interests, scholars
need to understand under what conditions states hire them to identify how these conditions affect
PMSC performance.
While there has been some research done on both questions, most of it relies on anecdotal
evidence or small-n comparative studies focused on supporting existing narratives about PMSCs,
rather than testing relationships between PMSC activities and specific causes or outcomes. As
such, the literature is still a long way from developing broad explanations for when states hire
PMSCs, and whether PMSCs help states advance their security interests. In this study, I examine
data from the Private Security Database, the Non-State Actor Data, and the Uppsala Conflict
Data Program to determine whether PMSCs do indeed advance their client states’ security
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interests, whether they create new security problems for states, or whether outcomes vary
depending on specific circumstances. In addition, I use these same data sources to uncover the
logic behind why some states willingly permit private corporations to manage aspects of their
security, while also looking specifically at the case of the Nigerian government’s hiring of the
PMSC STTEP in 2015. In doing so, I hope to reveal under what conditions PMSCs can be useful
for states committed to good governance practices, when states should avoid working with
PMSCs, and why some states work with PMSCs when doing so has the potential to make their
security problems worse. Answers to these questions would have important policy implications
for state leaders, as they would be better informed on whether hiring PMSCs would be helpful
for them, and on how to best utilize PMSCs so that they do not end up making security problems
worse. Through offering an analysis of these outcomes, I contribute a greater understanding of
state’s puzzling turn to PMSCs for help with security issues.
States Experiencing Civil Conflicts and PMSCs
Although this study may contain insights applicable to all states, I focus in particular on
the use of PMSCs by states experiencing civil conflicts. I do so for three reasons. First,
outsourcing military and security services has the potential to be more beneficial, but also more
dangerous, for states experiencing civil conflicts than for stronger more secure states1. Strong
states, “have superior monitoring and sanctioning capacity that should lead them to be in better
position to control [PMSCs] than weaker states” (Avant 2005, 58). In addition, strong states
generally have the resources to manage their own security, and rarely face immediate existential
threats, allowing them to be more selective with when they hire PMSCs and what tasks they

1

I consider states experiencing civil conflict to be inherently weak, because the very existence of armed rebels in a
country demonstrates that the state is not capable of maintaining its sovereign authority.
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allow them to perform. As such, it is easier to see why a strong secure state might delegate some
tasks to PMSCs when their core interests are not as stake. In contrast, weak states, “both have
more to gain from privatization and run the highest risks from it” (Avant 2005, 59). Hiring
PMSCs can greatly enhance a weak state’s military capabilities, which could be the difference
between it preserving its existence or facing collapse. Yet PMSCs may themselves be too
powerful for weak states to control, and end up ignoring or even challenging state authority.
Having to deal with an ongoing civil conflict increases these risks. Since civil conflicts tend to
lower economic output, states fighting them will find it more difficult to pay PMSCs and fund
institutions meant to hold them accountable. Moreover, if states hire PMSCs to operate in or near
conflicts zones where their authority is already limited, they will likely not be able to effectively
monitor PMSC activity. As such, studying relationships between PMSCs and states experiencing
civil conflicts makes it easier to see the tension between arguments for why states might sacrifice
autonomy over their national security to private corporations, and arguments for why states
should not take that risk.
In addition, states experiencing civil conflicts provide clear indicators for whether
PMSCs do or do not help states advance their security interests. It can be difficult to determine
what strong secure states hope to get out of their involvement in foreign conflicts, making it hard
to determine whether PMSCs help or hurt their interests. It is also difficult to determine whether
hiring PMSCs to help with domestic security makes states more secure when there is not an
ongoing civil conflict. But it is safe to assume that states experiencing civil conflicts have a clear
interest in achieving victory over rebels. Thus, focusing on states experiencing civil conflicts
allows me to use likelihood of state victory as a clear outcome for hypothesis testing.
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Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, I focus on states experiencing civil conflicts
because research that can reveal whether PMSCs help make such states more secure, and why
the states that have the most to lose from military and security outsourcing engage in it anyway,
have important and immediate implications. If hiring PMSCs generally helps states defeat rebel
groups and restore stability to their country, then hiring PMSCs should be encouraged when
governments are committed to good governance practices. If PMSCs are more likely to help
states win civil conflicts under certain conditions, then those conditions need to be identified. If
PMSCs tend to extend conflicts, then their use needs to be discouraged, and our understanding of
why states hire them in the first place needs to be developed.
Regarding this final point, existing research on why states hire PMSCs has limited
applicability to states experiencing civil conflicts, as it focuses either on states’ desire to carry
out cost-effective military operations while avoiding public backlash, or the strength of
neoliberal norms in a country. These theories were developed to explain why liberal democracies
hire PMSCs, but since states experiencing civil conflicts are usually poorer, often lack strong
democratic institutions, and face more immediate security threats than liberal democracies
generally face, such theories likely have limited explanatory power when it comes to why they
hire PMSCs. As such, more attention needs to be given to the reasons for why states
experiencing civil conflicts hire PMSCs. If states experiencing civil conflicts stand to both gain
and lose the most from military and security outsourcing, our theories for why states hire PMSCs
ought to be applicable to them.
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Principal-Agent Models and PMSCs
To answer my two questions—what factors influence when states experiencing civil
conflicts decide to work with PMSCs, and when do PMSCs help states win civil conflicts—I
utilize and build upon insights from the literature on principal-agent theory. The principal-agent
literature explores what factors cause some actors (principals) to delegate authority over specific
issues to other actors (agents), and what factors motivate and permit agents to either work
diligently, slack off, or deliberately work against their principal’s interests. Slacking off or
working against a principal’s interests is called shirking. In the context of states experiencing
civil conflicts working with PMSCs, shirking is anything PMSCs do (or don’t do) that works
against the interests of the client state, such as not working as hard as they could or making
secret deals with rebels for access to natural resources. If PMSCs never shirked, then they would
simply add to the military capabilities of their client state, increasing their client’s chances of
winning the conflict. Yet, PMSCs often do shirk, so whether they help states win civil conflicts
depends a great deal upon whether they can get away with a significant degree of shirking.
The principal-agent literature emphasizes two factors that motivate and allow agents to
shirk: information asymmetries and differences in interests. When principals are less capable of
knowing or understanding what agents do, it is harder for them to determine whether agents are
acting against their interests. As such, when information asymmetries are less extreme due to
client states having the capabilities to better monitor PMSCs, I expect PMSCs to put more effort
into helping states win civil conflicts. Regarding differences in interests, when working harder or
accepting more risk to satisfy their principal’s interests comes at the expense of satisfying their
own, agents are more likely to shirk. As such, when client states can structure incentives in ways
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that harmonize the interests of PMSCs with their own, PMSCs should be more likely to work
hard to help states win civil conflicts.
However, since principal-agent models were primarily developed to study economic and
political relationships in developed countries, there tends to be an underlying assumption in the
literature that principals always have the capabilities to punish agents when they are caught
shirking, either on their own or by appealing to a more powerful authority. This assumption
cannot be made when applying principal-agent models to states experiencing civil conflicts
working with PMSCs. If such states lack the capabilities to prevent rebellions and defeat rebel
groups on their own, how can they be expected to punish professional military and security
corporations if they decide not to follow orders? States experiencing civil conflicts also lack a
higher political authority to appeal to for help enforcing the terms of a contract if problems
develop in their relationships with PMSCs. These problems are compounded by the fact that,
knowing the risks that come with military and security outsourcing, states experiencing civil
conflicts may only hire PMSCs when they are very weak, and are thus willing to allow actors
into their country that they cannot control in a desperate attempt to survive.
I argue that even if reducing information asymmetries and differences in interests
between client states and PMSCs increase the likelihood that PMSCs will work hard to help
states win civil conflicts, it is likely that working with PMSCs will generally delay state victory
because states experiencing civil conflicts do not have capabilities to punish their agents that
most principals are assumed to have. Without being able to credibly threaten punishment, the
ability of states to detect shirking will not be enough of a deterrent to prevent PMSCs from
pursuing their own interests at the expense of their client’s. Thus, I expect that: states
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experiencing civil conflicts will tend to work with PMSCs when they are particularly weak and
vulnerable, which allows PMSCs to get away with shirking, in turn prolonging conflicts by
preventing state victory.
Plan of this Dissertation
This study proceeds as follows. In Chapter Two, I outline the existing literature on
PMSCs and their relationship with states experiencing civil conflicts, explaining how it has not
sufficiently answered which factors influence when states experiencing civil conflicts work with
PMSCs, or when PMSCs help states win civil conflicts. In Chapter Three, I outline the main
arguments in the principal-agent literature, explaining the conditions under which agents are
more or less likely to work against the interests of their principals, and how the existing literature
on principal-agent models fails to account for principals that lack the capabilities to punish their
agents. I then develop several hypotheses regarding what factors influence when states
experiencing civil conflicts work with PMSCs, and when PMSCs help states win civil conflicts.
In Chapter Four, I outline the sources and structure of my data, as well as my methodology for
my statistical analyses. In Chapter Five, I use logistic regression to test what factors correlate
with states working with PMSCs during civil conflicts, and competing risks hazard models to
test whether states working with PMSCs under various conditions affects the risk of state victory
in civil conflicts. In Chapter Six, I add to the insights from Chapter Five by conducting a case
study on the Nigerian government’s decision to hire the PMSC STTEP in 2015. This case study
is meant to test the existing theories for PMSC hiring against a specific case, as well as identify
factors that cause states fighting civil conflicts to hire PMSCs that my statistical analysis might
miss due to it relying on relatively broad sets of indicators. In Chapter Seven, I conclude my
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dissertation by summarizing whether my hypotheses were supported by my results, explaining
how I interpret my results, and discussing the implications my results have for scholars and
policymakers. The results from both my statistical analyses and case study suggest that factors
associated with threat levels from rebels and state capacity have the greatest impact on whether
states work with PMSCs, and that working with PMSCs tends to delay state victory.

CHAPTER TWO
DEFINING AND UNDERSTANDING PMSCs
The practice of hiring foreign soldier to fight in a war is not new. Mercenaries,
auxiliaries, pirates, foreign fighters, militias, criminal enterprises, and terrorist organizations all
predate the emergence of PMSCs on the world’s battlefields. Many of these actors operated in
the decades before PMSCs emerged and continue to operate today. Thus, in order to identify
when PMSCs are present in civil conflicts and what effects they have on how states manage civil
conflicts, I must first identify how they differ from other military and security actors. Without a
clear set of criteria for identifying PMSCs, I will have trouble distinguishing them from other
mercenary-like actors commonly active in civil conflicts, and I will lack a foundation for theories
related to what PMSCs want and what factors influence their behavior.
Unfortunately, the literature does not offer a common definition for PMSCs. As stated by
Carmola, PMSCs are, “ambiguous or polymorphous entities – a mix of old and new, public and
private; slippery, and hard to pin down analytically” (Carmola 2010, 9). McFate affirms that
observers struggle to define PMSCs, stating that, “despite the glut of attention lavished on this
topic in recent years, there is still no common definition, typology, or understanding of who
exactly is a member of the industry” (McFate 2014, 10). Much of the confusion over how to
define PMSCs comes from the fact that observers cannot agree on what to call them. The label
PMSC came into use because observers often cannot distinguish private military corporations
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from private security corporations. McFate, however, argues that the acronym is a catchall label,
and that by itself “such an all-encompassing category is not analytically meaningful” (McFate
2014, 11). Yet, trying to settle on more precise labels presents challenges. Debate over the
appropriateness of different labels often has less to do with providing clarity, and more to do
with pushing competing narratives. Critics will use the term mercenary due to its association
with concepts like greed, lawlessness, and violence (Musah and Fayemi 2000; Percy 2007;
Singer 2008; Carmola 2010; McFate 2014). The U.S. government prefers to call the groups it
hires private security companies. The PMSC lobbyist group International Stability Operations
Association (ISOA) avoids using the words mercenary, military, or security altogether,
preferring to use more marketable terms like contingency contractors or members of the stability
sector. Since these competing labels all contain different connotations, yet describe many of the
same actors, they sow confusion over exactly what these actors are and the roles they play.
Complicating matters further, scholars disagree over the range of tasks that PMSCs
perform. Singer defines private military firms as “private business entities that deliver to
consumers a wide spectrum of military and security services, once generally assumed to be
exclusively inside the public context” (Singer 2008, 9). This definition includes corporations that
perform nonlethal tasks, such as vehicle maintenance or medical support. McFate disagrees with
Singer’s broad definition, arguing that corporations that strictly offer logistical, maintenance, and
medical support are not members of the private military or security industry, “as they perform
nonlethal tasks that are not uniquely military or security-related in nature” (McFate 2014, 15).
This debate over whether firms that perform nonlethal tasks are military actors has led to the
development of a number of competing labels and definitions used to describe the same actors.
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As such, if one wants to study the causes and outcomes of states working with PMSCs,
the need for standard criteria for identifying PMSCs is clear. In the following section, I develop a
set of criteria that both differentiates PMSCs from other military and security actors and is useful
for developing theories regarding how PMSCs can be expected to behave under different
conditions. I then move to discussing the existing set of theories on why states hire PMSCs, and
whether PMSCs help states advance their security interests. I conclude this chapter by
summarizing the gaps in these literatures and discussing how my research furthers our
understanding of the role of PMSCs in civil conflicts.
What Are PMSCs?
Are PMSCs Mercenaries?
Debates over how to define PMSCs often start with the issue of whether they should
simply be labeled as mercenaries. Many observers do not find much meaningful distinction
between PMSCs and mercenaries (Arnold 1999; Musah and Fayemi 2000; Musah 2002; Leander
2002). These scholars assert that PMSCs “are merely modern versions of the age-old mercenary
fighter, a throwback to the day of mercenaries and pirates, private actors wielding deadly force
as proxies for governments and corporations” (Carmola 2010, 12). Given the ease with which
observers can apply this more familiar concept, it is tempting to simply call PMSCs modern
mercenaries and move on. Yet labeling PMSCs as mercenaries merely replaces one poorly
understood concept with another.
Accounts of the battle of Kadesh in 1294 B.C.E, the oldest battle that we have detailed
accounts of, mention the presence of Numidian mercenaries in the army of Pharaoh Ramses II.
Mercenaries were the dominant military actors in Europe during the medieval period (Mockler

16
1969). Throughout the Thirty Years War, “by and large, the military forces of every country
consisted of mercenaries” (Howard, 1976, 29). In the twentieth century, corporations with ties to
former colonial powers hired ex-soldiers from western militaries to act as mercenaries in the
African wars of decolonialization (Musah and Fayemi 2000). Precisely what these actors all have
in common is not always clear, since they existed in different historical periods, performed
different tasks, and had different relationships with the governments of their era. This makes it
difficult to settle on a definition for mercenaryism that is applicable across history.
Definitions developed by the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions are also too vague
and difficult to apply in the real world. Article 47 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions defines mercenaries according to the following criteria:
A mercenary is any person who:
a. is especially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
b. does, in fact, take direct part in the hostilities;
c. is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private
gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict,
material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to
combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
d. is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory
controlled by a Party to the conflict;
e. is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
f. has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty
as a member of its armed forces. (1125 UNTS 3)
The problem with these criteria is that they are so restrictive that few individuals or organizations
qualify as mercenaries. They exclude all non-combatants, non-foreigners, soldiers and citizens
that work for other states, and those who are not promised material compensation substantially in
excess to that paid to local national soldiers. As Best famously stated, “any mercenary who
cannot exclude himself from this definition deserves to be shot—and his lawyer with him” (Best
1980, 375).
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Scholars have tried to narrow down what it means to be a mercenary. Mockler argues that
“the real mark of a mercenary [is] a devotion to war for its own sake” (Mockler 1969, 21).
Thompson (1994) refutes Mockler’s definition, arguing that an individual’s motives for being a
mercenary are impossible to determine. Rather, she argues that mercenaryism “is the practice of
enlisting in and recruiting for a foreign army” (Thompson 1994, 27). Hampson goes back to
focusing on motives, arguing that mercenaries are motivated to fight by the prospect of financial
gain (Hampson 1991, 5-6). Musah and Fayemi combine aspects of Thompson and Hampson’s
definitions, arguing that mercenaryism is “the practice of foreign professional soldiers
freelancing their labor and skills to a party in a conflict for fees higher and above those of
soldiers of the state in conflict” (Musah and Fayemi 2000, 5).
Percy (2007) finds several faults in these competing definitions. She argues that in order
to label someone as a foreigner, there must be clearly defined cultural or territorial lines that
divide peoples into distinct nations. Yet in some historical periods, such as medieval Europe,
clearly defined nations did not exist. Thus, “the notion of nationality narrows the definition of
mercenaries to a time period in which the idea of nationhood makes sense, and thereby excludes
many fighters considered by their contemporaries to be mercenaries, especially before the
nineteenth century” (Percy 2007, 52). In addition, defining mercenaries by their foreign status
risks labeling actors like UN peacekeepers or foreign terrorist fighters as mercenaries, when most
observers do not think of them as such.
Being financially motivated also does not necessarily make someone a mercenary.
Throughout history, national militaries have advertised themselves as attractive career paths that
come with competitive pay and benefits. Many people enlist in national militaries in order to take
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advantage of these benefits and ensure that they have a stable income (Pung et al. 2008). Soldiers
can also be motivated to join national militaries to take advantage of opportunities for looting.
Some governments form entire units for the purpose of financial gain. The German state of
Hesse-Kessel, “was almost completely subsidized by the contracts its army had with the
Netherlands, Venice, and England” (Singer 2008, 33). In addition, “developing countries often
provide peacekeepers to the UN specifically to generate revenues for the state, and create jobs
for individuals” (Percy 2007, 53). Thus, claiming that all foreign and financially motivated
combatants are mercenaries is problematic, since foreign combatants are not always mercenaries,
and national soldiers are often motivated by the prospect of financial gain.
Instead of defining mercenaries as financially motivated foreign combatants, Percy
argues that, “mercenaries should be defined by the extent to which they are motivated to fight for
a cause” (Percy 2007, 54). She asserts that, “the idea of a ‘cause’ encapsulates both the idea that
mercenaries are external to a conflict and that they fight for financial gain, and furthermore
recognizes that foreigners can fight without being considered mercenaries as long as they have a
cause for their actions” (Percy 2007, 54). Causes can be ideological, religious, cultural, or
political, just so long as a combatant has some justification for fighting other than or in addition
to financial gain. In adding a lack of cause to the definition of mercenaries, Percy adds a
normative dimension to the distinction between national soldiers and mercenaries. Soldiers fight
for something higher than themselves, while mercenaries do not.
Percy also adds a second normative dimension to the distinction between national
soldiers and mercenaries. National soldiers operate under the permanent control of legitimate
political authorities that have the right to wage war. A mercenary is an “independent private
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contractor selling his services or the services of a company he commands” (Percy 2007, 57).
This distinction between independent fighters and those under the permanent command of a
legitimate political authority is useful because it reinforces the idea that mercenaries fight
without a higher cause, and because it excludes some types of foreign combatants that are not
usually considered mercenaries. For example, even if UN peacekeepers are foreigners operating
in conflicts that do not directly involve their home states, they are still bound by the laws of their
governments, as well as those of the international community, and exist within official national
military hierarchies. This distinction is also useful because it aligns with the idea that
mercenaries are outsiders, without specifically requiring that they be foreigners.
Percy uses these criteria to create of a spectrum of private violence. This spectrum varies
along the two dimensions of her definition of mercenaryism: the degree to which actors are
motivated by a cause; and the degree to which actors operate under the control of a legitimate
political authority. I have recreated this spectrum in Figure 1 from Percy’s original (Percy 2007,
59).
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Figure 1. Percy’s Spectrum of Private Violence
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Percy’s criteria for identifying mercenary-like actors is useful because it establishes a
spectrum of private violence, which eliminates the need to rely on strict criteria for classifying
violent actors. Instead, actors exist between idealized types, allowing them to be identified as
having stronger or weaker mercenary-like qualities. In addition, the spectrum varies along the
two dimensions that most observers believe separates mercenaries from regular soldiers: the
degree to which they are motivated by a higher cause instead of financial gain; and the degree to
which they are outside actors that operate independently of any established and legitimate
political authority.
With Percy’s criteria for mercenaryism, we can see that labeling PMSCs as mercenaries
does not go very far towards identifying what makes them different from other military and
security actors or what their fundamental interests are. As private actors, PMSCs exist outside
the permanent authority of national military hierarchies, and as corporations, they are motivated
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by financial gain, but there are many other actors on Percy’s spectrum that also have these traits.
As such, it may be fair to describe PMSCs as mercenary-like actors, but other factors need to be
included in order to distinguish PMSCs from other types of mercenaries.
The Unique Qualities of PMSCs
The conditions under which PMSCs first emerged reveals qualities that distinguish them
from other mercenary-like actors. Scholars typically explain the emergence of the PMSC
industry by pointing to changes brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of
the Cold War (Kinsey 2006; Singer 2008; Kruck 2014; McFate 2014). The bi-polar power
structure of the Cold War motivated the superpowers to maintain large national militaries and
enforce stability amongst their regional allies. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S.
and its allies shrank their defense budgets and disengaged from much of the world. This sudden
withdrawal of both superpowers had a destabilizing effect in many regions, leading to an
outbreak in interstate conflicts that the U.S. and its allies were not interested in managing.
Conventional military forces were not well suited for these conflicts, as they typically did not
involve directly confronting other conventional military units but instead involved fighting
guerilla forces in remote or civilian areas. Training a new generation of more qualified military
personnel would be expensive, as fighting irregular conflicts requires soldiers to possess a wide
variety of specialized technological and operational skills. Additionally, with the threat of Soviet
aggression gone, citizens in Europe and North America had lost their appetite for sending troops
to die in foreign wars. These factors created a demand for actors who could relieve western
governments of some of the financial and political burdens associated with managing post-Cold
War conflicts.
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While most existing mercenary-like actors at the time could not satisfy this demand
because of the existing stigma attached to mercenaries, PMSCs were able to openly work for
western states because they fit within a neoliberal worldview. Due to the popularity of Ronald
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher’s economic policies during the 1980s, as well as the collapse of
the world’s largest command style economy, neoliberal norms were quickly spreading across the
world and legitimizing the idea that private actors could perform many tasks better than
governments. As legally registered corporations, PMSCs qualified as members of the private
sector. PMSCs “are hierarchically organized into registered businesses that trade and compete
openly (for the most part) and are vertically integrated into the wider global marketplace”
(Singer 2008, 45). Dunigan affirms this characterization, stating, “[PMSC] personnel are by
definition backed by a corporate infrastructure designed to select, train, and deploy them”
(Dunigan 2011, 17). Thus, western governments fueled the growth of the PMSC industry after
the end of the Cold War because they needed a legitimate and cost-effective means to manage
post-Cold War conflicts that would avoid the risks of high causalities among national troops, and
neoliberal economic norms encouraged outsourcing government services to private actors. As
such, the most important difference between PMSCs and other mercenary-like actors is that they
are legal corporations.
A number of unique qualities follow from PMSCs being legal corporations, the first
being that they have long-term interests in generating profits. Almost by definition, corporations
are interested in portraying themselves as reliable and effective actors within a market in order
attract clients and generate long-term profits for their owners and shareholders (Dunigan 2011,
17-19; Krahmann 2010, 7). Other mercenary-like actors are not as focused on long-term profits.

23
Foreign auxiliary units such as the Numidian’s in the army of Ramses the II or the German
Hessians were preexisting military units. Unlike PMSCs, these mercenaries would have had
some inherent degree of loyalty to specific political or social groups that could conflict with their
pursuit of profits. Other mercenary-like actors do not have long-term interests at all. The armed
bands that roamed Europe during the medieval period or participated in the African wars of
decolonialization were little more than ad-hoc groups of ex-soldiers. As such, they did not have
any formal organizational structure or long-term interests. Thus, being interested in surviving as
corporations and generating long-term profits sets PMSCs apart from many other types of
mercenaries.
Another quality that sets PMSCs apart from other mercenaries is that, as corporations
operating in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, they operate within relatively
powerful regulatory systems. Some mercenaries, such as the medieval free companies, medieval
military entrepreneurs, and the nineteenth century European trading companies share PMSCs’
corporate nature. They worked to establish themselves within their respective markets and had
interests in surviving in order to generate long-term profits. What sets these mercenaries apart
from PMSCs is that they worked for relatively weak and underdeveloped states. The states
medieval and early modern mercenaries worked for often lacked the administrative and fiscal
institutions necessary to raise their own armies and collect taxes, let alone regulate private
militaries. In contrast, PMSCs are primarily headquartered in and often work for powerful
developed states with well-developed legal systems, like the U.S. and the U.K. (Dunigan 2011,
18). In such states, corporations need to register with the government and provide information
regarding their corporate structure, employees, labor practices, company policies, finances, and
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contracts (Zarate 1998, 115). In addition, during the twentieth century, norms against the use of
mercenaries were enshrined into international law (Percy 2007, 169). Several UN General
Assembly and Security Council resolutions proscribe and condemn the use of mercenaries. The
Organization of African Unity (OAU) had a convention that came into force in 1985 calling for
the elimination of mercenaries in Africa. Article 47 of Protocol I additional to the Geneva
Conventions, created in 1977, asserts that mercenaries do not have the right to act as combatants.
Using the definition of mercenary from Article 47, in 1979 the UN even established the United
Nations International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of
Mercenaries. These international legal frameworks can and have been used to prosecute and
regulate PMSCs, and reflect the existence of powerful norms against the hiring of mercenaries
and mercenary-like actors. In some states, PMSCs have even developed voluntary regulatory
systems for themselves (Dunigan 2011, 18). In the U.S., the trade association International
Stability Operations Association has developed a code of conduct for all its members, an open
system where anyone can register a complaint against a member, and a Standards Committee in
charge of investigating such complaints. PMSCs found to be in violation of these standards have
their membership revoked. The British Association of Private Security Companies monitors its
members in similar ways. Being integrated in such regulatory systems means that it is relatively
difficult for PMSCs to challenge state authority without the risk of their reputations suffering,
losing clients, having legal charges brought against them, and possibly being convicted. Earlier
mercenaries never existed in such well-developed and far-reaching regulatory systems.
Another factor that separates PMSCs from other mercenaries is the fact that most are not
strictly military or security actors. PMSCs offer a wide variety of services, most of which are not
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directly related to combat. Some corporations, such as Kellogg Brown and Root, focus on the
procurement, maintenance, and transportation of military equipment, facilities, and personnel,
and do not provide combat services at all (Singer 2008, 136-137). As mentioned above, there is
debate over whether these types of corporations are part of the PMSC industry (Singer 2008;
McFate 2014). Yet some PMSCs offer both lethal and non-lethal services. Blackwater (renamed
Xe Services LLC in 2009 and Academi in 2010), has provided services that range from fighting
Houthi rebels in Yemen, to providing diplomatic security for the U.S. government in Iraq, to
assisting in relief efforts after Hurricane Katrina. In addition, many PMSCs do not exist as
independent organizations. Rather, they are subsidiaries or partners of larger corporate
conglomerates. Until 2007, Kellogg Brown and Root was a subsidiary of the Halliburton
corporation, a transnational corporation that primarily provides technical support for the oil and
gas industry. The PMSCs Executive Outcomes, Lifegaurd, Teleservices, and Saracen were all
subsidiaries of the South African holding company Strategic Resources Corporation, which had
strong corporate ties to the mining company Branch-Heritage group, which in turn owned the
PMSCs Sandline International and Ibis Air Air (Singer 2008, 104-105). Academi is now a
subsidiary of Constellis Holdings, which also owns a number of other PMSCs such as Triple
Canopy, Constellis Ltd., Strategic Social, Tidewater Global Services, National Strategic
Protective Services, and International Development Solutions.
As such, while PMSCs are financially motivated and do not exist under the permanent
control of any legitimate government, they differ from past mercenaries in four important ways:
(1) Unlike more ad-hoc mercenary groups, PMSCs are corporations with an interest in surviving
as organizations and generating long-term profits; (2) As legally registered corporations
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operating in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, they exist within a relatively
powerful and well-developed regulatory systems that provide strong incentives to obey laws set
by states; (3) Most PMSCs are not one-dimensional organizations, but rather, offer clients a wide
variety of both lethal and non-lethal services; (4) Most PMSCs exist as part of a network of
corporate conglomerates that deal in both combat and non-combat related industries.
PMSCs Defined
I can now put forward a set of criteria useful for identifying PMSCs based on several
common themes found throughout the literature. PMSCs represent a uniquely corporate kind of
mercenary, with interests in surviving as legally operating organizations in order to generate
long-term profits. In addition, due to the strength of modern states and the development of both
domestic and international law, PMSCs exist within numerous overlapping regulatory systems
that together are more powerful than any regulatory system that ever existed for mercenaries in
the past. Such regulatory systems pressure PMSCs to subordinate themselves to states to a
degree that earlier mercenaries did not experience. PMSCs are also notable because most are not
narrowly focused on providing combat services. Rather, they are partners and subsidiaries of
larger corporate conglomerates that offer a wide range of military and security services, as well
as services unrelated to the provision of national security. Therefore, PMSCs can be fairly
characterized as legally registered corporate actors that perform or support military and
security operations, broadly defined, for clients. Based on these criteria, I expect PMSCs to
prioritize protecting their reputations as efficient and lawful military and security providers in
order to ensure that they continue to attract clients and avoid facing pressure to dissolve from
states or higher corporate authorities.
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PMSC Typologies
Given the range of tasks that PMSCs can perform, scholars have developed various
classification schemes for them. Most classify PMSCs based on the services they offer or
perform. Some observers divide PMSCs based on whether they are “passive” or “active” (Spicer
1999; Obrien 2000; Brooks 2000). Active PMSCs perform combat operations and take territory,
while passive PMSCs provide training, logistical support, and sometimes defend territory. The
U.S. Department of Defense divides PMSCs based on whether they are armed or unarmed.
Others divide PMSCs based on whether they are military corporations or security corporations.
What these typologies have in common is that they are dichotomous, and combat related
activities are thought of as core military functions while activities less related to combat are
considered peripheral functions.
The problem with using these strict dichotomous typologies is that not all tasks can be
neatly categorized as either combat or non-combat oriented. For example, PMSCs like
Armorgroup and Southern Cross focus on creating security islands around their client’s assets in
conflict zones (Singer 2008, 89). At first, this task seems defensive in nature, as it does not focus
on seeking out and engaging combatants. However, in order create security islands, these firms
will often enter areas under hostile control and use military tactics and equipment to clear
insurgents out. Some assets, such as mineral deposits or oil wells, act as the primary source of
funding for insurgent groups. In such cases, clearing insurgents away from these assets highly
resembles an offensive military operation. There is also disagreement over what exactly a core
military task is. Some PMSC personnel may not carry guns or exchange fire with their client’s
enemies, but they do pilot drones and launch missiles. Are such personnel armed combatants?
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Other PMSCs focus on transporting troops, equipment, food, and other essential supplies into
and around conflict zones. While personnel working for these PMSCs are often unarmed and do
not seek out enemy combatants, modern militaries could not function without the services they
provide. Does that mean that such PMSCs carry out core military functions? Scholars who use
strict dichotomous typologies rarely provide answers to such questions.
As Carmola states, “it is perhaps preferable to consider such tasks along a continuum,
rather than in two divided categories” (Carmola 2010, 25). This is what Singer does with his
“tip-of-the-spear” typology. Singer escapes the problem of having to determine what tasks are
inherently more or less combat oriented by classifying PMSCs by their physical proximity to the
frontlines. Singer asserts that, “traditionally, units within the armed forces are distinguished by
their closeness to the actual fighting” (Singer 2008, 91). Units that operate on the front lines
operate closer to the tip of the spear, while units that serve with command or offer logistical
support exist further down the spear. Singer argues that the tip-of-the-spear typology mimics
how most corporations classify outside partner organizations. Some are core service providers,
some are consultation firms, and some offer non-core services. As such, Singer argues that the
PMSC industry is divided into three groups: military provider firms, military consultant firms,
and military support firms (Singer 2008, 91). Military provider firms “provide services at the
forefront of the battlespace, by engaging in actual fighting, either as line units or specialists (for
example, combat pilots) and/or direct command or control of field units” (Singer 2008, 92).
Military consulting firms “offer strategic, operational, and/or organizational analysis” but they
do not operate within the battlespace itself or engage in direct combat (Singer 2008, 95). Rather,
they tend to exist within the command structure and assist in military training, development, and
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strategic decision-making. Military support firms provide assistance with “logistics, intelligence,
technical support, supply, and transportation” (Singer 2008, 97). These firms do not participate
in core military or security functions. Instead, they offer secondary or peripheral services and
operate away from the front lines. Singer includes military support firms as members of the
PMSC industry because they perform tasks essential for military effectiveness that are typically
carried out by national military units.
Singer’s tip-of-the-spear typology has become the standard for classifying PMSCs.
Nevertheless, some scholars have pointed out weaknesses and offer improvements. Dunigan
argues that, “the tip-of-the-spear terminology is somewhat misleading in the context of modern
security companies” (Dunigan 2011, 13). Due to the prevalence of asymmetric warfare, modern
wars rarely have clear frontlines. In addition, tasks like training and strategic consulting usually
occur further from the frontlines than do many logistical services, such as troop transportation.
Another problem is that, as discussed above, many PMSCs offer a range of services that fall into
all three of Singer’s categories, making it difficult to place PMSCs into any one category.
Avant (2005) offers solutions to these problems. She resolves the issue of some PMSCs
occupying multiple categories on Singer’s spectrum by using contracts as her unit of analysis
rather than PMSCs themselves. As Dunigan states, “this allows the analyst to look at a certain
firm based on its activities in a certain situation, rather than generalizing about the firm based on
outdated notions of the services it provides” (Dunigan 2011, 14). Avant also returns to dividing
PMSCs into two distinct categories: those that provide external security, or military services; and
those that provide internal security, or police services. She then organizes both of these
categories around their own tip-of-the-spear typology. PMSCs that provide external security
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exist neatly along Singer’s tip-of-the-spear typology. PMSCs that offer internal security offer
services that range from “site security (armed and unarmed), crime prevention, and intelligence
gathering” (Avant 2005, 16). Armed security represents a core police function, while unarmed
security, crime prevention, and intelligence gathering represent more peripheral police functions.
In this study, I utilize Avant’s typology because it recognizes that PMSCs perform a wide
range of services that cannot all be placed in rigid dichotomous categories, while maintaining the
distinction between military corporations and security corporations. Also, focusing on PMSC
contracts instead of the PMSCs themselves allows me to focus on what PMSCs actually do in the
conflicts they are hired to participate in, rather on what they have done in the past or advertise
that they are capable doing. Moreover, the dataset I use, the Private Security Database (PSD),
distinguishes PMSCs based on categories very similar to Avant’s typology, making it the ideal
typology for my study.
Having discussed what makes PMSCs unique, I outline the relevant literature on my first
question: what factors influence whether states fighting civil conflicts work with PMSCs.
Why Hire PMSCs?
Since PMSCs perform a wide variety of tasks, there is no one reason that governments
hire them. The most well-known PMSCs are famous for their roles in violent conflicts, but
governments also hire PMSCs to help with reconstruction efforts after conflicts have ended.
Governments not experiencing violent conflicts hire PMSCs to help with security issues, such as
maritime security (Cusumano and Ruzza 2015), or preventing drug trafficking (Perret 2012).
There is also a great deal of variation in the types of governments that hire PMSCs. The largest
clients have been wealthy western democracies like the U.S. and U.K., but PMSCs have also
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played a large role working for governments that are often poor, unstable, and lack a history of
democratic rule (Branović 2011). In short, governments have different problems, interests,
capabilities, and face different normative constraints that all affect their abilities to solve
problems autonomously, meaning that different governments will have different reasons for
hiring PMSCs.
While most of the literature on when governments hire PMSCs tends to focus on specific
cases, Kruck (2014), Cusumano (2015), and Fahn and Hadjer (2015) outline the most prominent
explanations of why governments hire PMSCs, organizing these explanations into three
categories: functionalist explanations, post-instrumentalist explanations, and ideationist
explanations. These explanations are not mutually exclusive. Governments can hire PMSCs for
all three or just one of these reasons. However, depending on the client government’s
characteristics and the problems they face, it is likely that these explanations will have different
degrees of explanatory power in different situations.
Functionalist Explanations
According to Kruck, “a functionalist model of problem-driven privatization conceives of
the increasing use of PMSCs as a means for the effective and cost-efficient pursuit of states’
security goals” (Kruck 2014, 115). This explanation can be broken down into two parts: hiring
PMSCs reduces financial costs; and hiring PMSCs increases military effectiveness (Fahn and
Hadjer 2015, 222). These two sides of the functionalist explanation are often interrelated.
Reducing costs in one area can free up resources that can be used to increase military
effectiveness in other areas, and increasing military effectiveness can help reduce the amount of
resources spent on an issue. It is, however, important to recognize that hiring PMSCs can be
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more cost-effective than using national soldiers even if it they raise financial costs or reduce
military effectiveness, just so long as it has an offsetting positive effect on the other dimension.
One of the most prominent functionalist explanations for why governments hire PMSCs
is that they reduce the need to train and equip military units to handle highly technical and
specialized tasks. While unconventional war has always existed, during most of the twentieth
century, a principal means of warfare involved large national armies supported by artillery,
armor, and air cover designed to face-off until one side managed to overpower the other (Kaldor
2013). Since populous wealthy states were typically the only actors that could support such
armies, military power was concentrated in the hands of a few states. Yet advancements in
technology and the breakdown of the bi-polar Cold War system have made such armies less
effective. The primary security threats for most states after the Cold War do not come from the
national armies of other powerful states. Rather, “guerrillas, terrorists, members of private
militias—even malevolent computer hackers—seem to be displacing the formally trained, wellequipped, publicly funded soldier” (Mandelbaum 1998, 35). Conventional national armies are ill
suited for fighting these smaller yet numerous decentralized actors because they rarely present
themselves as targets on a battlefield. Instead, these actors make a point of avoiding direct
engagement with conventional armed forces, preferring to hide and operate in civilian areas or in
geographically isolated regions where conventional military units find it difficult to operate. For
these reasons, militaries have had to shift their focus from combating large-scale national armies
on the battlefield to combating a diverse set of smaller, decentralized, and often tech savvy
actors.
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The problem for governments is that, “under the complex-enhancing conditions of deep
and rapid technological changes in warfare, volatile security environments and asymmetric
violent conflicts, states—and more specifically their armies—do not always possess all the skills,
qualifications and expertise that would be necessary to effectively manage their security
problems” (Kruck 2014, 115). As the information revolution progresses weapons systems are
becoming more complex. Soldiers are using robots to deactivate landmines and improvised
explosives. Drone pilots need to coordinate with soldiers operating on different continents. In
order to utilize new technological advancements, today’s soldiers must be more tech savvy than
ever before. Moreover, as Singer notes, “most of the information systems used by the world’s
modern military forces are designed, developed, and managed by civilians, primarily for civilian
purposes, and make extensive use of the civilian information infrastructure” (Singer 2008, 62).
As such, modern militaries often cannot acquire the skills they need to utilize their weapons and
information systems without consulting with the civilians that design and maintain them. In
addition, with the shift from combating large national armies to smaller decentralized insurgent
groups in failed states, the mission of modern militaries has expanded. Instead of being able to
focus primarily on combating enemy armies on the battlefield, soldiers must now also utilize a
diverse set of counterinsurgency and peacekeeping techniques necessary for undermining
insurgents’ support networks (Cusumano 2014).
Together, these factors mean that the costs of maintaining militaries that are capable of
handling the latest security threats are increasing. The more technical and diverse the tasks that
soldiers need to be capable of performing, the more specialized training they must go through,
and the more specialized equipment they need. The reliance on complex civilian infrastructure
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also means that modern militaries often do not have personnel with the necessary expertise to
operate their weapons and information systems autonomously. This is problematic for cost
sensitive bureaucrats and politicians, who “balk at the expense of building up and continuously
sustaining a military resource base that would be sufficient for autonomously dealing with their
security problems” (Kruck 2014, 115). As stated by McFate, “the costs associated with
equipping, training, and sustaining these specialized military units are too great for all but the
wealthiest public armies” (McFate 2014, 48), and even wealthy governments face pressure to
reign in growing defense budgets.
Hiring PMSCs can help alleviate some of the costs of maintaining military preparedness.
PMSCs typically employ small groups of specialized personnel that can mobilize and arrive
where and when they are needed on relatively short notice. In April of 1995, Sierra Leone hired
Executive Outcomes to “support, train, and aid” national troops in combating Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) insurgents, and in less than a month Executive Outcomes had between 150
to 200 personnel in the country fully equipped with their own helicopter support (Avant 2005,
86-87). In this case, Sierra Leone’s government was able to acquire a highly trained and wellequipped military unit on short notice without having to pay for any of their training or
equipment themselves. The ability to hire well-trained and well-equipped combat units is
especially helpful for poorer governments like Sierra Leone’s, as they often lack the resources to
develop their own military capabilities autonomously. Hiring PMSCs also, “enables the armed
forces to free their own resources and to concentrate on core functions” (Fohn and Hadjer 2015,
222). According to McFate, “even though the number of PMSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan well
exceeded the number of regular military personnel, the vast majority of contractors in Iraq and
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other places are unarmed and provide nonlethal logistical support, such as construction,
maintenance, and administrative duties” (McFate 2014, 22). As modern militaries grow to rely
more and more on civilian information infrastructure, personnel from private firms “send
hundreds of employees into the field to act as trainers, repairmen, troubleshooters, programmers,
and hand holders to military personnel” (Singer 2008, 63). Outsourcing these technical tasks to
PMSCs frees up national militaries to focus on their core missions, which they usually define as
engaging enemy combatants.
Hiring PMSCs can also be more cost-effective than developing military units
autonomously because governments only need to pay PMSCs when they are on the job (Fahn
and Hadjer 2015, 222). National soldiers need to be trained, equipped, housed, fed, transported,
and given medical care throughout their entire time in the military. Once soldiers retire, most
militaries provide them with retirement packages, as well as various benefits such as education
stipends, money to start a business, or discounts on various forms of insurance. If a soldier dies
or is wounded, the military pays for medical treatment or funeral arrangements. Large segments
of national militaries’ bureaucracies need to be devoted to managing the payout of these benefits.
Moreover, governments need to pay for these expenses regardless of whether their soldiers go to
war or never leave their barracks. In contrast, PMSCs handle most of their own expenses. They
find their own qualified personnel, they acquire their own equipment, they handle their
personnel’s medical expenses and retirement benefits, and governments’ only need to pay them
if they are actually used. Once their task is complete or a government decides that it no longer
needs PMSCs, they can terminate their contracts. Thus, PMSCs are viewed as more costeffective than maintaining national armed forces because they can be hired and paid on an as-
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needed basis. In sum, “contracting with PMSCs enhances states’ capacity to respond quickly and
flexibly to complex security problems and bolsters their adaptability in the face of changing
challenges and technologies of warfare, while reducing economic costs” (Kruck, 2014, 116).
Political-Instrumentalist Explanation
Political-instrumentalist explanations for why governments hire PMSCs differ from
functionalist explanations in that they focus on political costs rather than financial costs (Minow
2004; Avant 2004; 2005; Avant and Sigelman 2010; Carmola 2010; Deitelhoff 2010). Military
operations deemed necessary by military leaders can be unpopular with legislators, the media,
special interest groups, or the public in general due to being viewed as too expensive, not
important enough to put lives at risk, or out of alignment with prevailing norms. Higher casualty
rates in particular have been found to undermine domestic support for military actions (Mueller
1973; Gartner and Segura 1998; Gartner 2008). Even in those situations when military operations
do have domestic support, actors outside the military hierarchy tend to want some level of
influence over how operations are conducted. This is especially true in liberal democracies,
where legislatures control military spending, citizens can vote out leaders who drag their country
through unpopular wars, and civil society actors can lobby leaders to act on specific issues. In
such situations, military leaders must often sacrifice their autonomy and alter how they carry out
their operations, or else risk losing the political support necessary to operate at all.
Hiring PMSCs instead of using national soldiers allows military leaders to carry out
military and security operations while avoiding some of these political costs. One reason for this
is that PMSCs are less transparent than national militaries (Avant 2004; Avant 2005; Avant and
Sigelman 2010). In democracies like the U.S., information on where troops are deployed, the
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number of troops deployed, and the number of troop casualties is publicly available. Information
on when troops are accused of committing crimes is available as well, as is information on the
amount of money spent on military operations. In contrast, there is much less information
available on the activities of PMSCs. According to Avant and Sigelman, “in many areas, the
government simply does not (or did not) collect data on contractors, so information about which
PMSC personnel are deployed, where, and in what ways is (or was) de facto not available”
(Avant and Sigelman 2010, 244). Of the information that is collected, much of it is not made
available to the public, because “by law, commercially sensitive information must be concealed
when government documents are released” (Avant and Sigelman 2010, 244).
The media also tends to ignore the activities of PMSCs compared to the activities of
national troops. Specifically, media outlets draw a great deal of attention to stories concerning
when national troops are deployed or killed, but they ignore similar stories about PMSCs. Avant
and Sigelman show this in their month-by-month study of the New York Times’ coverage of
PMSCs versus U.S. troops in Iraq from January 2003 to March 2007. They argue that, “the only
times when PMSC personnel amounted to more than a blip on the media’s radar screen were
when sensational events occurred that involved PMSC employees” (Avant and Sigelman 2010,
246). In contrast, the number of articles written on U.S. troops never fell below 250 a month.
They also tracked the coverage of PMSCs versus U.S. troops in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and
found similar results. Avant and Sigelman argue that these differences are not due to their being
fewer PMSC personnel than military personnel in Iraq, as the number of PMSC personnel in Iraq
has been nearly equal to the number of U.S. troops since such information began being recorded
in 2006. The number of death claims filed for PMSC personnel were also about one-third of U.S.
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military deaths, meaning that PMSC personnel were being killed at a rate that would warrant
media attention if casualty rates were the primary means of determining the importance of a
story.
In addition, several scholars have argued that citizens are less sensitive to private
contractor casualties, both because private contractor casualties receive less attention in the
media, and because the public simply cares less about private contractors (Brooks 2000a;
Stranger and Williams 2006). As Brooks puts it, when a soldier dies its front-page news
everywhere, but if a private contractor “is shot wearing blue jeans, it's page fifty-three of their
hometown newspaper” (Brooks 2000a). Stranger and Williams agree, stating that, “put simply, a
public concerned about U.S. casualties and American body-bag counts is less sensitive and less
attentive to these same issues when the victims are private contractors, not Americans in
uniform” (Stranger and Williams 2006, 10). Surveys conducted by Avant and Sigelman
contradict the idea that the general public cares less about the deaths of private contractors than
they do about the deaths of U.S. troops, but they did find that the public was generally less aware
when contractor casualties occurred. Schooner (2008) also found that private contractor
casualties go widely unreported in the media, supporting Avant and Sigelman’s findings from
their study of the New York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and suggesting that there is less
demand from the public for stories on contractor casualties. Thus, the lack of widely available
information on PMSCs and the possible apathetic attitude citizens take towards PMSC casualties
means that military leaders can avoid the political costs that normally come with carrying out
military operations by hiring PMSCs instead of using national troops.
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PMCS are also more difficult for government actors outside the military hierarchy to
control, not only because less information is available on their activities, but because PMSCs are
private actors that exist outside normal chains of command. For example, in the U.S., “Congress
approves the military budget, but it does not approve—or often know about—individual
decisions for contracts” (Avant and Sigelman 2010, 249). Congress is also in charge of
regulating the size of the military, restricting how soldiers can be deployed, structuring the chain
of command, and approving promotions. Yet these powers are difficult to apply to PMSCs who,
being private actors, do not need Congress’ approval to manage their personnel or redesign their
internal structure. More generally, “contracting avoids the need to mobilize state machinery and
centralizes influence with those in charge of dispersing funds to and overseeing the contractor”
(Avant 2005, 60). This effect tends to favor executives and military leaders, as opposed to
legislators or judicial actors, and is more prominent in weak or non-democratic states where
executives already hold a disproportionate amount of power. As such, hiring PMSCs allows
executives and military leaders to avoid veto points that they would normally have to overcome
were they to use national troops to carry out military operations.
PMSCs can also help executive and military leaders avoid political costs by taking on
illicit or unpopular tasks and keeping them out of the eye of the public. For example, private
contractors were present at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and participated in the human rights
abuses that occurred there (Minow 2004, 993). PMSC personnel were also part of the failed 2004
“Wonga Coup,” in which personnel from Executive Outcomes and the Steele Foundation
attempted to carry out a coup in Equatorial Guinea with the “tacit approval of both UK and US
administration officials” (Carmola 2010, 48). In 1997, U.K. government officials also worked
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closely with Sandline International to deliver 35 tons of AK-47 rifles to Sierra Leone in violation
of a UN resolution banning the shipment of weapons to the region (Kinsey 2006, 78). These
weapons were to be used in a counter-coup against Liberian President Charles Taylor, but the
operation was discovered before the coup occurred. Although these events were eventually
brought to the public’s attention, the fact that they occurred at all suggests that government and
military officials hire PMSCs to carry out illicit and unpopular tasks in order to keep some
distance from the tasks themselves. Thus, as stated by Kruck, “the privatization of security is a
genuinely political and instrumentalist strategy of governments in strong and democratic states
that serves to avoid politically costly parliamentary, civil society, and media scrutiny, opposition
and control in the area of security policies” (Kruck 2014, 117).
Ideationist Explanations
In contrast to functionalist or political-instrumentalist explanations of hiring PMSCs,
ideationist explanations do not emphasize the costs and benefits of this decision. These
explanations instead focus on the prevailing norms on the proper role of government and the core
mission of the military. According to Kruck, “from an ideationist’s perspective, conceptions of
what constitutes proper and normal modes of security governance are first and foremost shaped
by transnational and national norms and ideas defining the appropriate roles of state and nonstate (market) actors in fulfilling security functions” (Kruck 2014, 119). The strength of
neoliberal economic norms is argued to be particularly influential in determining how willing
governments are to outsource military and security services.
Neoliberalism first took root in the U.S. and U.K. during the 1980s. Margret Thatcher
was a strong believer in free enterprise and competition, believing that “state-owned enterprises
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were inefficient and politicized” (Dunigan 2011, 9). Under her leadership and that of her
successor John Major, the U.K. privatized dozens of industries, including the National Freight
Corporation, British Oil, the British water supply, Rolls Royce, the British Airports Authority,
and the electric industry (Reitan 2003). In the U.S., one of the central principles of Reaganomics
was that the country’s basic needs could best be met by private enterprise. Due to the economic
growth that followed the adoption of neoliberalism in the U.S. and U.K. and the collapse of the
Soviet Union, other developed countries as well as many in Latin America, East Asia, and
Eastern Europe adopted neoliberal economic policies. These norms legitimize the idea that
private actors are capable of carrying out many functions once thought to solely be the
responsibility of governments, including military and security tasks. According to Kruck, “the
transnational diffusion of neoliberal policy ideas has increasingly undermined normative biases
for the state provision of security governance—to the point that privatization of non-core
functions has become part of the transnational model of a lean armed force that are focused on
the ‘core tasks’ (Kruck 2014, 119).
Yet not all states have bought into the idea that military and security tasks should be
outsourced to private actors. Even the most powerful transnational norms must be filtered
through domestic norms and institutions, and many governments consider providing military and
security services to be their core function. There are, however, different national conceptions of
the relationship between states and private actors. According to Petersohn (2010), the crucial
domestic variable that determines how open governments are to privatizing military and security
services is their notion of sovereignty. He states that, “if sovereignty is defined minimally market
solutions are embraced and military activities are outsourced extensively” (Petersohn 2010, 531).
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States that hold a broader understanding of sovereignty are more reluctant to hand over military
and security tasks to private actors. Kruck makes a similar distinction. He contends that there are
two basic types of states: those built on laissez-faire liberalism conceptions of the state; and
those built on interventionist conceptions of the state:
“A conception of the state that is built on laissez-faire liberalism is skeptical about
the concentration of competencies and power resources with the federal state and
aims at a minimal state, which leaves as many tasks as possible to the individual
or the private sector. By contrast, an interventionist conception of the state has
less confidence in the steering capacities of the market and considers necessary
interventions of a state that is rich in competencies and resources. In the stateinterventionist conception, crucial governance functions affecting the common
good must be fulfilled by the state.” (Kruck 2014, 119)
Governments predominantly built on laissez-faire liberal conceptions of the state are more likely
to apply neoliberal economic norms to the provision of military and security tasks and privatize
many of the non-core functions, while governments predominantly built on state-interventionist
conceptions of the state will be less likely to privatize military and security tasks and maintain
control of non-core functions. Krahmann also argues that states built on a republican approach to
civil-military relations which “emphasize the responsibilities of an active citizenry,” like
Germany, have been less likely to outsource military tasks than those state built on a liberal
approach to civil-military relations which emphasizes “the rights and choices of the individual,”
like the U.S. and U.K. (Krahmann 2010, 27).
Differences in what national militaries consider to be important elements in their core
mission also affect how likely they are to hire PMSCs. Cusumano (2014) shows this in his
comparative study on military role conceptions in the U.S. and U.K. and how they affect these
governments proclivity to hire PMSCs. He notes that the U.S. and U.K. are both developed
democracies that underwent neoliberal reforms at the same time and have worked as partners in
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large-scale military conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the global fight against terrorism. As
such, their militaries have faced many of the same functional, political, and normative constraints
since the end of the Cold War. Yet, “although it systemically relied on PMSCs for the provision
of logistics, the UK military has largely refrained from outsourcing tasks extensively privatized
in the United States, such as armed security and military training” (Cusumano 2014, 220).
Cusumano argues that this difference is due to the U.S. and U.K. militaries having different
understandings of what their roles are. In the U.S., low intensity and law enforcement operations
are considered unconventional functions for the military, which avoids performing such tasks
whenever possible. As Cusumano explains:
“A focus on European continental militaries as organizational templates, the
experience of the civil war, the two World Wars and the prospect of a
confrontation with the Soviet bloc in the form of large-scale ground operations in
Europe shaped the organizational culture of the US Army around the performing
of high intensity, division-size operations.” (Cusumano 2015, 223)
The conception of the U.S.’s role is thus based on combat specialization. Tasks outside of
combat specialization are seen as peripheral, and therefore appropriate for privatization. In
contrast, the U.K.’s military has been required to meet a wider array of challenges over the
centuries as it worked to maintain the British Empire. Low-intensity tasks such as policing,
counterinsurgency, and administrative duties were often an interregnal part of the army’s
mission, making them core functions. Thus, the U.K. military has been more resistant to
outsourcing military and security tasks to PMSCs than the U.S. because historically it had a
wider role than the U.S. military. In sum, ideationist explanations for why governments hire
PMSCs draw attention to the importance of transnational and national norms on the proper role
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of governments, the proper relationship between government and markets, and what tasks
represent the core functions of national militaries.
Quantitative Evidence for Theories on Why States Hire PMSCs
Despite the attention PMSCs have received from scholars, there is relatively little
quantitative research on why governments hire them. The explanations outlined above are
largely based on anecdotes, case studies, or small-n comparative studies. Moreover, these studies
focus a great deal on the hiring practices of the U.S. and U.K., two developed democracies with a
liberal conception of the state that faced similar functional demands during and after the Cold
War. As such, while the explanations outlined above have empirical support, broader testing has
not been conducted on which explanations are more powerful and which are more applicable to
governments that are not the U.S. and U.K.
Branović (2011) presents data from the Private Security Database (PSD) that suggests
certain conditions influence when governments hire PMSCs, but as he admits, his article is
“strictly descriptive and does not aim at proving causal relations” (Branović 2011, 2). The PSD
contains annual data on thirty-two countries that experienced state failure for at least one year
between 1990 and 2007. It includes data on what year PMSCs were present in each country, who
hired them, and how many PMSCs performed specific types of tasks. Tasks are organized along
a spectrum similar to Singer’s tip-of-the-spear typology. Branović finds that the number of
PMSCs present in these states generally increased over the period studied, as did the number of
PMSCs hired by external clients rather than internal clients. He also found that PMSCs were
generally hired to perform non-core military and security functions, and that this trend increased
over the period studied. Governments with higher military budgets, those experiencing political
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instability, and those experiencing foreign military intervention were also more likely to see the
presence of PMSCs in their country. These findings provide useful information for building
theories as to why particular governments hire PMSCs, but since they are not based on any
theoretical framework, they do not answer that question.
The only Large-N study that tests a theory useful for answering when governments are
more likely to hire PMSCs is Chojnacki et al.’s (2009) study on mercenaries in civil wars.
Chojnacki et al. examine what factors contribute to a higher risk of mercenary involvement in
civil wars. Their data is based on “the New List of Wars by Chojnacki (2006), which builds on
the COW and Uppsala data but includes additional information” (Chojnacki 2009, 7). It contains
data on every internal and sub-state conflict that occurred between the years 1950 and 2000,
using a dichotomous indicator for whether the conflict did or did not experience the presence of
any kind of mercenary. Chojnacki et al. build their hypotheses on the principle of supply and
demand: “mercenaries will be fighting in a war if and only if some party to the conflict is willing
and able to pay a price for their service, and there are some potential mercenaries who, for this
price, are willing to fight” (Chojnacki et al. 2009, 2). Factors such as GDP, the presence of
natural resources, and military intervention are hypothesized to shape demand for mercenaries,
while factors such as troop numbers in national militaries are argued to shape the supply. Their
results confirm that mercenaries are more likely to participate in wars in countries with higher
GDPs, diamond mines, and those experiencing military interventions. The presence of oil wells
was not found to affect the probability of mercenary involvement, nor were downward trends in
national troop levels in the years preceding civil wars.
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Chojnacki et al.’s study has limitations. First, it does not distinguish between PMSCs and
more ad-hoc mercenary actors also active in the mid-twentieth century. Second, it only looks at
mercenary involvement in civil conflict, not at whether governments are doing the actual hiring.
However, the study does contribute to an understanding of when governments experiencing civil
conflicts are more likely to hire PMSCs. Its primary contribution is that it explains how the
theory of supply and demand can be useful for examining when governments hire PMSCs. When
demand is high and governments are capable of paying, PMSCs should be more likely to accept
contracts, and when supply is high, governments should be more likely to view PMSCs as a costeffective means for satisfying their security needs. Even though not all of the indicators used by
Chojnacki et al. were found to be statistically significant, that does not invalidate the overall
theory. Thus, Chojnacki et al.’s Large-N study provides explanations for when governments
experiencing civil conflicts are more likely to hire PMSCs in addition to the explanations that
rely more on small-n studies that looked at developed democracies like the U.S. and U.K.
My study will fill in the gaps in the existing literature on when states work with PMSCs
in several ways. First, I will test theories that are applicable to states experiencing civil conflicts,
instead of focusing on the hiring practices of a few developed democracies participating in a few
specific foreign wars. In doing so, my results will be useful for explaining why those states that
are least capable of limiting shirking when working with PMSCs sometimes do so anyway. I will
also focus specifically on when states hire PMSCs, not more ad hoc mercenary-like actors, since
these types of mercenaries cannot be assumed to have the same interests that PMSCs have in
abiding by rules set by states in order to protect long term profits. In doing so, I will be testing
theories specifically designed to explain PMSC involvement in civil conflicts, not mercenary
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involvement in general. My study will also distinguish PMSCs based on the type of services they
are hired to provide, instead of assuming that explanations for why states hire PMSCs are equally
applicable to all types of PMSCs. Lastly, I will perform my own case study on why the Nigerian
government hired the PMSC STTEP in 2015, in order to examine what this particular case
reveals about why states fighting civil conflicts hire PMSCs, as opposed to small-n studies that
focus on the hiring practices of stronger more secure states.
Having discussed the gaps in the existing literature related to why states hire PMSCs, I
move to outlining the relevant literature on my second question: when do PMSCs help states win
civil conflicts once they are hired.
PMSCs and Civil Conflict Outcomes
It is not clear whether the PMSCs that governments hire to defeat rebels and help resolve
civil conflicts actually contribute to ensuring these outcomes. Advocates argue that hiring
PMSCs is an efficient way for governments to quickly increase their military capabilities, defeat
insurgent groups, and reestablish stability within a territory (Brooks 2000a; 2000b; Lynch and
Walsh 2000; Shearer 2001; Wright and Brooke, 2007). Critics argue that since PMSCs are
ultimately profit-driven, they have incentives to work prolong conflicts in order to maximize
profits (Avant 2004; Avant 2005; Avant and Sigelman 2010; Francis 1999; Leadner 2005;
McCoy 2010; Minow 2004; Musah 2002; Valente and Medani 2012). Complicating matters
further, advocates and critics often look at the same conflicts and come to different conclusions
on whether PMSCs had a positive or negative effect. Disagreements such as these are typically
the result of advocates and critics having different standards for what it means for a conflict to be
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resolved, what PMSCs can be expected to achieve, and whether PMSC activities are compared to
the activities of other types of military and security actors.
The Advocates’ View: PMSCs Help Resolve Conflicts
Advocates of PMSCs focus on their potential to increase the effectiveness of government
troops, terminate conflicts quickly, and establish levels of stability necessary for post-war
reconstruction more efficiently than local and international troops. Brooks (2000a) argues that
through armed peace efforts or outright military victory, PMSCs can quickly end civil conflicts
and provide the post-conflict stability necessary for state building and democratic transition
“faster, better, and cheaper than the United Nations” (Brooks 2000a). In the case of Sierra Leone,
Executive Outcomes only charged $35 million for the 19 months it spent in the country, as
opposed to the $600 million the government paid to its own military during that time (Shearer
2001), or the $3 million the UN spent each day (Brooks 2000b). Executive Outcomes also
indisputably turned the tide of the conflict in Sierra Leone in the government’s favor, at least for
as long as it was present in the country.
PMSCs like Executive Outcomes are claimed to be so effective because they are capable
of quickly mobilizing specialized personnel and equipment to fit the needs of their client without
being weighed down by the “bureaucratic and sometimes partisan political concerns that hinder
decision-making processes of governments, militaries and international organization” (Wright
and Brooke, 2007). In addition, advocates claim that PMSCs “utilize highly trained personnel
who are veterans of the world’s finest militaries” whose quality is “bound to be much higher than
contributing states to a multinational mission” (Brooks 2000b, 4). PMSCs also face strong
incentives to be more efficient than public troops due the availability of other PMSCs willing to
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take their place (McFate 2014, 46). Indeed, advocates refute the claim that PMSCs are less loyal
than national soldiers by asserting that market forces provide sufficient incentive for PMSCs to
remain loyal (McCoy 2010).
Advocates also argue that PMSCs are more humane than some national troops. PMSCs
are corporations with an interest in maintaining their reputations (Coker 1999, 111), are profitdriven instead of ideological, and rarely have loyalties to specific ethnic or cultural groups in the
countries they operate in (Lynch and Walsh, 2000). For these reasons, PMSCs have few
incentives and several strong disincentives to commit human rights violations. In contrast,
national armed forces in most states experiencing civil conflicts suffer from “training
deficiencies, strategic inadequacies, and a poor understanding and regard for the rules of war and
human rights” (Books 2000a). Additionally, national military forces often have personal loyalties
to specific ethnic or cultural groups affected by the conflicts. For these reasons, national military
forces are often ill equipped to act as professional and effective soldiers in comparison to
PMSCs.
Perhaps the strongest argument advocates make is that it is unethical not to allow PMSCs
to help resolve civil conflicts considering how many people die while most of the international
community does nothing. Shearer asks, “if a private force, operating with international authority
and within international law, can protect civilians, how moral is it to deny people protection just
because states can’t or won’t find the forces to do it?” (Shearer 2001, 30). Indeed, one of the
reasons PMSCs first emerged was because powerful states with the capabilities to intervene in
civil conflicts in the developing world were no longer willing to do so. Thus, advocates ask
which course is better: to allow civil conflicts to drag on and let human rights abuses continue
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while those actors with the capabilities to end the violence do nothing, or to allow PMSCs to put
a stop to the violence for a comparatively small fee? While most advocates acknowledge that
enduring solutions to civil conflicts can only come from local actors, when it comes to options
for ending civil conflicts, advocates claim that PMSCs have the capabilities to “stop the killing
and provide the essential window of peace that will allow for reconciliation, and free and fair
self-determination” (Brooks 2000).
The Critics’ View: PMSCs Are Part of the Problem
Critics of PMSCs tend to focus on three related yet distinct arguments: that PMSCs
increase both the perceived and actual security needs of states; that they empower actors that can
challenge state authority; and that they undermine necessary processes of state building. Anna
Leander (2005) argues that, “the development of a market for force increases the availability and
perceived need for military services” (Leander 2005, 605). Being profit-driven, PMSCs create
demand for their services by portraying themselves as experts at identifying the changing
security needs of their clients. Once they identify new security needs, PMSCs offer their services
to fulfill those needs. In this way, PMSCs can create security issues where no security issues
used to exist. In addition, PMSCs are more difficult to monitor than public forces (Avant 2004;
Avant 2005; Avant and Sigelman 2010; Leadner 2005; McCoy 2010; Minow 2004). Combined
with the fact that PMSC clients are often weak states, being difficult to monitor makes it hard for
client states to tell whether PMSCs are actually addressing legitimate security concerns or are
working to prolong conflicts in order to increase their profits. Moreover, in addition to being
paid to help defeat rebels and establish order, PMSCs are often paid by partner corporations to
help secure their access to natural resources. Thus, given that PMSCs can find numerous ways to
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profit from conflicts, critics assert that PMSCs have incentives to underperform or even
purposely prolong conflicts in order to increase their profits.
Critics also claim that PMSCs perpetuate conflicts by increasing the military capabilities
of insurgents and other non-state actors. Prominent PMSCs insist that they only work for clients
with legitimate authority, but it is often difficult to determine who has legitimate authority in
civil conflicts, allowing for situations where PMSCs can be flexible with who they sell their
services to. Francis (1999), Musah (2002), and Valente and Medani (2012) look at Sierra Leone
to demonstrate this argument. Sandline International brokered the sale of 35 tons of AK-47
assault rifles, ammunition, and mortars to government loyalists after the coup in 1997. Prominent
members of Executive Outcomes remained in Sierra Leone to supply and fight with rebel forces
as well as to act as intermediaries between Liberian President Charles Taylor and the RUF.
Musah claims that PMSCs in Sierra Leone “often transferred deadly expertise in weapon
handling to unaccountable local militias,” such as the Kamajor militia who Executive Outcomes
worked with throughout the war. In working with so many actors, PMSCs perpetuated the war in
Sierra Leone by supplying military and security services to any group that could pay. Thus,
critics argue that PMSCs prolong and intensify civil conflicts by training and supplying actors
that would otherwise not be able to fight.
Another argument that critics make is that PMSCs divert resources away from public
militaries and interrupt necessary processes of state building. Leander argues that the presence of
PMSCs “diverts financial and human resources that might otherwise have gone into constructing
public security institutions into the private market” (Leander 2005, 616). PMSCs tend to offer
better pay to soldiers than their own governments, especially if the soldiers are highly qualified,
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and once military budgets have been reduced states face pressure to maintain low levels of
spending by continuing to outsource their security. Musah (2002) makes a similar claim, arguing
that international organizations like the World Bank and the IMF place a great deal of pressure
on states to reduce government spending in an attempt to foster economic growth. As a result,
states typically do not invest in a well-functioning security apparatus, preferring to buy security
from PMSCs or other private armed actors. The effectiveness of PMSCs also undermines the
status of the government’s military forces both in the eyes of the public and the international
community. Together, these factors make it difficult for states to develop the security institutions
necessary to function as modern states.
Quantitative Evidence for Whether PMSCs Help States Win Civil Wars
As is the case with theories on why governments hire PMSCs, theories on when PMSCs
help resolve civil conflicts tend to rely on anecdotes, case studies, and small-n comparative
studies. Scholars tend to focus on the role PMSCs played in conflicts in Sierra Leone, Angola,
and Croatia because those are the conflicts where the best case can be made that PMSCs helped
governments resolve civil conflicts. Only a few large-n studies examine the activities of PMSCs
in civil conflicts more broadly. Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2012) analyze the impact of
private military corporations (PMCs) on the duration of civil wars in Africa from 1990 to 2008.
They theorize that since they are profit-oriented entities, “prevailing opportunity structures in
conflicts will determine PMCs’ behavior in wars” (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012, 797).
They assert that, “if the environment in which a PMC operates allows it to profit from
prolonging the war without facing reputational consequences, we expect it to do so”
(Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012, 800). Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski hypothesize that if
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multiple PMCs are hired to end a conflict, each PMC will have greater incentives to help end the
conflict sooner because it is more difficult to underperform and still maintain a contract when
there are competitors able to take your place. Their findings support this argument. In the
absence of competition from other PMCs operating within a conflict, conflicts involving PMCs
tend to last longer. In addition, they also find evidence supporting the theory that when
governments compensate PMCs through contracts to extract natural resources, PMSCs end
conflicts more quickly. Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski presume that this is because extracting
natural resources is more expensive during periods of instability.
Petersohn (2014) tests the impact of mercenary involvement on civil war severity
between 1946 and 2002. He theorizes that since mercenaries are more difficult to hold
accountable than public troops and often have an interest in quashing violence that might
interfere with mining operations, conflicts characterized by the presence of mercenaries should
be more severe. The number of civilian or military casualties that result directly from hostilities
measures severity. His results show that mercenary involvement in civil conflicts correlates with
an average of 65 percent increase in the number of deaths. In addition, Petersohn finds that the
interaction between mercenaries and valued natural resources in the same conflict also increases
conflict severity. Controls such as military quality, rebel strength, and ethnic fragmentation were
not significant. In another article, Petersohn (2017) uses the Private Security Database to argue
that PMSCs increase military effectiveness, which he defines as “the ability of the client’s forces
to inflict damage upon the enemy and expand military operations” (Petersohn 2017, 4), which he
operationalizes as the total military and civilian casualties that result from direct hostilities.
Moreover, he theorizes that the extent to which PMSCs increase military effectiveness depends
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on the type of services they provide. His results indicate that the impact the presence of PMSCs
has on conflict severity depends on where the tasks they perform appear on the tip-of-the-spear
typology. PMSCs performing combat related tasks increase conflict severity the most, while
PMSCs providing logistical support may decrease conflict severity. PMSCs providing
operational support increase conflict severity, but less so than PMSCs engaged in actual combat.
In sum, while both advocates and critics of PMSCs have developed several arguments
regarding whether PMSCs help resolve or prolong civil conflicts, these arguments are largely
theoretical and rarely rest on any broad empirical evidence. Moreover, advocates and critics hold
PMSCs to different standards. Advocates tend to compare PMSCs with poorly trained local or
international troops, while critics compare PMSCs to national militaries in developed states.
Advocates and critics also emphasize different aspects of the same cases in order to push a
particular narrative. For example, advocates point to the case of Executive Outcomes in Sierra
Leone to show how an affordable PMSC helped push back RUF insurgents, while critics point to
the involvement of other PMSCs in Sierra Leone to show how they worked with both sides of
the conflict. While there are a small number of large-n studies that examine the affect PMSCs
have on conflict outcomes, only Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski look at how they affect conflict
duration, but their study is limited to conflicts in Africa. Petersohn finds that PMSCs can affect
conflict severity, but it is not clear if this increase in severity leads to a reduction in conflict
duration. Lastly, none of these studies examine whether PMSCs help states win civil conflicts.
While it is important to identify factors that affect civil war duration in general, shorter conflicts
are not a good thing from the perspective of states if conflicts end with rebel victory.
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My study will fill in the gaps in the existing literature on how PMSCs affect civil conflict
outcomes in several ways. First, I focus on state victory over rebels as my outcome of interest. It
makes sense to focus on this outcome because states have a clear interest in defeating rebels,
while they do not have a clear interest in reducing conflict duration or decreasing conflict
severity if doing so increases the risk of losing the conflict. As such, results that indicate that
PMSCs can affect whether states win civil conflicts under certain conditions have clear and
immediate policy implications. Using state victory as my outcome of interest also means that all
PMSCs in my study will be examined according to the same clear standard: did hiring PMSCs
under specific condition increase or decrease the risk of state victory? I do not focus on costeffectiveness, or on whether PMSCs perform better in comparison with other types of actors.
Having this narrow focus allows me to interpret my results without having to rely on the
narratives advocates and critics use to support their claims about PMSCs. My study also includes
states from five major continents, giving my study greater external validity than studies that
focus on single continents. Lastly, my study examines the unique effects different types of
PMSCs have on the risk of state victory, rather than assuming that all PMSCs can be expected to
have similar effects.
Conclusion
The existing literature on PMSCs offers a great deal of material useful for examining
when states experiencing civil conflicts hire PMSCs and when PMSCs help states win civil
conflicts. Recognizing that PMSCs are legal corporations allows researchers to assume that
PMSCs gravitate toward behavior that increases the probability of maintaining or increasing
long-term profits. Since PMSCs exist in multiple overlapping regulatory systems, researchers
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can also assume that they have strong incentives to abide by rules set by states, or at least appear
to abide by such rules. There are also several existing theories that help explain why
governments hire PMSCs, ranging from those that focus on costs-benefit calculations for
governments and PMSCs, to normative theories that emphasize the different conceptions
governments have of what tasks are appropriate for outsourcing. The debate between advocates
and critics of PMSCs also provides a great deal of qualitative material on when PMSCs have
helped governments resolve conflicts, and when they have hindered such efforts.
Yet, being highly qualitative, the existing literature does not test many of the most
prominent theories more broadly and may not be applicable in certain contexts. When it comes to
theories for why states hire PMSCs, a great deal of emphasis is placed on the hiring activities of
the U.S., U.K., and other developed democracies. This is problematic, as theories that emphasize
democratic institutions and neoliberal norms are difficult to apply to states experiencing civil
conflicts where such norms and institutions are less common. The same is true for theories that
emphasize the security needs of states that have the resources to meet their security needs on
their own. Strong states like the U.S. and U.K. can be selective with when they hire PMSCs
because they rarely face immediate existential threats that require a quick increase in their
military capabilities, and because they already have well-funded and well-equipped militaries on
stand-by. In contrast, states experiencing civil conflicts may not have the luxury of being able to
choose when to hire outside actors, because the security threats they face come in the form of
rebel groups operating within their borders. States that struggle with civil conflicts also tend to
have less need to rely on private actors for help operating technologically sophisticated weapons
systems, because they often don’t have technologically sophisticated weapons systems. Thus,
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existing theories on why states hire PMSCs may not be applicable for states fighting civil
conflicts.
When it comes to the debate over whether states should or should not work with PMSCs,
scholars often use different sets of indicators, or simply do not use indictors at all. Rather, they
tend to select cases where PMSCs have done something good or bad, and then push the narrative
that fits their argument. These studies fail to recognize that PMSCs may have the potential to
both resolve and prolong civil conflicts depending on other factors. The existing literature also
lacks both a broad theoretical framework and a common set of variables for studying how
PMSCs affect state’s security interests. Theories and variables tend to be contextual and not
based on more general theories that are applicable in a broad set of cases.
My study seeks to fill many of these gaps in the literature. I focus on testing specific
theories across a broad set of cases, making sure to differentiate PMSCs from other actors, and
recognizing that different PMSCs perform different types of tasks under different conditions. In
addition, I also closely examine the case of the Nigerian government hiring the PMSC STTEP in
2015, in which the hiring government is not a secure developed democracy, but a developing
state fighting a civil conflict. The set of cases I examine in my statistical analyses are also all
states experiencing civil conflicts, which existing theories were not developed to examine. The
theories I test relate to two outcomes: when states experiencing civil conflicts hire PMSCs, and
when PMSCs help states win civil conflicts. Having these clear and narrow testable outcomes
makes it easier to interpret my results while still addressing the broader issue of whether PMSCs
help or harm state interests. Lastly, addressing both why states experiencing civil conflicts hire
PMSCs and under what conditions PMSCs help states win civil conflicts in the same study
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provides more complete answers to these questions than studies that only examine one of these
questions. In the next chapter, I explain how principal-agent theory is useful for developing
hypotheses for why states hire PMSCs and when PMSCs help states win civil conflicts.

CHAPTER THREE
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
In the previous chapter, I discussed existing theories on why states work with PMSCs,
arguing that these theories were developed to explain military and security outsourcing by secure
developed democracies, not to explain why developing states work with PMSCs during civil
conflicts. I also argued that not enough research has been done to answer whether working with
PMSCs helps states win civil conflicts, or how the conditions under which PMSCs are hired
affect their performance. The literature on how PMSCs affect violent conflict is largely divided
between advocates, who focus on PMSCs’ potential to promote peace and stability better than
other types of actors, and critics, who point out ways in which PMSCs can and have made
conflicts worse. The problem with this debate is that both sides start with a biased view of
PMSCs, and then search for evidence to support that view. No one appears open to the idea that
PMSCs affect conflict outcomes differently under different conditions, meaning that no one has
tried developing and testing theories that can explain variance in conflict outcomes when PMSCs
are present. This is problematic, not only because answering whether and when PMSCs can help
states win civil conflicts is important on its own, but also because whether or not PMSCs can
increase the probability of states winning civil conflicts likely influences whether states continue
to hire them. As such, using and building upon insights from principal-agent theory, I develop
hypotheses on when states experiencing civil conflicts are most likely to work with PMSCs, and
when PMSCs can be expected to increase the probability that states win civil conflicts.
59
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First, it is important to note that other scholars have used principal-agent theory to
explain aspects of military and security outsourcing (Singer 2008, Avant 2005, McCoy 2010).
According to McCoy, the problem of PMSCs not delivering the outcomes desired by their client
state resembles the civil-military problematique, which she describes as “a particular application
of a more general arrangement known as the principal-agent problem” (McCoy 2010, 673). The
central challenge for states in the civil-military problematique is how to empower their military
to the extent that it can defend the state, while still ensuring that the military remains subordinate
(Feaver 1996; 2003). McCoy argues that military outsourcing increases this challenge, because
solutions to the traditional problematique focus on monitoring soldiers and building rigid
military hierarchies that reinforce professionalism and socialize soldiers to respect the rule of law
(Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Fever 1996; 2003). Since PMSCs are independent and profitoriented actors that exist outside national military hierarchies, these solutions are less applicable
to them. As such, PMSCs are known to present agency problems for client states.
Yet few scholars dig deeper into the principal-agent literature to determine what kinds of
factors might increase or minimize these agency problems. Principal-agent theory is merely
pointed to as an explanation for why PMSCs sometimes act against the interests of their clients.
This shallow utilization of the literature misses the fact that in many contexts, principals are
often satisfied with their agent’s performance, and so agency problems alone are not a sufficient
explanation for why PMSCs do not always satisfy their client state’s interests. Moreover, the
existing principal-agent literature explores what kinds of factors influence agents’ motivations
and opportunities to work against their principal’s interests, which has led to several theories that
can help explain when PMSCs are more or less likely to help client states win civil conflicts. As
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such, taking a closer look at the literature on principal-agent theory is useful when developing
theories on when states experiencing civil conflicts hire PMSCs, and what factors affect PMSC
performance during civil conflicts.
In the rest of this chapter, I first outline the main tenets of principal-agent theory. I then
develop hypotheses on when states experiencing civil conflicts are more likely to work with
PMSCs, and hypotheses on when PMSCs can be expected to help deliver victory to client states.
The Principal-Agent Problem
Economists first formally developed principal-agent theory in the 1970s (Ross 1973;
Mitnick 1973; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Spence and Zeckhauser 1978). Principal-agent
relationships arise between actors “when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as
representative for the other, designated as the principal, in a particular domain of decision
problems” (Ross 1973, 134). All contractual arrangements contain elements of agency (Perrow
1986, 224). Principal-agent theory assumes that both principals and agents are rational utility
maximizers, with principals seeking to control agents in order to ensure that they carry out their
tasks faithfully. In conventional models, principals face two problems that limit their ability to
control agents: goal conflicts with agents and information advantages held by agents. According
to Waterman and Meier (1998), “because there is goal conflict between principals and agents,
agents have incentives to shirk (or engage in non-sanctioned actions)” (Waterman and Meier
1998, 177). This is because, as rational-utility maximizers, agents care more about satisfying
their own interests than they do about satisfying their principal’s, meaning that they are
motivated to engage in activities that undermine with their principal’s interests when it furthers
their own. Shirking can take various forms, from working inefficiently, to ignoring a principal’s

62
commands, to directly working to undermine a principal’s interests. Yet even agents with goals
that closely align with those of their principal do not want to work harder or incur more risk than
they have to. As such, agents have incentives to use their knowledge and expertise to get away
with slacking off, as long as it does not undermine their own interests. Because principals lack
the expertise of their agents, or a detailed knowledge of their agent’s activities, they are often
incapable of detecting such shirking, and in this way, agents can use their information
advantages in order to satisfy their own interests in expending minimal effort and incurring
minimal risk at the expense of their principals.
Miller (2005) provides a list of the core assumptions contained within the formal
conventional principal-agent model. First, the agent must take some action that determines a
payoff for the principal. Second, the principal can observe the outcome of the action, but not the
action itself. In other words, principals do not understand precisely how agents produce the
outcomes that they do, giving agents information advantages. Third, the interests of the agent are
different from those of the principal. Interests do not necessarily have to conflict, but they do
have to be different. Fourth, principals and agents are rational actors with a transitive set of
preferences. Fifth, both principals and agents can predict the other’s behavior based on shared
knowledge of the other’s effort costs, the probability distribution of outcomes, and the other’s
rationality. Lastly, with knowledge of the agent’s preferences and rationality, principals offer
agents contracts that align as closely as possible with their own interests while still being
acceptable to the agent. Miller asserts that these assumptions lead to two outcomes: principals
offer agents performance-based incentives to overcome the problem of agent shirking, but even
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so, agents always engage in some shirking that limits the overall efficiency of the relationship for
principals.
In short, the classic principal-agent problem asserts that agents will always shirk to some
degree, either by not working as hard as they could, or by deliberately undermining their
principal’s interests when doing so advances their own. In the context of states working with
PMSCs to help win civil conflicts, states represent principals with an interest in defeating rebels,
and PMSCs represent agents with an interest in increasing profits. Because of these differing
interests, and because PMSCs perform specialized military and security tasks that client states
have limited knowledge of, PMSCs will always have some incentive to shirk their
responsibilities to client states, either by not working hard in order to minimize costs and risk, or
by deliberately making conflicts last longer in order to increase the payout they receive from the
conflict. If PMSCs never shirked, they would simply add to their client’s military capabilities
and help win the conflict. But since PMSCs can be relied on to shirk to some degree, whether or
not they help states win civil conflicts depends on how much they can shirk without detection.
Why Delegate?
A question that immediately arises when discussing agency problems is that, given the
incentives agents have to shirk, why do principals delegate at all? This question is especially
relevant for states experiencing civil conflicts, because if PMSCs can be expected to engage in
activities that delay victory over rebels, then there seems to be little reason to hire them. The
most common answer to this question is that some tasks are too costly or too difficult for
principals to perform autonomously (Sappington 1991, 45). In such cases, it can be more costeffective for a principal to pay the agency costs that come with delegating. Agency costs are the
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sum of the costs associated with monitoring an agent, providing an agent with incentives not to
shirk, and the residual costs of the shirking that the agent still manages to get away with (Jensen
and Meckling 1976). When the expected utility of delegating is less than the expected utility of
performing a task autonomously, it is rational for principals to delegate despite knowing that
agents will likely get away with some shirking. This is the functional explanation for delegating.
Rational principals seek the most efficient tradeoffs between the expected costs, risks, benefits,
and probability of successfully completing a task through various means, and sometimes
delegating to an agent is the most cost-effective option. In the contexts of states working with
PMSCs, sometimes hiring a PMSC to help defeat rebels is expected to be less costly and less
risky than trying to fight rebels alone, even if PMSCs have incentives not to work hard to deliver
victory.
It is important to note though that the factors principals weigh when deciding whether to
delegate are not always strictly economic. Principals might also delegate to protect themselves
from outcomes that might damage their public image (Hood 2002; Flinders and Buller 2006;
Bartling and Fischbacher 2012). This argument is especially applicable to political principals
who are accountable to other actors. When a politician needs a task completed that they know
will be unpopular with their constituents, they have incentives to delegate the authority and even
the decision to complete the task to an agent, thereby distancing themselves from the task and
any unpopular outcomes that might follow from it. This strategy is also useful for principals
engaged in illicit activity. When principals need to get something done that is illegal, delegating
can be an effective way to complete the task while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability.
This is one of the primary reasons why governments sponsor foreign insurgents or terrorist

65
organizations (Byman and Kreps 2010; Salehyan et al. 2011). When governments do not want to
risk engaging their rivals directly, supporting insurgent or terrorist organizations can be a way
for governments to hurt their rivals while maintaining a low risk of direct conflict.
Principals may also delegate in order to increase the probability that a task will be carried
out over the long-term (Moe 1989; Pollack 1997; Moravcsik 2000; Keefer and Savage 2001;
Hawkins et al. 2006). This logic applies well to political principals seeking to bring about longterm benefits to their constituents at the expense of short-term benefits. For example, if a
particular economic policy is expected to bring about long-term growth while hurting powerful
industries in the short-term, politicians have incentives to delegate responsibility for economic
policies to well insulated bureaucratic agencies that do not need to fear electoral backlash. The
U.S. government delegating the power to set interests rates to the Federal Reserve is one
example of this. Such delegation protects changes in interest rates from being sporadically
reversed by taking the authority over interest rates out of the hands of popularly elected officials.
Political principals who are aware that their tenure in office may not be guaranteed over the longterm may also delegate authority to agents who can continue carrying out policy objectives even
after the original political principal has lost power.
In sum, the general explanations for why principals delegate tasks to agents focus on
principals’ searching for efficient tradeoffs between political and economic costs of performing
tasks autonomously versus delegating to an agent, and the probability that a task will be
successfully carried out if it is handled autonomously versus if it is delegated to an agent. If
performing the task autonomously is expected to be costlier or riskier than delegating, or the
probability that a task will be successfully carried out is expected to be lower if it is handled
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autonomously, then the principal is more likely to delegate even though it knows that the agent
will get away with some shirking. In the context of states experiencing civil conflicts, states can
be expected to work with PMSCs when they calculate that the economic and political costs and
risks associated with delegating tasks to PMSCs are lower than the costs and risks of trying to
fight rebels on their own.
This logic leads to several hypotheses for when states experiencing civil conflicts can be
expected to work with PMSCs, several of which fit well with the existing theories on why
developed democracies sometimes work with PMSCs. First, more threatening rebels should
increase the likelihood that states will work with PMSCs. When rebels are weak, poorly
equipped, do not control territory, or are operating away from large population centers, states
should feel more secure and be less likely to calculate that it is worth paying the agency costs
associated with hiring PMSCs. When rebels are strong, well-armed, control territory, or are
operating close to large population centers, states should be more likely to calculate that it is
worth paying the agency costs that come with hiring PMSCs, lest they risk losing the conflict.
This leads to hypothesis H1.
H1: When states experiencing civil conflicts face more threatening rebels, they are more
likely to work with PMSCs.
Second, states with limited military resources should be more likely to work with
PMSCs. As discussed, delegating always comes with agency costs, and principals will only pay
these agency costs when they are expected to be lower than the costs of handling a task
autonomously. Thus, states that are better equipped to handle civil conflicts autonomously
should see fewer benefits from hiring PMSCs, while states with more limited military
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capabilities should be more likely see benefits from hiring PMSCs. This logic fits well with the
functionalist explanation for why states hire PMSCs, as discussed in the previous chapter,
leading to hypotheses H2.
H2: States experiencing civil conflicts with fewer military resources are more likely to
work with PMSCs.
Third, higher levels of risk that military leaders will be scrutinized and punished by
domestic actors for their conduct during civil conflicts should motivate states to work with
PMSCs. When domestic actors are motivated to punish state leaders, such as when civilian
casualties are high, or have more opportunities to punish states leaders, as in democracies, states
should be more likely to delegate tasks to PMSCs because doing so allows them to distance
themselves from negative outcomes that follow from their policies. By the same logic, when a
state’s conduct during a civil conflict is more easily observed, as it is when media groups operate
more freely in a country, it will have incentives to distance itself from the conflict by hiring
PMSCs to perform unpopular tasks. This logic fits well with the political-instrumentalist
explanation for why states hire PMSCs discussed in the previous chapter, leading to hypothesis
H3.
H3: States that face greater scrutiny from domestic actors for their conduct in civil
conflicts are more likely to work with PMSCs.
Lastly, if the idea that paying agency costs can be more cost-effective than handling tasks
autonomously is the fundamental reason why principals delegate to agents, then states that are
more inclined to view military and security outsourcing as efficient should be more likely to hire
PMSCs. This argument fits well with the ideationist explanations for why states hire PMSCs.
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States that are more influenced by neoliberal norms should be predisposed to expect greater
benefits from delegating military and security tasks to private actors. As I argued in the previous
chapter, states experiencing civil conflicts are unlikely to be committed to neoliberal norms, but
that does not mean that such states are not influenced by such norms or are not pressured to abide
by such norms from outside actors. Many states rely on foreign aid from western governments,
or borrow from the World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF). Such actors have a
history of pressuring states to adopt neoliberal reforms. This leads to hypothesis H4.
H4: States experiencing civil conflicts that receive aid from actors committed to
neoliberal norms are more likely to work with PMSCs.
Together, factors related to how threatening rebels are to states, the military capabilities
of states, the probability that domestic actors will scrutinize military leaders for their conduct
during conflicts, and the degree to which states rely on support from neoliberal actors should all
affect how likely states experiencing civil conflicts will hire PMSCs. These hypotheses follow
from existing principal-agent theory on why principals delegate tasks to agents, and fit well with
existing theories on when developed democracies work with PMSCs. These hypotheses are
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of Hypotheses One Through Four
When do states experiencing civil conflicts work with PMSCs?
Key Factor
Hypotheses
H1
The level of threat that rebels
When states experiencing civil conflicts face
present to states.
more threatening rebels, they are more likely to
work with PMSCs.
H2
The amount of military
States experiencing civil conflicts with fewer
resources available to states.
military resources are more likely to work with
PMSCs.
H3
The amount of scrutiny that
States that face greater scrutiny from domestic
military leaders receive from
actors for their conduct in civil conflicts are more
domestic actors.
likely to work with PMSCs.
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H4

The amount of aid that states
receive from neoliberal actors.

States experiencing civil conflicts that receive aid
from actors committed to neoliberal norms are
more likely to work with PMSCs.

Minimizing Shirking
The next issue that arises when discussing agency problems is how principals can
minimize agent shirking. Since shirking is the act of an agent undermining their principal’s
interests, how well states can minimize PMSC shirking ought to affect when working with
PMSCs helps advance their interest in winning the conflict. As discussed, there is always some
degree of inefficiency in every principal-agent relationship, but that does not mean that
principals cannot not try to minimize that inefficiency in order to maximize benefits. This is
especially true for states working with PMSCs. States may accept that PMSCs will pursue their
own interests, knowing that accepting this fact is better than fighting rebels alone, but that does
not mean that they will not use whatever means available to them to motivate PMSCs to work
hard to help deliver victory. Scholars who study principal-agent models argue that there are
numerous ways for principals to minimize agent shirking, but each method comes with its own
costs and requires certain capabilities. Whether principals utilize these methods depends on
whether they bring about efficient tradeoffs between the costs of agent shirking and the costs of
trying to minimize agent shirking, whether they lower the probability that the task will be
completed, and whether principals have that capabilities to utilize them at all. The methods focus
on reducing two factors that allow and give agents incentives to shirk: goal conflicts with
principals and information advantages over principals.
The most prominent strategy principals use to minimize shirking is to offer agents
performance-based incentives. This strategy emphasizes providing agents with incentives not to
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shirk, as opposed to monitoring agents to catch shirking. According to Sappington (1991), the
best way for a principal to ensure that agents work efficiently is to offer them franchise contracts.
In a franchise contract, agents pay for the right to work for the principal and receive as payment
a fixed percentage of whatever benefits they generate. Sappington uses the relationship between
a landowner and a tenant farmer to illustrate this contract. The tenant farmer pays for the right to
work land owned by the land owner, and in return he gets to keep a percentage of whatever
profits he generates. In such an arrangement, the tenant farmer has every incentive to work as
efficiently as possible because his profits are directly linked to his performance. In this way,
when principals can provide agents with performance-based incentives that tie the benefits
agents receive to their performance, agents have more incentive to work efficiently than they do
when their benefits are not tied to their performance.
However, performance-based incentives are not applicable in every situation. One reason
for this is that performance-based contracts are not desirable for risk-averse agents. Under
performance-based contracts, agents bear all the costs associated with random events that might
reduce production levels. For example, after paying a landowner for the right to work a piece of
land, a lack of rainfall might reduce production levels to the point that the tenant farmer cannot
make a profit. To solve this problem, risk-averse agents often demand that principals pay them
according to a fixed flat rate. But as noted by Shavell, “setting the fee equal to a constant would
leave him with no incentive to take effort” (1979, 56). If the tenant farmer knows that his profits
will be the same no matter his level of production, he has no reason to work efficiently. Thus,
when principals require agents to perform tasks where there is a high risk that costs could exceed
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profits, principals often have to offer contracts that provide agents with less incentive to work
efficiently in order to convince them to work at all.
Another problem with performance-based incentives is that an agent’s performance can
be hard to evaluate. This is especially true when desired outcomes are difficult to quantify
(Feaver 2003). Feaver offers the example of evaluating scholarly contributions to an academic
field, which is ultimately not something that can be directly measured. Another example is
evaluating an athlete’s commitment to staying in shape once signed to a contract. In such
situations, principals must rely on proxy measures, such as the number of publications or
conference presentations a scholar has, or the number of hours an athlete spends at the gym. Yet
once proxies are established, agents have incentives to maximize them rather than focus on the
true outcome desired by the principal. Academics who publish a lot and go to a lot of
conferences may not be making significant contributions to their field, and athletes that spend a
lot of hours at the gym may not be staying in shape, but because they maximize the indicators
that their principals use to evaluate their performance, their shirking is difficult to detect. This
problem can lower the efficiency of performance-based incentives because they only provide
incentives for agents to maximize proxies rather than the true outcomes desired by principals.
For these reasons, states experiencing civil conflicts are limited in their ability to use
performance-based incentives to make PMSCs work harder to deliver victory. There are a lot of
factors that affect conflict outcomes besides the level of effort put in by PMSCs, so PMSCs are
likely to be risk-averse and not accept performance-based payments. In addition, it is not clear
how a state would measure PMSC performance to determine payments in the first place.
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Regulatory principal-agent models, such as between bureaucratic agencies and their
political principals, rely more on monitoring agents than on offering performance-based
incentives (Mitnick 1980; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Waterman and Meier 1998). In
regulatory principal-agent models, while agents often desire larger budgets, they may also desire
greater political autonomy or greater control over policy. Agents may also possess objectives
opposed to those of newly elected or appointed political principals, who in turn may lack the
ability to dismiss bureaucratic agents in the same way that an employer can simply fire an
employee. In such cases, principals have less ability to structure incentives in ways that align the
agent’s interests with their own. As such, the literature on regulatory principal-agent models
focuses more on how principals can monitor their agents in order to reduce their information
advantages. Since bureaucratic agents have expertise advantages over politicians and have a
deeper knowledge of the organizational procedures necessary to implement policy, “they have
both the opportunity and the incentive to manipulate politicians and processes for political gain”
(Waterman and Meier 1998, 176). Minimizing the information advantages processed by
bureaucratic agents is the most direct way for political principals to minimize such shirking.
Since performance-based incentives are difficult to provide to PMSCs, states seeking to motivate
PMSCs to help delivery victory in civil conflicts have to rely on monitoring strategies.
Yet monitoring is not costless. According to Mitnick, “principals must pay specification
costs to identify acts of the agent that would satisfy the principal’s preferences, and policing
costs in monitoring and enforcing compliance” (Mitnick 1980, 150). Mitnick goes on to assert
that principals only pay policing costs if they expect a net return. Monitoring agents always
carries some costs, and a rational principal will not pay those costs if they exceed the expected
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costs of agent shirking. There are, however, different types of monitoring strategies, which offer
principals different tradeoffs between the costs and the effectiveness of monitoring. In their study
on Congressional oversight, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) identify two different types of
monitoring techniques: police patrol oversight and fire-alarm oversight. Police patrol oversight is
“comparatively centralized, active, and direct” (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, 166). It involves
the principal actively and closely examining the activities of its agent and punishing the agent
when it is caught shirking. In the context of Congressional oversight, examples of police patrol
oversight include reading bureaucratic documents, commissioning scientific studies, conducting
field observations, holding hearings, and directly questioning people affected by the agent’s
activities. In contrast, “fire-alarm oversight is less centralized and involves less active and direct
intervention than police patrol oversight” (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, 166). Fire-alarm
oversight involves the principal establishing a system of “rules, procedures, and informal
practices that enable individual citizens and organized interest groups to examine administrative
decisions (sometimes in prospect), to charge executive agencies with violating congressional
goals, and to seek remedies” (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, 166). In other words, fire-alarm
oversight relies on making it easy for third parties to make principals aware of agent shirking.
Both monitoring strategies have their strengths and weaknesses. Police-patrol oversight
allows principals to directly observe their agent’s activities and detect shirking before it becomes
too costly, but direct observation can be costly and may interfere with the agent’s work. Firealarm oversight is less costly because it relies on third-parties to call attention to agent shirking,
but it is less precise, gives up control of monitoring to outside actors, and only comes into effect
after an agent’s shirking has become severe enough that third-parties feel motivated to report it.
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Which strategy a principal chooses to emphasize depends on how much they can afford to spend
on monitoring, how costly agent shirking would be for the principal, and what actors and
institutions are in place to implement and facilitate monitoring strategies.
Another strategy for reducing agent shirking is delegating tasks to multiple agents and
forcing them to compete. There are several competition-based strategies that principals can use
to minimize agent shirking, all of which relate to reducing agents’ information advantages. One
strategy is for principals to link an agent’s benefits to reports from other agents on how
efficiently they predict they can work, working less with agents that make below average
predictions (Sappington 1991, 53). For example, when bargaining with a landowner, a tenant
farmer working in isolation has incentives to understate how productive he can be in order to
reduce the landowner’s expectations. In contrast, when a tenant farmer knows that the amount of
land they will be allowed to work will be reduced if their predicted level of production is lower
than the average predicted level of production, they will have incentives not to exaggerate about
conditions that might make them less productive. In this way, principals can play agents against
each other and get them to reveal exactly how efficient they can be. Principals can also reward
agents when they provide credible information on when other agents are shirking (Holmstrom
1982; Sappington 1991). This strategy makes it difficult for agents to collude and agree to
underreport their predicted levels of production, because as long as one agent determines that the
reward for tattling is greater than what they would earn through colluding with other agents,
collusion is not possible. The presence of multiple competing agents also allows principals to
compare the relative performance of their agents operating under similar conditions, again
reducing the information advantage an agent working in isolation would have over how
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productive it can be under normal conditions (Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983; Mookherjee 1984).
Thus, delegating tasks to multiple agents and tying their payments to their relative performance
motivates them to reveal how efficiently they can work under similar conditions, thereby
reducing the information advantages they have over principals.
The number of different principals agents work for at one time also affects how likely
they are to shirk, both because this number affects how well agents can align their activities with
the interests of any single principal, and because this number influences how well agents can
maintain their information advantages. McCubbins et al. (1987; 1989) explore this problem in
the context of bureaucratic agencies operating in the U.S. In the U.S., the President, both houses
of Congress, and any number of relevant bureaucrats all share responsibility to monitor and
sanction bureaucratic agencies. If any one of these principals benefit from an agency’s shirking,
it will block efforts to monitor and sanction that agency, allowing it to shirk uninhibited. Thus,
increasing the number of principals an agent answers to increases the likelihood that at least one
principal will protect the agent’s information advantage. In addition, agents working for multiple
principals are “forced to make compromises and trade-offs favoring some principals over others”
(Moe 1987, 482). When multiple principals exist, it is likely that the principals will have
different interests (Waterman and Meier 1998, 179). As a result, “no matter how well the
monitoring systems are designed or how well the principals structure incentives, one or perhaps
both principals will be dissatisfied with the relationship” (Waterman and Meier 1998, 179).
Lastly, when principals share the responsibility to monitor and sanction an agent, monitoring and
sanctioning can present collective action problems, since reduced shirking is a good that cannot
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be kept from the other principals. Thus, reducing the number of principals that agents answer to
reduces their ability and motivation to shirk against any single principal.
In sum, according to the conventional principal-agent literature, minimizing agent
shirking relies on two general strategies: structuring incentives in ways that tie agents’ benefits to
their performance, thereby reducing goal conflict between principals and agents; and reducing
information asymmetries between principals and agents through monitoring, promoting agent
competition, and reducing the number of principals agents answer to. When principals can
reduce goal conflict and information asymmetries between themselves and agents, agents will
have less incentive and less opportunity to shirk. As discussed, states are limited in their ability
to offer performance-based incentives to PMSCs, so I focus on monitoring, competition, and
reducing the number of principals PMSCs answer to when analyzing what makes them work
harder toward delivering victory.
Several factors might affect how well client states can monitor PMSCs. One is the state’s
ability to gather information from areas where PMSCs are operating. In order to utilize policepatrol oversight strategies that rely on direct forms of observation, governments need to be able
to send qualified personnel to where PMSCs work and communicate with these personnel
regarding what PMSCs are doing. This can be made more difficult when conflict zones are
located away from major population centers, terrain is rough and difficult to access, or if the
country does not have the infrastructure necessary to send information quickly across the
country. Under such conditions, governments will be less capable of collecting and processing
the information necessary to establish whether PMSCs are shirking. The same is true for firealarm oversight strategies. For third parties to alert client states to PMSC shirking, they must be
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able to access areas where PMSCs operate and send information back out. Without access to
conflict zones and the ability to send information from these zones back out, client governments
should find it much more difficult to monitor PMSC activity, making it easier for PMSCs to
maintain their information advantages and not work very hard to help delivery victory. This
leads to hypothesis H5.
H5: The easier it is to send information in and out of conflict zones, the less likely that
agent shirking will take place, and thus the more likely hiring PMSCs will help states
achieve victory.
There are also factors that affect the ability of client states to utilize fire-alarm oversight
specifically. Since fire-alarm oversight depends on third-parties reporting agent shirking, its
effectiveness depends on the presence of organized third-parties with an interest in reporting
agent shirking. Without such third-parties, there would be no one to pull the figurative alarm and
alert the principal to trouble. Thus, the ability of client governments to utilize fire-alarm
oversight to monitor PMSCs will depend on the presence of organized actors operating in or
around conflict zones with an interest in reporting on PMSC activities. Media organizations fit
this description very well. Media organizations have incentives to discover illicit behavior and
make it public, especially regarding issues that have piqued the world’s interest. As such, one
can expect that PMSCs operating in conflicts that occur in countries that are friendlier to the
press should be easier to monitor and less likely to shirk. This leads to hypothesis H6.
H6: The higher the level of press freedom in a country experiencing a civil conflict, the
more likely hiring PMSCs will help states achieve victory.
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The number of governments that PMSCs answer to should also influence their
performance. As discussed, when multiple principals have authority over an agent, the more
likely there are to be conflicts of interest between principals that inhibit their ability to monitor.
Moreover, when working for multiple principals, agents are more likely to need to shirk against
one principal to satisfy the interests of another principal. Different principals may also be
responsible for monitoring and offering incentives. In the context of states working with PMSCs
in civil conflicts, the government responsible for paying PMSCs may not be the same
government that monitors or consumes their services. In contrast, PMSCs that are only
answerable to a single government that pays, monitors, and consumes their services should be
both easier to monitor and have less incentive to shirk overall. This theory leads to hypothesis
H7.
H7: When PMSCs work for multiple states in the same civil conflict, the less likely hiring
PMSCs will help states achieve victory.
Advocates of PMSCs also claims that “by forcing PMCs into competition with one
another for states’ business, the market itself provides incentives for PMCs and their employees
to act as diligent agents of the state” (McCoy 2010, 675). Simply having multiple agents makes it
easier for principals to determine what level of efficiency they can realistically expect from
agents, providing agents with disincentives to try and get away with shirking. The presence of
multiple agents also provides PMSCs with incentives to tattle on each other in order to gain
rewards from the principal, reducing information asymmetries between governments and
PMSCs. Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2012) test this argument, finding that conflicts that
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include more PMSCs end sooner than those that include fewer PMSCs. This theory leads to
hypothesis H8.
H8: The more PMSCs that are operating in a conflict, the more likely PMSCs will help
states achieve victory.
State Capacity and the Principal-Agent Relationship
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, there is a significant difference between
relationships between states experiencing civil conflicts and their use of PMSCs and those
typically studied in the principal-agent literature. In conventional principal-agent relationships,
principals can typically punish agents that are caught shirking, either through their own means or
by calling upon a well-functioning state. In stable developed democracies, employers can legally
fire or demote underperforming employees, corporations can sue contractors for failing to uphold
contracts, and politicians can fire bureaucrats, cut their funding, or reduce their role in policymaking. In these cases, the dominance of the principal over the agent is assumed, and as such,
the idea that an agent would continue to get away with shirking at a high level even after being
caught is not considered. Yet in relationships between governments, militaries, and other security
providers, the dominance of the principal cannot be assumed, because there are dramatic
differences between the ability of civilian leaders to carry out acts of organized violence
compared with those of military and security providers.
Feaver (2003) notes this problem in his study of civil-military relations in the U.S. during
and after the Cold War, where he applies principal-agent theory to the civil-military
problematique. Feaver argues that, “managing the coercive power of the military—making sure
that those who govern do not become a tyranny to the governed—is the central focus of civil-
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military relations” (Feaver 2003, 4). On one hand, civilian leaders must provide their military
agents with sufficient capabilities and freedoms so that they can effectively protect civilians and
the government. On the other hand, civilian leaders must maintain control of their militaries in
order to ensure that they will not use their capabilities and freedoms to threaten the government.
Feaver’s solution to this problem incorporates insights from the principal-agent literature that
suggest harmonizing incentives and monitoring are both necessary to prevent military agents
from shirking. However, Feaver argues that an additional variable is also important for civilian
governments seeking to control military agents: “how agent’s behavior is a function of their
expectation that they will be punished if their failure to work is discovered” (Feaver 2003, 56).
An agent that does not believe that it is likely to be punished or does not believe that punishment
will be very severe, has less incentive to keep shirking at a low level where it is unlikely to be
detected. As such, Feaver argues that it is necessary for civilian leaders to make it clear to
military personnel that they will be punished if they are caught shirking.
Feaver’s contribution to principal-agent theory, that agents’ expectations of punishment
matter just as much as the principal’s ability to monitor and harmonize interests with agents, can
help explain why states experiencing civil conflicts often cannot control PMSCs. Considering
that such states cannot even maintain control of their own territory, most of them likely lack
sufficient capabilities to make PMSCs believe that they will be punished if they engage in
activities that delay government victory. Yet as Feaver notes, the military in the U.S., as well as
in other developed democracies, often faithfully carry out their orders and work to hide shirking
from political principals. Such behavior does not seem to make sense when political principals
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lack the material capabilities to threaten military personnel. If the military wants to shirk, there is
little that a democratic government can do to force them to accept punishment.
Feaver’s answer to this puzzle is that, in developed democracies, the military’s
expectation of punishment rests on a normative foundation. Military agents believe that they
have a moral obligation to follow orders from civilian leaders and accept punishment when it is
handed down. Feaver calls this normative foundation a “prerequisite for democratic civil-military
relations” (Feaver 2003, 90). Yet since PMSCs are independent corporations with no inherent
ties to national military hierarchies or civilian governments, the norm that military and security
personnel are duty bound to accept punishment from clients is likely to be weak, or missing
among PMSCs. As noted in the previous chapter, PMSCs are mercenary-like actors, meaning
that they are less motivated by a sense of cause or duty and more motivated by the pursuit of
profits. As such, the ability of states experiencing civil conflicts to punish PMSCs rest entirely
on their material capabilities. This leads to hypothesis H9.
H9: PMSCs are less likely to help weaker states win civil conflicts than they are stronger
states.
Together, factors related to the ease with which information can be sent in and out of
conflict zones, levels of press freedom, the number of states PMSCs work for, the number of
PMSCs working for the state, and the material capabilities of states should all affect whether
PMSCs help states win civil conflicts. These hypotheses are summarized below in Table 2.
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Table 2. Summary of Hypotheses Five Through Nine
When do PMSCs help states win civil conflicts?
Number Key Factor
Hypotheses
H5
Ease with which information is The easier it is to send information in and out of
sent in and out of conflict
conflict zones, the more likely hiring PMSCs will
zones.
help states achieve victory.
H6
Level of press freedom in a
The higher the level of press freedom in a
country.
country experiencing a civil conflict, the more
likely hiring PMSCs will help states achieve
victory.
H7
Number of states that PMSCs
When PMSCs work for multiple states in the
work for in the same countrysame civil conflict, the less likely hiring PMSCs
year.
will help states achieve victory.
H8
Number of PMSCs working for
The more PMSCs operating in a conflict, the
the state.
more likely hiring PMSCs will help states achieve
victory.
H9
The capabilities of states to
PMSCs are less likely to help weaker states win
punish PMSCs.
civil conflicts than they are stronger states.

Conclusion
In conclusion, since relationships between states and PMSCs resemble principal-agent
models, I argue that insights from the existing principal-agent literature reveal when states
experiencing civil conflicts hire PMSCs, and how states experiencing civil conflicts can increase
the likelihood that a PMSC will help deliver victory. Regarding the first question, I argue that
whether or not states hire PMSCs depends on whether they calculate that doing so carries fewer
costs and risks than trying to fight rebels alone. Regarding the second question, I argue that those
strategies applicable to conventional principal-agent relationships aimed at reducing goal conflict
and information asymmetries between client states and PMSCs should help reduce shirking by
PMSCs, making them work harder to bring their client state victory. In addition, based on
insights from Feaver’s analysis of the relationship between the U.S. government and military, I
argue that PMSCs should be more likely to help stronger states win civil conflicts than weaker
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states. In the following chapters, I will lay out my methodology for testing these hypotheses and
present my results.

CHAPTER FOUR
METHODS AND DATA FOR STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Having developed my hypotheses, I move to discussing how I will test them. Since I ask
two distinct questions, I need methodologies appropriate for each. I have argued that the
literature on PMSCs needs more quantitative studies to help develop general theories regarding
the causes and outcomes of states fighting civil conflicts working with PMSCs. To investigate
the conditions under which states experiencing civil conflicts work with PMSCs, I combine data
from the Private Security Database (Branović 2011a), the Non-State Actor Data v3.4
(Cunningham et al. 2013), and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Conflict Termination dataset
v2.2015 (Kreutz 2010) to develop a dataset on what years a set of thirty-one states worked with
PMSCs during civil conflicts from 1990 to 2007. With this dataset, I use logistic regression to
determine what indicators correlate with states working with PMSCs in general, with PMSCs
that perform military tasks, and PMSCs that perform police tasks. In order to investigate when
PMSCs help states win civil conflicts, I use the same primary sources for longitudinal data on the
duration and outcomes of civil conflict dyad-episodes. With this data. I run competing risks
hazard models to discover how working with PMSCs under various conditions affects the “risk”
that states will win civil conflicts. In this chapter, I discuss why I chose these methodologies, my
primary data sources, the structure of my two datasets, and how I operationalize my variables.
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Methodologies
Logistic Regression
I first explore the choice by states to employ PMSCs. The best method for testing under
what conditions states experiencing civil conflicts work with PMSCs is to use logistic regression.
Utilizing logistic regression requires me to have a dichotomous dependent variable, which is
appropriate, because I am not asking what factors determine how many PMSCs states work with,
but what factors cause states to make the initial decision to outsource military or security
services to private actors during a civil conflict. A state experiencing a civil conflict either does
outsource tasks to PMSCs in a given year, or it does not. I want to understand what factors affect
this choice.
Logistic regression is not, however, appropriate for answering my second question
regarding how PMSCs affect conflict outcomes. Nor is any form of linear regression. As
discussed, it is possible that working with PMSCs helps bring about victory for states
experiencing civil conflicts, but it may also be possible that PMSCs delay state victory,
depending on the conditions under which they operate. Regardless, the basic question I am
asking is how different factors affect the duration until state victory in civil conflicts. Data that
treats the duration until some event as the dependent variable, otherwise known as duration data,
does not lend itself to linear regression for several reasons.
One reason is the problem of censored data. According to Box-Steffensmeier and Jones,
“censoring occurs whenever an observation’s full event history is unobserved” (BoxSteffensmeier and Jones 2004, 16). The most common form of censoring is right-censoring, in
which the end of a process or event occurs after the observation period. Right-censored data are
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problematic for linear regression models because linear regression is not capable of
distinguishing between uncensored and right-censored cases. For example, if two conflicts began
in the fifteenth year of a twenty-year observation period, and one ended at the end of the
observation period, linear regression models would treat both conflicts as having lasted five
years. This is clearly a problem, because the conflict that had not finished may continue on for
any number of years. As such, any correlations drawn between a set of covariates and the
conflict duration times using linear regression would be misleading.
A similar problem to right-censoring is the issue of left-truncation, which occurs “when
history prior to the first observation point is unobserved” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004,
16). Using the same example study as above, if some conflicts began prior to the twenty-year
observation period, those cases would be left-truncated. As with right-censoring, linear
regression models are not capable of distinguishing left-truncated cases from those that started at
the beginning of the observation period. If two conflicts both ended in the fifth year of an
observation period, but one of those conflicts had been ongoing prior to the observation period,
linear regression would treat both conflicts as having lasted five years when one had clearly
lasted longer. Again, were one to use linear regression with such cases, correlations drawn
between covariates and conflict duration times would be misleading.
Another problem with applying linear regression to duration data is that it is not capable
of accounting for time-varying covariates. Time-varying covariates are variables that change
value overtime, such as state capacity, etc. My main explanatory variable, the presence of
PMSCs working for the state in a civil conflict, is time-varying, as are many of my explanatory
variables. Yet linear regression, “implicitly treats all covariates as if they are time-invariant”
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(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 19). As such, researchers attempting to study relationships
between time-varying covariates and duration times cannot use linear regression.
Survival Analysis
There are, however, statistical models that are capable of handling duration data. These
models fall within a set of methods widely known as survival analysis (Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones 2004). Survival analysis is applicable in any field concerned with questions related to the
timing of events. What factors determine when incumbents leave office? How long can
governing coalitions stay together? What can be done to bring about the end of violent conflicts?
These questions are not merely concerned with if certain events happen, but also when they
happen. The timing of events is the outcome of interest. As such, when utilizing survival models,
the dependent variable is the duration of time units spend in one state before transitioning into
another.
With data on how long subjects survive in a particular state during an observation period,
researchers are able to calculate several pieces of information (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones
2004, 12-3). The first are distribution and density functions, which tell researchers the
probability of an event of interest occurring at a given point in time during the observation
period. Next are survivor functions, which tell researchers the proportion of cases that survive
past any given point in time during the observation period. Lastly, researchers are able to
calculate hazard rates, which denote “the rate at which units fail (or durations end) by t given that
the unit had survived until t,” t representing any given point in time during the observation
period (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 14). According to Box-Steffensmeier and Jones,
“most analyses using duration data tend to model the hazard rate” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones
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1997, 1419), rather than distribution, density, or survivor functions. The reason for this is
because hazard rates denote the risk of something happening given that it hasn’t happened yet,
which provides information that is useful going forward. Someone studying how long
incumbents stay in office may have an academic interest in what percentage of incumbents make
it to a second or third term, but the more practical question is, given that a particular incumbent
has remained in office so far, what level of risk do they face in the next election? Hazard rates
are also conditional upon past events. Researchers don’t just want to know what level of risk
units face, but what factors can alter levels of risk.
Survival analysis is also capable of handling the problems of right-censored and lefttruncated data. While it is always better to know the full history of every unit in a study, rightcensored and left-truncated cases can still be used for constructing hazard rates (BoxSteffensmeier and Jones 2004, 17-18). According to Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, “uncensored
cases contribute information regarding failure times (as the event of interest is experienced),
while censored observations only contribute information on survival” (Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones 2004, 18). Knowing some of a unit’s survival time, even though you may not know its full
survival time, still reveals that the unit survived for a certain amount of time during the
observation period without experiencing the event of interest. For example, if two wars began in
the fifteenth year of a twenty-year observation period, but only one ended by the twentieth year,
the ongoing case still provides information on relationships between covariates and survival
times for a five-year period. The researcher may not know how covariates correlate with the
unit’s survival time past that five years, but for those five years the covariates correlated with the
event of interest not happening. In the same way, left-truncated cases have history prior to the
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observation period, but information can still be gathered on how long left-truncated units
survived during the observation period. Including the partial information from right-censored and
left-truncated cases is better than the alternative of omitting such cases from the analysis. Doing
so may “induce a form of case selection bias into the results” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones
2004, 19).
Survival analysis can also handle time-varying covariates. This is done by structuring the
data so that, instead of each subject receiving one row of data with one variable indicating its
survival time, subjects are given multiple rows of data, one for each period that a time-varying
covariate takes on a different value. This is called counting processes, or start stop data (BoxSteffensmeier and Jones 2004, 98). For example, if someone were conducting a study on how
endorsements affect the duration of presidential campaigns, each candidate would not simply
receive a single row in the dataset, because one row could not capture the changing number of
endorsements a candidate has over the course of the campaign. Instead, each candidate would
receive a row recording the amount of time between the beginning of their campaign and their
first endorsement. Then, a new row of data would be created, marking the amount of time until
the number of endorsements the candidate has changes, or the end of the campaign. This process
would repeat every time the number of endorsements a candidate has changes until the campaign
ends. Through this process, researchers can calculate how variation in time-varying covariates
affect hazard rates.
Using survival analysis to calculate hazard rates for when states win civil conflicts is the
best methodology available for me to test when PMSCs help states win civil conflicts. This
assertion is supported by the fact that survival analysis has been widely used to study how other
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factors affect civil conflict duration and outcomes, such as rebel strength and interests (Collier et
al. 2004; Buhaug et al. 2009; Cunningham et al. 2009; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012), state capacity
and regime type (De Rouen Jr and Sobek 2004; Cunningham et al. 2009), third-party aid and
intervention (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; 2008; Cunningham 2006; 2010), war fighting
tactics (Balcells and Kalyvas 2014), and geography (Rustad et al. 2008; Buhaug et al. 2005;
Buhaug et al. 2009). Thus, because it is capable of handling duration data and is already widely
used in the conflict resolution literature, I use survival analysis to investigate when PMSCs
increase or decrease the risk that states win civil conflicts, given that they have not yet achieved
victory.
Competing Risks
Yet state victory is an outcome for civil conflicts that is by no means guaranteed. In the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Conflict Termination Dataset (UCDP), civil conflicts can be
coded as ending because of a ceasefire, a negotiated settlement, a government victory, a rebel
victory, low activity (annual casualties fall under 25) or one of the conflicting parties transforms
into a different actor by breaking apart or combining with another group (Kreutz 2010). Event
history processes where multiple types of events can occur to end a process are said to have
“competing risks problems” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Standard survival analysis
models are not capable of handling competing risks problems, because they merely reveal what
factors affect when processes end, not what factors affect when processes end in a particular
way.
In this study, I use the latent survivor time approach to competing risks. This model
assumes that there is a potential transition time for each type of possible outcome a subject can
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experience, but only the shortest transition event is observed. In other words, “the remaining
failure times are latent, but are assumed to exist” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 168).
Although individual civil conflicts only experience one type of ending, the latent survivor time
approach assumes that all types of endings would eventually occur on a long enough timeline.
When testing what factors affect the timing of specific types of outcomes, “the overall survivor
function can be partitioned into marginal survivor functions,” each corresponding to one of the
possible outcomes (Box-Steffensmeier Jones 2004, 168). If a case does not experience the type
of outcome being studied, it is treated as being right-censored. This method allows me to
investigate whether PMSCs affect the risk of state victory in civil conflicts without removing
those conflicts that did not end in state victory from my analysis. In addition, it allows me to
identify covariates that might affect the timing of different types of civil conflict outcomes in
different ways. For example, it is plausible that when rebels have access to foreign aid, they will
feel more confident meeting government forces in battle, increasing the risk that the conflict will
end in a military victory for one side, while decreasing the risk that the conflict will drag on until
a negotiated settlement is reached. For these reasons, the latent survivor time model is well
suited for examining whether PMSCs hasten or delay state victory in civil conflicts under
different conditions.
Primary Data Sources
My two datasets are constructed with data taken from three primary sources: The Private
Security Database (PSD); the Non-State Actor Data version 3.4 (NSA); and the Uppsala Conflict
Data Program’s Conflict Termination Dataset (UCDP). Since these sources form the foundation
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of the two datasets, I devote this next section to outlining how they were constructed and why
they are reliable sources of data useful for answering my two questions.
Private Security Database
The PSD serves as my source for data on the activities of PMSCs working for states
experiencing civil conflicts. According to its manual, the PSD “collects data on the use of Private
Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) by public actors (governments and international
organizations) in failing or collapsed states, and asks in general who consumed what kind of
private security” (Branović 2011b, 1). The set of thirty-two states included in the PSD are all
states that experienced periods of state failure or collapse in at least one year between the years
1990 and 2007. These states were identified by relying on three indicators from the Political
Instability Task Force (PITF) database: MAGAREA; MAGFAIL; and MAGVOIL (Marshall et
al. 2009). MAGAREA indicates the percentage of a state’s territory that is affected by war.
MAGVOIL indicates the degree of control states have over political institutions in disputed
areas. MAGVOIL indicates the degree to which non-state actors use violence to challenge state
authority. The PSD is composed of those thirty-two states that achieved the highest score in at
least one of these three indicators in at least one year, and observes all of these states for the
entire eighteen-year period between 1990 and 2007. A complete list of these states is contained
in Table 3. None of these states are included in the PSD because they hired PMSCs, but because
they can fairly be said to have experienced state failure or collapse in at least one year between
1990 and 2007.
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Table 3. States in the Private Security Database
Afghanistan

Croatia

Nigeria

Albania

Ethiopia

Peru

Algeria

Georgia

Philippines

Angola

Guatemala

Rwanda

Azerbaijan

Guinea-Bissau

Sierra Leone

Bosnia

Iraq

Somalia

Burundi

Côte d’Ivoire

Sudan

Cambodia

Lebanon

Tajikistan

Colombia

Liberia

Uganda

Congo-Brazzaville

Mozambique

Yugoslavia (Serbia+Kosovo)

Congo-Kinshasa

Nepal

These states are a suitable sample of states for which to test my hypotheses because all
but one of them experienced a civil conflict between 1990 and 2007. According to the UCDP,
Albania did not undergo any civil conflicts during this period, and for this reason I do not include
it in my analysis, as I am focused on states’ relationships with PMSCs during civil conflicts.
Moreover, these states come from all five major continents and have diverse cultural and
historical backgrounds, which helps prevent selection bias, controls for factors not included in
my datasets, and supports the external validity of my study.
The PSD defines PMSCs as “private business entities that deliver to consumers a wide
spectrum of military and security services” (Branović 2011b, 3). To be recorded as a PMSC in
the PSD, an entity must be commercial, benefit-oriented companies, that fit the following
criteria: (1) market-oriented logic of action (economic; business-management); (2) high degree
of professionalization (official headquarter, business structure, trained military staff); (3)
organized under private law; (4) legally registered; (5) contracted to perform a task related to the

94
process of implementing internal and/or external security policy goals by states and/or IOs; (6)
contracted to perform a task equivalent to tasks usually provided by military or policing
organizations. These criteria fit well with the criteria for PMSCs I developed in Chapter Two.
The creators of the PSD used a multi-step data collection strategy to gather information
on PMSC activity in their sample of states. First, well-known reports and case studies offered by
the literature on PMSCs were cross-checked against multiple sources before being included in
the dataset. Second, LexisNexis was used to search all available English news sources, including
major international newspapers like the New York Times, the Washington Post, The Guardian,
The Times (London), Newsweek, The Financial Times, The Economist, and Time magazine, for
stories about PMSCs in the states of interest. Specific terms and phrases were used to perform
these searches, including military contractors, security contractors, military firm, security firm,
military company, security company, military agency, security agency, military outsourcing,
defense outsourcing, and mercenary. All of these terms were searched in conjunction with the
word private and the name of the state of interest. Third, the data were supplemented by
information from news services (Alertnet, IrinNews, CrisisWatch database, Human Security
Gateway, BBC Monitoring), and regional internet gateways (AllAfrica.com, Africa Confidential,
Reliefweb).
This data collection strategy is not perfect. PMSCs are notoriously clandestine entities
that are not eager to share many of the details about their activities with the public. Governments
also tend to avoid disclosing information about working with PMSCs. Indeed, as I’ve noted in
the previous chapter, one of the reasons governments may like working with PMSCs is because
they have a low profile and can perform secret or illicit tasks without drawing too much attention
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to themselves or their clients. As such, a data collection strategy that relies on public records and
media reporting to keep track of the presence and activities of PMSCs in civil conflicts “cannot
account for contractual relationships that were kept secret and were not reported to the public”
(Branović 2011b, 1). However, I believe that the PSD still offers reliable data on PMSC
activities in states experiencing civil conflicts. First, as state struggling with political instability
and civil conflict, it is not likely that the states in the PSD were in the position to prioritize
secrecy over expediency. If a state is in a position where they need to sacrifice autonomy over
their national security to private actors, there is likely a limit to how much effort they can put
into keeping PMSCs activities secret, especially if such efforts have the potential to limit military
effectiveness during a war. Second, PMSCs have an interest in demonstrating to outside actors
that they are capable of handling the tasks given to them by their clients. While PMSCs may not
always want to disclose information about the details of the tasks they perform, they do have an
interest in letting the world know that they are active. Third, PMSCs that escape detection by
outside actors are unlikely to be those that have a strong impact on the conflict. If a state
suddenly starts winning battles, demonstrates improvements in military effectiveness, or
inexplicably starts using new weapons and tactics, outside actors will likely take notice and
search for explanations. Thus, the bigger the impact PMSCs have in a conflict, the more likely
they will not be able to keep their activities secret. Fourth, as discussed as in Chapter Two,
PMSCs operate in a highly regulated industry where their activities are monitored by multiple
states and international organizations. As such, while the particulars of what PMSCs do in a civil
conflict may not always be evident, their presence and basic mission is likely to eventually
become public knowledge due to the number of actors committed to keeping track of them. For
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these reasons, I agree with Branović that the PSD “can be used for representative analysis of the
main trends and patterns of private security consumption by public actors in failing or collapsed
states” (Branović 2011b, 1).
In addition to the country-year PMSCs operate in, the PSD contains additional indicators
useful for testing my hypotheses. First, the PSD measures the type of tasks PMSCs perform
using a 12-point scale, which “can be used in analogy to the tip of the spear logic, as well as a
scale of organic core functions of military and policing organizations” (Branović 2011b, 5). A
complete list of these tasks is contained in Table 4 (Branović 2011b, 6). As I will discuss in more
detail later in this chapter, separating tasks in this way allows me to group PMSCs according to
whether they perform military, police, or peripheral tasks. The PSD also distinguishes between
PMSCs whose services are directly consumed by their client, and PMSCs that perform tasks for
a third-party on behalf of their client. The client is the government or international organization
that pays the PMSC for its services, but the client doesn’t necessarily directly consume these
services. For example, if the U.S. government hired a PMSC to help train an Afghani police unit,
the PMSC would be performing the task for a third-party (the Afghan government) on behalf of
their client (the U.S. government). The PSD makes sure to distinguish between these two types
of relationships. Lastly, the PSD indicates how many PMSCs performed each type of task in
each county-year. It does not, however, directly indicate how many PMSCs were working in a
country-year overall. For example, if the PSD indicates that one PMSC was present in a countryyear performing task 1, and one PMSC was in the same country-year performing task 2, it is
possible that one PMSC was in the country-year performing two tasks, or two PMSCs were in
the country-year performing one task each. I was able to get around this problem through gaining
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access to company identification. The PSD user manual advises that, “due to legal issues the
company names are not made public,” and that “researchers that want to differentiate the data by
companies are asked to contact the project investigators” (Branović 2011b, 7). I did so, and was
generously given the names of the companies working on each task in each country-year in the
PSD, allowing me to count how many PMSCs were present in each country-year overall.
Table 4. PMSC Tasks in the Private Security Database
Scale Task
1
Combat and military operations
2

Military assistance

3

Operational support

4

Logistics support

5

Intelligence

6

Quasi-police tasks (prevention) and
border patrol

7

Security/protection (individuals
and facilities)

8

Police advice and training

9

Demining

10

Humanitarian aid

11

Weapons disposal/destruction

12

Facility and infrastructural build-up

Description
Armed private actors are directly involved in military
operations and fighting
Private actors provide military training and consulting
(e.g. tactics) to parties
Private actors operate and/or maintain combat-related
goods (e.g. weaponry, satellites) and/or fulfill certain
functions in the command and control chain
Transportation of soldiers and/or combat-related
goods
Private actors provide risk assessments,
reconnaissance or translation services and/or are part
of interrogations
Private actors provide services that would usually be
ascribed to the police, including the safety of public
places and/or protection of state and local borders
Private actors provide (mobile) security for
individuals and/or facilities; this task refers to
protective services details
Similar to military assistance, private actors provide
training and/or consulting to police forces
Military and humanitarian demining for the
destruction and removal of land and/or naval mines
Private actors provide armed material or logistical
services for humanitarian purposes, such as
transportation of food in crisis zones
Deinstallation, destruction and disposal of warfare
related goods and facilities
Private actors construct and build military
infrastructure such as military bases
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In sum, the PSD provides reliable data on a set of thirty-one states that experienced civil
conflict between the years 1990 and 2007 regarding how many PMSCs were in each countryyear, who they were working for, who consumed their services, and what type of tasks they
performed. As such, the PSD provides data necessary for me to test all my hypotheses regarding
under what conditions states experiencing civil conflicts decide to work with PMSCs, and when
PMSCs help such states win civil conflicts.
The Non-State Actor Dataset and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
I use the Non-State Actor Data version 3.4 (NSA), updated with data from the UCDP
Conflict Termination dataset v2.2015 (UCDP), as my primary sources for what years the states
in the PSD were fighting civil conflicts, how the conflicts ended (if they ended by 2007), and
what specific civil conflict-dyads were ongoing in each country-year. The NSA provides data on
rebel groups that aren’t present in the UCDP, making it useful for testing my hypothesis that
states fighting civil conflicts are more likely to work with PMSCs when they are fighting more
threatening rebel groups. The NSA also provides several useful control variables related to rebel
group characteristics. Indeed, the reason the NSA was developed was to provide data on the
military capabilities and political opportunities available to non-state actors in civil conflicts.
According to Cunningham et al., “while previous studies have examined primarily the
characteristics of governments or country-level economic and demographic factors, the NSA
data allow scholars to incorporate critical information on the opposition side as well”
(Cunningham et al. 2013, 517). Indicators for rebel strength, territorial control, organizational
structure, and external support are all included in the NSA. In addition, the NSA disaggregates
civil conflicts into civil conflict-dyads. Civil conflict-dyads are composed of a single state and a
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single rebel group fighting the state, while a civil conflict in general may be composed of
multiple rebel groups all fighting a state together. Disaggregating civil conflicts into civil
conflict-dyads is useful for me because it allows me to detect when working with PMSCs might
end some conflict-dyads, even if the entire civil conflict does not end. This is a more precise way
to measure what effects PMSCs have on civil conflict outcomes. If a state hires PMSCs while
fighting three rebel groups, and shortly after two of these groups are defeated while the civil
conflict as a whole continues on with the third group, this still offers evidence that working with
the PMSCs helped the state achieve victory in two cases.
However, the NSA does not always agree with the UCDP regarding when particular
conflicts start, or how and when they end. For example, the NSA codes a conflict between
Algeria and the rebel group Takfir wa'l Hijra as starting in 1990, while the UCDP codes the
conflict as starting in 1991. In another example, the UCDP codes a conflict between Sudan and
SLM/A as terminating in 2006, while the NSA codes it as terminating in 2007. The reasons for
the discrepancies are not always clear. According to Cunningham et al., “the NSA data is coded
to line up with the 2012 version of the UCDP Dyadic Dataset” (Cunningham et al. 2013, 520).
However, when one reads the NSA casebook closely, it seems that a number of judgment calls
had to be made regarding details related to the duration of certain conflict-dyads. One clear
difference between the two datasets is that the NSA only codes a conflict as terminating due to
low activity if annual casualty rates fall below 25 for two years in a row, whereas in the UCDP it
is only one year. Whenever there are discrepancies, I defer to the UCDP since it is the most up to
date dataset and is much more widely used than the NSA in the civil war literature.
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Why Do States Hire PMSCs During Civil Conflicts? Data and Indicators
Now that I have discussed the primary sources for my two datasets, I move to discussing
how I structure the data and what indicators I use to test my hypotheses. I start with the dataset
testing the conditions under which states experiencing civil conflicts work with PMSCs. The unit
of analysis in this dataset is the conflict-year. Each row of data represents one year in which one
of the thirty-one states taken from the PSD engaged in a civil conflict between the years 1990
and 2007, for a total of 286 unique conflict-years. Each of these represents a conflict-year in
which states choose whether or not to work with PMSCs.
Dependent Variables:
As discussed in the methods section of this chapter, the dependent variable used to
examine my first question is dichotomous. A state either outsources military and/or security
services to PMSCs in a particular conflict-year, or it does not. However, there are still multiple
ways for me to measure whether outsourcing occurs. The most straightforward method is to
create a dichotomous indicator based on data from the PSD which indicates if a state pays for
and consumes the services of any number of PMSCs in a conflict-year. I do exactly this using an
indicator I designed called PMSC_Hired, which is coded with a 1 if a state hires a PMSC to
perform military (Tasks1-4) or police (Tasks 5-8) tasks, and a 0 otherwise. Since there are so few
PMSCs that perform periphery tasks in my dataset (Tasks 9-12), I do not include them in my
analysis.
A drawback of PMSC_Hired, however, is that it treats military and security outsourcing
as the same. A state that hires a PMSC to perform combat and military operations is treated the
same as a state that hires a PMSC to assist with base security. Yet participating in combat
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operations and assisting with base security clearly very different types of tasks. Therefore, I also
create two dichotomous indicators for whether states hire PMSCs to perform military tasks and
police tasks, based on Avant’s two “tip-of-the-spear” scales (Avant 2005). If a state works with
PMSCs to perform tasks 1 through 4, those being combat and military operations, military
assistance, operational support, or logistics support, I code a 1 for the variable Military_Hired
and a 0 otherwise. These four types of tasks can be fairly characterized as core military tasks
related to combat operations, and align with Avant’s characterization of military tasks. If a state
works with PMSCs to perform tasks 5 through 8, those being intelligence work, quasi-police
tasks, security/protection, and police advice and training, I code a 1 for the variable Police_Hired
and a 0 otherwise. These types of tasks can be fairly characterized as police style tasks, and align
with Avant’s characterization of police tasks. In utilizing these two indicators as dependent
variables, I am able to differentiate what conditions lead to different types of military or security
outsourcing, and in particular, identify what conditions correlate with state outsourcing core
military functions, which offer the greatest risks and rewards for states fighting civil conflicts.
Hypotheses 1:
My first hypotheses, H1, is that states experiencing civil conflicts face more threatening
rebels should be more likely to work with PMSCs. As such, I need indicators that measure how
threatening rebel groups are to the states they are fighting. The first indicator I use is a modified
version of an indicator from the NSA called Rebstrength, which is an ordinal measure that
indicates whether the rebel group in a particular dyad-year is much weaker, weaker, at parity,
stronger, or much stronger than the government. The relative strength of rebel groups was
determined using information from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, as well as “Keesing’s
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Record of World Events, news reports found through searches in Lexis-Nexis academic, and
secondary academic sources about individual conflicts and countries to code this information”
(Cunningham et al. 2009, 521). I modify Rebstrength into dichotomous indicator called
Reb_Strong, coding a 1 if there is at least one rebel group that is stronger or much stronger than
the government in a particular conflict-year, and a 0 if otherwise. I use an indicator that measures
relative strength because I want to capture how powerful rebels are in a conflict-year compared
to the state they are fighting. I made Reb_Strong dichotomous instead of utilizing the full fivepoint scale in order to simplify how to interpret possible correlations between this indicator and
my dependent variables. With this indicator, I am able to determine whether there is a correlation
between states working with PMSCs and states fighting rebel groups that are stronger than them.
The second indicator I use to measure rebel threat is Reb_Num, in which I simply code
the number of separate civil conflict-dyads in a conflict-year based on the NSA data. Each
conflict-dyad in a conflict-year represents a unique rebel group fighting the state. It stands to
reason that, all else being equal, states are more threatened when they are fighting multiple rebel
groups, as opposed to only one.
The third and fourth indicators I use to measure threat levels from rebels are related to
whether or not rebels receive assistance from foreign states. The NSA includes a variable called
Rebsuport, which indicates whether a rebel group receives alleged, explicit, or no support from a
foreign state in a specific dyad-year. The NSA also includes a variable called Rtypesuport, which
indicates what type of support, if any, a rebel group receives. Types of support range from
endorsements, non-military, military, and troops. Since it is possible that a rebel group might
receive multiple types of support from a foreign state, only the highest level of support is coded
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for each dyad-year. I take information from both variables and create a dichotomous variable
called Reb_Mil_Aid, which indicates whether at least one rebel group present in a particular
conflict-year received explicit military aid from a foreign government. In addition, I also create a
dichotomous indicator called Reb_Interv, which indicates whether an external state directly
intervened in a conflict-year on the side of a rebel group by committing troops, according to the
NSA and UCDP. With these two indicators, I am able to capture whether states were fighting at
least one rebel group that received explicit military aid from a foreign state, or faced direct
military intervention on the side of the rebels. I expect to find rebel groups that receive military
aid from foreign states or receive assistance in the form of military intervention should be more
threatening to states than those that do not.
The fifth indicator I use to measure threat levels from rebels is from the Conflict Site
Dataset. The Conflict Site Dataset was designed to be an extension to the UCDP that provides
coordinates for the conflict zones in states with ongoing conflicts from 1989 to 2008 (Dittrich
and Hallberg 2012). Conflict zones are coded with center-point coordinates, plus a radius
variable to denote spatial extent, and covers the area directly affected by a conflict. Civil conflict
zone center-point coordinates are calculated using the locations of reported armed encounters
between government and rebel soldiers, the locations of territories occupied by rebels, and the
location of rebel bases. With this data on conflict zone center-points, I calculate the distance
between conflict zones and state capital cities in particular conflict-years. These data provide a
rough indicator reflecting how close a civil conflict is to the political center of a country in
particular year. It is plausible that the closer a conflict zone is to a state’s capital city, the more
threatened states are by rebel activity. However, I do not code the literal distance between
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conflict zone center-points and capital cities because I do not expect that threat levels to states
increase at the same rate as distance from conflict zones decreases. A conflict moving from 100
to 50 kilometers away from a capital represents a much greater increase in threat than a conflict
moving from 500 to 450 kilometers away from a capital, even though the change in distance is
the same. Therefore, I designed an ordinal variable called Dis2Cap_lag, which indicates whether
a conflict zone in a particular conflict-year was within 50 kilometers (coded as 6), 100 kilometers
(coded as 5), 200 kilometers (coded as 4), 400 kilometers (coded as 3), 800 kilometers (coded as
2) or more than 800 kilometers (coded at 1) away from the state’s capital city, lagged by one
year. This indicator allows me to test whether conflicts that take place closer to capital cities
motivate states to hire PMSCs, while considering that changes in the distance between capital
cities and conflict zones matter more the closer the conflict zone is to the capital. This variable is
lagged by one year in order to prevent reverse causation occurring between PMSCs being hired
and the location of conflict zones. In country-years where the previous year had no ongoing civil
conflict, Dis2Cap_lag is coded as 0.
The sixth and final indicator I use to measure threat levels from rebels reflects whether at
least one rebel group in a conflict-year controls physical territory. The NSA includes a variable
called terrcont, which indicates whether the rebel group in a dyad-year controls physical territory
or not. Using terrcont, I create a dichotomous variable called Terr_Control, which indicates
whether a state is fighting at least one rebel group that controls territory in a given year. I expect
that when a rebel group controls physical territory in a country, it presents a greater threat to the
state than it would if it did not control any territory, because territory provides rebels with a base
of operations and control over natural resources and civilians.
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In sum, I have six separate indicators that measure the level of threat that states engaged
in civil conflicts face from rebel groups: Reb_Strong, which indicates whether a state is fighting
a rebel group that is stronger than it; Reb_Num, which indicates the number of rebel groups a
state is fighting; Reb_Mil_Aid, which indicates whether a state is fighting a rebel group that
receives explicit military aid from a foreign government; Reb_Interv, which indicates whether a
state is fighting a rebel group that is being supported by a direct military intervention by a
foreign state; Dis2Cap_lag, which indicates how far conflict zones are from capital cities; and
Terr_Control, which indicates whether the state is fighting a rebel group that controls territory. I
believe that higher values for these indicators all reflect higher levels of threat from rebels for
states engaged in civil conflicts.
Hypotheses 2
My second hypothesis, H2, is that states experiencing civil conflicts with fewer military
resources should be more likely to work with PMSCs. As such, I need indicators that measure
the amount of military resources available to states fighting civil conflicts. However, indicators
that might seem like obvious choices, such as those reflecting military spending, troop levels,
military technology, or state capacity are not available for several of the thirty-one states from
the PSD. This is due to the fact that the PSD is comprised of relatively weak and unstable states,
which are the most difficult states to collect data from, and the least adept at gathering and
reporting data themselves. As such, I use three indicators that indirectly reflect the amount of
military resources likely available to the states in my dataset. The first is called log_GDPpc,
which simply indicates the log of a state’s GDP per capita in each conflict-year according to the

106
2013 Maddison Project Database (Bolt and Van Zanden 2014)1. This indicator captures the size
of each state’s economy. While it is true that correlations between GDP per capita and military
spending are likely heteroscedastic, due to wealthy states having the option not to spend much on
their military, poorer states have a lower limit to how much they can spend on their military.
Because of this lower limit on possible military spending, and because my dataset is populated
by poorer states, I expect a state’s GDP per capita to be a relatively accurate indicator for how
much the states in my dataset can afford to spend on military resources.
The second and third indicators are dichotomous indicators called Gov_Mil_Aid, and
Gov_Interv, indicating whether a state receives explicit military aid from a foreign state, and
whether a foreign state directly intervenes in a civil conflict on the side of the state, respectively.
These indicators were constructed in a similar fashion as the indicators Reb_Mil_Aid and
Reb_Interv, and use data from the NSA dataset. It stands to reason that states fighting civil
conflicts that receive explicit military aid from other states should be better equipped than those
that do not. It also makes sense that when foreign states intervene in a civil conflict on the side of
the state, the state should be better equipped than states that fight alone.
These three indicators, log_GDPpc, Gov_Mil_Aid, and Gov_Interv, are all related to the
amount of military resource states can bring to bear when fighting civil conflicts. Higher GDP
per capita, receiving military aid, and fighting alongside another state should all correlate with
having more available military resources than lower GDP per capita, fighting without outside
aid, and fighting alone. Thus, even though these indicators are not ideal, due to data restrictions,
they are the best indicators available for testing my second my hypothesis.

1

I use the 2013 Maddison Project Database because the World Bank does not have official GDP per capita data for
some of the states in my analysis, while the Maddison Project specializes in estimating GDP per capita across time.
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Hypotheses 3
My third hypothesis, H3, is that states that face greater scrutiny from domestic actors for
their conduct in civil conflicts should be more likely to work with PMSCs. As such, I need
indicators that reflect conditions related to how well domestic actors can monitor civil conflicts,
and that reflect the level of interest domestic actors have in civil conflicts. The first two I use are
press freedom and democracy scores. I expect that when the press has greater freedom to operate
in a country, monitoring state activity in civil conflicts will be easier for media organizations. In
such an environment, it is plausible that states will be more motivated to hire PMSCs because the
press has less access and interest in PMSC activity, and states want to handle their military and
security affairs without facing media scrutiny. Where press freedom is more restricted, states
have less need to use PMSCs in order to hide their activities. The precise indicator I use to
measure press freedom is the Freedom House Press Freedom Index, which is an annual report on
media independence around the world. Published since 1980, it assesses the degree of print,
broadcast, and digital media freedom for all thirty-one of the countries in my dataset and
provides numerical scores reflecting the legal environment for the media, political pressures that
influence reporting, and economic factors that affect access to news and information. Countries
are coded a 1 if their press is considered not free, a 2 for partly free, and a 3 for free. I rename
this indicator Free_Press for my dataset.
I also expect that when a state is more democratic, domestic actors outside the executive
branch and the military such as the press, legislators, courts, and civil society actors, will all have
greater access to information on the state’s military and security activities as well as greater
influence over military and security policy. It is plausible that in such an environment, in order to
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avoid scrutiny from such actors, states will be more motivated to work with PMSCs. The
democracy indicator I use is based on Polity IV’s Polity2 score. Polity IV is the most widely
used dataset throughout the civil conflict literature for measuring democracy levels. The Polity2
indicator is calculated by subtracting a countries autocracy score (Autoc) from its democracy
score (Democ), both of which also come from the Polity IV dataset. The conventional wisdom
regarding Polity2 scores is that states that earn between a 6 and a 10, on a scale that ranges from
-10 to 10, are considered democracies. I follow the conventional wisdom by creating a
dichotomous indicator called Democracy, which codes a 1 if a country earns a 6 or higher on
their Polity2 score in a given year, and a 0 otherwise.
The third indicator I use to test my third hypothesis is related to the number of battlerelated deaths that occur in a conflict. All else being equal, I expect that when battle-related
deaths are low, outside actors will have less interest in a conflict and therefore be less interested
in scrutinizing state activity. When battle-related deaths are high, it will draw more outside
attention, increasing the motivation state leaders have to hide their activities. In order to create an
indicator that reflects annual battle-related deaths in a conflict, I utilize data from the UCDP
Battle-Related Deaths Dataset 18.1 (Pettersson 2019). This dataset records the total number of
battle-related deaths resulting from intrastate conflicts and internationalized intrastate conflicts in
each conflict-year. Using these data, I create an indicator called log_BattRD_lag, which indicates
the log of the total number of battle related deaths resulting from intrastate conflicts and
internationalized intrastate conflicts in the previous calendar year of a conflict-year. Using an
indicator that lags annual battle-related deaths by one year allows me to eliminate the possibility
of reverse causation between hiring PMSCs and casualty rates.
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The fourth indicator I use to test my third hypothesis is called War_Time, which indicates
how many continuous calendar years each country has experienced ongoing civil conflict,
regardless of which specific rebel groups the state is fighting, according to the NSA and UCDP. I
include this indicator because I believe that domestic actors are more likely to scrutinize state
leaders the longer civil conflict persists in their country, which may cause state leaders to hire
PMSCs to order to avoid this scrutiny. If a country experiences more than a one calendar year
gap between conflict periods, I count the new conflict period as unique and start War_Time back
at 1. I also include two additional indicators to measure war time: War_Time_sq, which is simply
War_Time squared, and War_Time_cu, which is simply War_Time cubed. I include these
following Carter’s (2006) argument that doing so is a simple and effective way to estimate the
true effect that time has on the hazard of an outcome.
These four indicators, Free_Press, Democracy, log_BattRD_lag, and War_Time, all
reflect conditions related to the opportunities and motivations domestic actor have to scrutinize
state behavior in civil conflicts, and are based on widely used sources of data. I expect that states
with higher Free_Press scores, those states coded as democracies by the Democracy indicator,
and conflict-years with higher values in BattRD_lag and War_Time will be more inclined to
work with PMSCs because conditions in those countries makes it difficult for the state to use
national military personnel to carry out tasks autonomously. Thus, all four indicators are
appropriate for testing my third hypothesis.
Hypotheses 4
My fourth hypothesis, H4, is that states experiencing civil conflicts that receive aid from
actors committed to neoliberal norms should be more likely to work with PMSCs. As such, I
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need indicators that reflect how much economic or military aid the states in my dataset receive
from powerful neoliberal actors. The two indicators I use reflect whether states owe money to the
World Bank or the IMF in a given year. As discussed in Chapter Two, Musah (2002) argues that
the World Bank and the IMF pressure states to reduce government spending in an attempt to
foster economic growth, which is a hallmark of neoliberal economic policy. Other scholars from
outside the PMSC literature, such as Alfredo Filho and Johnston (2005) and Peet (2009) also
discuss how the World Bank and the IMF operate within a neoliberal economic worldview,
which emphasizes reducing government interference in the economy and allowing the private
sector to deliver public goods. Moreover, both of these institutions often make their loans
conditional upon the expectation that the states will implement neoliberal economic reforms
(Hurd 2017). As such, I expect that states that are indebted to the World Bank or IMF are likely
to be under more pressure to cut government spending, limit government activity to what
neoliberal theory considers to be core functions, and be more open to allowing private actors to
deliver public goods. I therefore use data from the World Bank to create two indicators. The first,
WB_Debt, indicate whether a state owes money to the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development or the International Development Association, both of which are part of the World
Bank, in a particular conflict-year. The second, IMF_Debt, indicates whether a state owes money
to the IMF in a particular year.2 These two indicators reflect whether states receive support from
two powerful neoliberal actors, which makes them useful for testing my fourth hypothesis.

2

I use the presence of loans to the World Bank and IMF instead of how large the loan is relative to a states GDP
because neither the World Bank or the Maddison Project Database provide GDP data for all of the country-years in
my dataset.
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Controls
Since this is the first Large-N study examining what factors correlate with states working
with PMSCs during civil conflicts, there aren’t many control variables established within the
literature on PMSCs concerning this question. However, Chojnacki et al.’s (2009) study on
mercenary involvement in civil wars from 1950 to 2000 does suggest that three variables
unrelated to my hypotheses need to be included in my analysis. As discussed in Chapter Two,
Chojnacki et al. build their hypotheses on the principle of supply and demand, expecting that
mercenaries will only participate in a conflict when there are actors capable of paying for their
services. Their results provide some support for this belief, as they found that countries with
diamond mines are more likely to see mercenary activity. This result suggests that clients with
access to valuable natural resource can credibly offer payment to PMSCs, which is supported by
critics of PMSCs who point out they often have connections with oil and mineral extraction
companies. As such, I include two indicators to control for the presence of valuable natural
resources in a state. The first, Diamonds, indicates whether or not lootable or non-lootable
diamonds were known to be present in a state, regardless of mining or production levels,
according to the Conflict Diamonds Dataset (Gilmore et al. 2005). The second, Oil, indicates
whether or not onshore or offshore deposits of oil or natural gas are known to be present in a
state according to the Petroleum Dataset (Lujala et al. 2007).
The third control variable I include follows from Chojnacki et al.’s supply and demand
theory rather than being based on a specific variable included in their analysis. I call this variable
Failed_State, which is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether or not there is a complete
collapse of central authority in a country. This variable is based off the indicator SF from the
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Polity IV data. I include Failed_State as a control variable because state failure could plausibly
affect both the supply and demand for PMSCs in a country. If a state has completely collapsed,
then there may be no entity in the country with the ability to formally hire PMSCs, which means
that there could be no demand for PMSC services. Moreover, it is unlikely that PMSCs would
supply their services behalf of any remnant of the state that still exists, because this entity would
likely be unable to pay them. Alternatively, if a state’s formal authority has completely
collapsed, but a remnant of the state still exists, this remnant would likely be extremely desperate
and willing to promise PMSCs a high price for their services. As such, it is important to control
for state failure in a country when analyzing what factors motivate states to hire PMSCs.
I acknowledge that some of these indicators are relatively crude, but I hope to overcome
this fact by using multiple indicators to test each hypothesis. Moreover, since this study is the
first attempt to conduct a Large-N study on what factors correlate with states working with
PMSCs during civil conflicts, even if only a few indicators correlate with working with PMSCs,
I will still have made moved forward our understanding of PMSCs. I expect that more precise
indicators can be developed as the amount of data available on PMSCs expands. Summary
statistics for these indicators can be seen below in Table 5.
Table 5. Summary Statistics for Predictors of When States Hire PMSCs
Variable
PMSC_Hired
Military_Hired
Police_Hired
Reb_Strong
Reb_Num
Reb_Mil_Aid
Reb_Interv
Terr_Control
Dis2Cap_lag
Log_GDPpc
Gov_Mil_Aid
Gov_Interv
Free_Press

Observations
286
286
286
286
286
286
286
286
286
286
286
286
286

Mean
.1153846
.0839161
.0629371
.034965
1.706294
.0454545
.0769231
.548951
3.090909
7.132665
.1293706
.1328671
1.293706

Std. Dev.
.3200455
.2777479
.2432754
.1840132
.8970295
.208664
.2669364
.4984702
1.649706
.8054899
.336198
.3400261
.463884

Min
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
5.313206
0
0
1

Max
1
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
6
8.808369
1
1
3
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Democracy
War_Time
War_Time_sq
Wa_Time_cu
Log_BattRD_lag
WB_Debt
IMF_Debt
State_Failure
Diamonds
Oil

286
286
286
286
286
286
286
286
286
286

.1608392
12.73427
259.0769
6321.483
5.65475
.8356643
.7762238
.1538462
.2972028
.7482517

.3680265
9.861818
322.1716
10464.36
2.473021
.3712295
.4175044
.3614336
.4578277
.4347781

0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
39
1521
59319
10.81354
1
1
1
1
1

When Do PMSCs Help States Win Civil Conflict? Data and Indicators
I now move to discussing the dataset and individual indicators I use to test when PMSCs
help states win civil conflicts. Each row of data represents one year in which one of the thirtyone states taken from the PSD engaged in a civil conflict with a specific rebel group between the
years 1990 and 2007, for a total of 489 unique dyad-years. The unit if analysis in this dataset is
the dyad-episode, or in other words, distinct periods of conflict between a state and a specific
rebel group. Dyad-episodes that take place between the same disputants are treated as distinct if
the first episode formally ended through a negotiated settlement, a ceasefire, or military victory,
or if the two conflict-episodes are separated by at least one year of low activity. There is a total
of 157 dyad-episodes in the dataset, spanning from one year to eighteen years.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable in this dataset is the risk of state victory in a dyad-episode.
Because I am using survival analysis with this dataset, my dependent variable is calculated using
two indicators. The first indicator is Sequence, which indicates how many calendar years an
ongoing dyad-episode occurred in within the eighteen years covered in my dataset.3 The second
indicator is Term_Type, which indicates whether and how a dyad-episode terminated in a

3

Using calendar years is a relatively blunt way to measure time, but most of data in my analysis are annual data, so I
cannot use smaller units of time.
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particular year. There are six ways a dyad-episode can terminate in my dataset: peace settlement,
ceasefire, government victory, rebel victory, low activity, or one of the disputants merged or split
into a different actor. I code these termination types from the UCDP. With these two indicators, I
am able to calculate the duration until government victory was achieved for each of my dyadepisodes. If a dyad-episode terminated through some other means besides government victory, or
was still ongoing after 2007, it is treated right-censored. Dyad-episode duration varies from
occurring all within one calendar year to spanning the entire eighteen-year period covered in my
dataset, providing plenty of variance in my dependent variable. With data on the duration until
state victory for all of my dyad-episodes, I can calculate hazard rates and determine how various
factors related to states working with PMSCs influence the risk of state victory.
Measuring PMSC Activity
Since my remaining six hypotheses are all related to how PMSCs affect the risk of state
victory in civil conflicts, I address how I measure PMSC activity in specific dyad-years before
moving on to discussing how I measure the indicators used to test each individual hypothesis. I
utilize the same coding scheme as I do when testing hypothesis related to when states
experiencing civil conflicts work with PMSCs. First, I utilize PMSC_Hired, which codes a 1 if a
state pays for and consumes the services at least one PMSCs in a conflict-year, and codes a 0 if a
state does not. I also utilize Military_Hired and Police_Hired, which indicate whether a state did
or did not hire at least one PMSC to perform military or police tasks, respectively. Using these
three indicators, I am able to determine whether working with PMSCs under various conditions
affects the risk of state victory in those against specific rebel groups, and whether PMSCs that
perform certain types of tasks affect the risk of state victory differently.
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Hypothesis 5
My fifth hypothesis, H5, is that hiring PMSCs will help states achieve victory when it is
easier to send information in and out of conflict zones. To test this hypothesis, I need indicators
that reflect how difficult it is for information to be sent in and out of conflict zones. The first
indicator I use, Mountains, indicates what percentage of a country’s land area is covered by
mountainous terrain, rounded to the nearest percentage (Fearon and Laitin 2003). I expect that
higher levels of mountainous terrain should make it more difficult for vehicles and personnel to
move across the country. In addition, higher levels of mountainous terrain should make it more
difficult to build, maintain, and use the infrastructure necessary for telecommunications.
Mountainous terrain is also known to block radio waves and inhibit contact with satellites.
Although Mountains is a country-level indicator that is constant overtime, and therefore does not
specifically indicate whether a conflict zone is located in mountainous terrain, it still provides
some information regarding the kind of terrain all actors have to contend with when operating in
a country.
The second indicator I use is called Electricity, which indicates the percent of the total
population with access to electricity in a country-year, rounded to the nearest percentage,
according to the World Bank. This indicator is meant to provide a rough indication of how easy
it is to transfer information across a country-year via telecommunications. Country-years where a
higher percentage of the population has access to electricity are more likely to have the
infrastructure necessary to send information across the country from within or nearby conflict
zones. Country-years where a smaller percentage of the country has access to electricity are less
likely to have such infrastructure in place. Like Mountains, Electricity is a country-level
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indicator, and therefore does not provide specific information regarding whether actors operating
in or near actual conflict zones have access to electricity. Nevertheless, it provides a general
indication of how well wired a country is and how capable state and non-state actors are of
transferring information across a country via telecommunications.
The third indicator I use to is Dis2CapKm, which uses the Conflict Site Dataset to
measures the distance between capital cities and conflict zones in kilometers. I expect that the
farther a conflict zone is from a state’s capital, the more difficult it is to transfer information
between state leaders and those actors operating in conflict zones. Dis2CapKm is a conflict-level
indicator, meaning that if multiple rebel groups are participating in a conflict, it includes data
from all of the rebel groups to calculate a single conflict zone, instead of indicating the general
areas where each specific rebel group operated in in a specific country-year. In my dataset, each
dyad-year is assigned the score received by the conflict-year associated with it. Since the
Conflict Site Dataset does not provide the data necessary to disaggregate conflict zones into
dyad-conflict zones, this is the best method available for examining whether the distance
between a state’s leadership and the rebels they are fighting affects how much PMSCs are
actually working to help defeat specific rebel groups.
All three of the variables, Mountains, Electricity, and Dis2CapKm, reflect information
related to how well information can be transferred in and out of conflict zones. As such, these
indicators reflect information related to how easy it is for states to monitor PMSC activity in
their country. When testing my fifth hypothesis, I interact these three indicators with my
indicators for PMSC activity to see how the affects PMSCs have on the risk of state victory vary.
I believe that higher values for Mountains and Dis2CapKm should correlate with PMSCs
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decreasing the risk of government victory, while higher values for Electricity should correlate
with PMSCs having a more positive effect on the risk of government victory.
Hypothesis 6
My sixth hypothesis, H6, is that PMSCs will help states achieve victory when there is
greater press freedom in a country experiencing a civil conflict. To test this hypothesis, I use
Press_Freedom, one of the indicators I use to test my third hypothesis. This indicator provides a
score for each country-year according to how free its press is. Scores range from 1 (Not Free), to
2 (Partly Free), to 3 (Free), and come from the Freedom House Press Freedom Index. Higher
levels of press freedom in a country should make it easier for media groups to alert the state
when PMSCs engage in activities that might delay state victory. When testing my sixth
hypothesis, I interact Press_Freedom with my variables for PMSC activity to see whether the
affect PMSCs have on the risk of state victory varies depending on how free the press is.
Hypothesis 7
My seventh hypothesis, H7, is that when PMSCs work for multiple states in the same
civil conflict, the less likely hiring PMSCs will help states achieve victory. To test this
hypothesis, I use data from the PSD to compare PMSCs that work for and are paid by the state
experiencing the civil conflict, and PMSCs that work for the state experiencing the civil conflict
but are paid by another actor. I expect that when a PMSC works for one state but is paid by
another actor, it will be more difficult to help the state experiencing the civil conflict because
they also have to satisfy the interests of their real client, the one paying them. In addition,
PMSCs that work for one state but are paid by another actor should find it easier to shirk,
because there are more opportunities for the PMSCs to rely on one of their principals to protect
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them from punishment by the other. To test this hypothesis, I create three new indicators. The
first, Foreign_Paid_PMSC, indicates whether at least one PMSC working for the state
experiencing the civil conflict while being paid by another actor is present in a conflict-year. I
also disaggregate Foreign_Paid_PMSC into Foreign_Paid_Military and Foreign_Paid_Police,
to indicate whether at least one PMSC working on military or police tasks, respectively, are
being paid by a foreign actor. These indicators allow me to compare how PMSCs that work for
and are paid by the state experiencing a civil conflict affect the risk of state victory differently
than PMSCs that are paid by foreign actors. I include one of these indicators in each of my
models, matching them with the corresponding indicator for PMSC activity outlined above.
Hypothesis 8
My eighth hypothesis, H8, is that more PMSCs operating in a conflict increase a PMSC’s
ability to help states achieve victory. Here, I utilize the data I received from the creators of the
PSD on the specific number of PMSCs in each country-year and their tasks. With these data, I
create three new indicators: PMSC_Total, Military_Total and Police_Total. With PMSC_Total, I
am able to control for the total number of PMSCs working for and being paid by the state
experiencing a civil conflict, and see whether higher values for this indicator alter the affect
PMSC_Hired has on the risk of state victory. Likewise, Military_Total and Police_Total allow
me to control for the presence of the total number of PMSCs performing military and police
tasks respectively in a civil conflict, and see whether higher values alter the affect hiring PMSCs
to perform military or police functions in general has on the risk of state victory. It is important
to include these latter two variables, because PMSCs that perform different types of tasks may
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not be in competition with one another, so a high number of PMSCs operating in a country-year
may not mean that they are actually competing if they are performing different types of tasks.
Hypothesis 9
My ninth hypothesis, H9, is that PMSCs are less likely to help weaker states win civil
conflicts than they are stronger states. With this hypothesis, I measure state weakness in absolute
terms, not relative to rebel groups. This is because how powerful rebel groups are compared to
the state they are fighting does not have anything to do with whether the state has the capabilities
to punish PMSCs. As previously discussed, indicators such as those reflecting military spending,
troop levels, military technology, or state capacity are not available for several of the thirty-one
states from the PSD. As such, I use the same indicators I use to indirectly measure my states’
military resources: log_GDPpc, which indicates a state’s GDP per capita in each conflict-year
according to the 2013 Maddison Project Database; a dichotomous indicator called Gov_Mil_Aid,
which indicates whether a state receives explicit military support from a foreign state according
to the NSA Database; and a dichotomous indicator called Gov_Interv, which indicates whether a
foreign state directly intervenes in a civil conflict on the side of the state according to the NSA
Database. I also use Electricity, which measures how what percentage of the country has access
to electricity, as an alternative to log_GDPpc for how developed a state is. These indicators
provide a decent approximation of how capable states are of punishing PMSCs caught shirking.
States that are wealthier, more developed, receive military aid from foreign states, or are directly
supported by foreign troops should have more resources available to monitor and punish PMSCs
than poorer states fighting alone and without aid. When testing my ninth hypothesis, I interact
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these indicators with my indicators for PMSC activity to see how the affects PMSCs have on the
risk of state victory vary.
Controls
The literature on civil conflict duration and outcomes has established many standard
control variables. Since my own dataset is based largely on the NSA data, I take many of these
control variables from Cunningham et al. (2009), which was the first study to utilize the NSA
data and include variables on the characteristics of rebel groups in addition to conflict and
country level indicators. In this study, the authors assert that once a civil conflict has begun,
“violence will continue until one side is defeated, or until actors agree to come to the bargaining
table and find a negotiated settlement” (Cunningham et al. 2009, 573). As such, at every point in
a conflict, both disputants choose between agreeing to a settlement or continuing to fight.
Cunningham et al. go on to discuss how both military and political factors contribute to this
choice. They divide military factors between those that increase rebel effectiveness in targeting
the vital interests of the government, and those that prevent rebel defeat. The political factors
they examine are those that relate to whether rebels (or potential rebels) anticipate being able to
achieve their goals through non-violent means. I borrow this framework when selecting my
control variables, focusing on those that relate to rebel offensive effectiveness, rebel defensive
effectiveness, opportunities for achieving rebel goals without further violence, and motivation
for achieving rebel goals without further violence.
The first two control variables I include are called EthFrac, which indicates the level of
ethnic fractionalization in a country according to Alesina et al. (2003), and EthnicClaim, which
is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether there is direct evidence that a rebel group in a

121
dyad-year makes an exclusive claim to fight on behalf of an ethnic group, according to the
ACD2EPR v.1.2 dataset (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). Wucherpfennig et al. argue that when civil
conflicts are fought along ethnic lines, both sides are more reluctant to agree to peace settlements
and are more willing to pay the costs of continued fighting. Their analysis of 290 rebel
organizations in 198 conflicts between 1946 and 2005 support these arguments
The next two control variables I include are dichotomous variables called Gov_Con and
Terr_Con, which indicate whether a conflict-dyad’s incompatibility is governmental or
territorial, according to the UCDP Dyadic Dataset version 19.1 (Pettersson et al. 2019). In the
civil conflict literature, governmental conflicts are understood to be fights over who controls the
state, and territorial conflicts are understood to be fights over rebel demands for secession or
autonomy (Gleditsch et al. 2002). It is possible that conflicts could be over both control of the
state and over control of specific pieces of territory. There is no consensus in the civil conflict
literature regarding how these two types of conflicts might affect civil conflict duration and
outcomes differently. Buhaug (2006) argues that stronger rebel groups are more likely to seek
control the state, while weaker groups must settle for territorial concessions. Yet wars over
territory tend to be fought along ethnic lines, which as discussed, may make them more difficult
to resolve, especially if rebel groups are concentrated in specific regions and have control of
valuable natural resources.
This leads to my next three control variables, which indicate whether valuable natural
resources are present in conflict zones, sourced from Buhaug et al. (2009). AllDrugs is a
dichotomous variable indicating whether or not plant cultivation used to produce drugs (opium
poppy, coca bush, cannabis) took place in a conflict zone at the time of conflict outbreak.
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HydroD is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not oil or natural gas was produced in a
conflict zone. AllGems is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not alluvial diamonds or
other gemstones such ruby, sapphires, opal, and jade are present in a conflict area. Together,
these three indicators help reveal whether rebel groups that have access to valuable and easily
extractable natural resources that can be used to finance their rebellions. According to Buhaug et
al. (2009), when rebels have access to such resources, they can fight longer and have less reason
to accept negotiated settlements.
The next two control variable I include relate to whether rebels have political
opportunities to address their grievances with the state non-violently. Democracy is the same
indicator used to test hypothesis three, indicating whether or not a state is a democracy (Polity
IV, 2018) Democracies theoretically provide rebels with more opportunities to express their
grievances through activities such as protests or voting, rather than by taking up arms. The next
control variable is a dichotomous indicator called Legal_Pol_Wing, which indicates whether
rebel groups have explicit link to a legal political party in their country, according to the NSA.
Cunningham et al. (2009) argue that rebel groups associated with legal political parties should
have more opportunities to try and resolve issues with the state non-violently, making it more
likely that conflicts end more quickly with a peace settlement rather than through military victory
by one side.
The next set of control variables related to the material capabilities of both the state and
rebel groups, and are closely related to the indicators I used to test hypotheses one and two,
except here the indicators reflect information about specific dyad-years instead of conflict-years.
All of the following indicators come from the NSA dataset (Cunningham et al. 2013).
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Reb_Strong indicates whether a state is fighting a rebel group that is stronger than the state.
Reb_Num indicates the number of rebel groups a state is fighting including the rebel group in the
dyad-episode. Reb_Mil_Aid indicates whether a state is fighting a rebel group that receives
explicit military aid from a foreign government. Reb_Interv indicates whether a state is fighting a
rebel group that is being supported by a direct military intervention by a foreign state.
Terr_Control indicates whether the state is fighting a rebel group that controls territory.
Gov_Mil_Aid indicates whether the state receives explicit military aid from a foreign
government. Gov_Interv indicates whether a state is being supported by a direct military
intervention by a foreign state. Cunningham et al. (2009) argue that stronger rebel groups, those
that control territory, and those that receive help from foreign states should be able to target the
state more easily and defend against the state. States that face fewer rebel groups and receive
help from foreign states should be better able to target and defeat rebel groups. However, the
addition of foreign states in a conflict also increases the number of “veto players” that must agree
to any proposed peace settlement, decreasing the likelihood that a negotiated settlement can be
reached (Cunningham 2010). Together, these indicators all reflect factors related to the offensive
and defensive capabilities of the disputants. Summary statistics for these variables can be seen
below in Table 6.
Table 6. Summary Statistics for Predictors of When PMSCs Help States Win Conflicts
Variable
PMSC_Hired
PMSC_Hired_Total
Foreign_Hired_PMSC
Military_Hired
Military_Hired_Total
Foreign_Paid_Military
Police_Hired
Police_Hired_Total
Foreign_Paid_Police
Electricity

Observations
489
489
489
489
489
489
489
489
489
489

Mean
.1247444
.2188139
.1533742
.0920245
.1288344
.1554192
.0736196
.1206544
.0511247
43.51125

Std. Dev.
.3307672
.7377232
.3607169
.2893566
.4591587
.3626749
.2614183
.557882
.2204777
39.74231

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Max
1
6
1
1
5
1
1
5
1
100
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Mountains
Dis2CapKm
Press_Freedom
logGDPpc
EthFrac
EthnicClaim
Terr_Conflict
AllDrugs
HydroD
AllGems
Democracy
Legal_Pol_Wing
Reb_Mil_Aid
Gov_Mil_Aid
Reb_Gov_Aid
Reb_Interv
Gov_Interv
Terr_Control

489
489
489
489
489
489
489
489
489
489
489
489
489
489
489
489
489
489

31.56237
319.7975
1.298569
7.152828
.6009065
.4478528
.2433538
.2351738
.6216769
.3292434
.198364
.1840491
.0327198
.1002045
.0143149
.0490798
.1104294
.4376278

27.30821
285.0017
.4756553
.8136663
.222699
.4977825
.4295463
.4245417
.4854654
.4704197
.3991761
.3879211
.1780845
.30058
.1189072
.2162558
.3137453
.4966025

0
2
1
5.313206
.1314
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

81
1650
3
8.808332
.9302
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Conclusion
The methods and data I utilize in this study represent what I believe to be the best
currently available for testing my hypotheses across a broad set of cases. As previously noted,
there are no broad studies that directly examine under what conditions states experiencing civil
conflict work with PMSCs or when PMSCs help states win civil conflicts. As such, my study
represents a first pass at answering these questions using quantitative methods. Yet due to data
limitations, I am not always able to include indicators that directly reflect the underlying
concepts contained within my hypotheses. I try to overcome some of these limitations by
utilizing multiple indicators that I argue are still closely related with the underlying concepts. It
is my hope that any statistically significant correlations that I find will motivate and inform
future research on the corresponding hypotheses. I also hope that if my models do not reveal
significant correlations, this will inspire further research to develop better methods and data for
testing my hypotheses, rather than be taken as the final word regarding their plausibility. Early
attempts to examine important issues using new techniques are always going to contain flaws,
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but having accepted this, I believe that this study still offers a strong first test for my hypotheses.
In the following chapter, I present the results of my analyses and discuss their implications.

CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS
In Chapter Two, I argued that the existing literature on PMSCs has not sufficiently
explored two questions: when do states fighting civil conflicts work with PMSCs, and when do
PMSCs help states win civil conflicts. In Chapter Three, I develop four hypotheses for the first
question, and five hypotheses for the second. All of these hypotheses are grounded in principalagent theory, focusing on what factors cause principals to delegate tasks to agents, and what
factors motivate and provide opportunity for agents to shirk. In Chapter Four, I outlined the data
and methodology I used to develop statistical models in order to test these hypotheses. In this
chapter, I present and discuss the results from these models. Results are presented in two
sections: the first contains the results from logit models designed to test my first four hypotheses,
and the second contains the results from my competing risk hazard models designed to test
hypotheses five through nine. After my initial presentation of the results, I discuss their
implications.
When do States Work with PMSCs?
In this section, I present and discuss the results from my logit models designed to test
when states fighting civil conflicts work with PMSCs. In all models, the dependent variable is a
dichotomous indicator that reflects whether states did or did not work with at least one PMSC in
a particular country-year. However, each model looks at a different category of PMSCs. Model 1
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tests what factors correlate with states working with at least one PMSC in general, while Model
2 and Model 3 look at what factors correlate with states working with PMSCs that perform
military tasks and police tasks, respectively. As discussed in the previous chapter, I do not
include PMSCs that perform what I call periphery tasks in my models because there are so few
incidences of these types of PMSC activities. In all of these models, the country-year is the unit
of analysis, and all country-years are clustered by country. I present the results from these three
models starting with those that pertain to Hypothesis 1, and ending with those that pertain
Hypothesis 4. The logit output for all three models can be seen in Table 7.
Table 7. Logit Models for States Working with PMSCs, 1990-2007
Variables
Reb_Strong
Reb_Num
Reb_Mil_Aid
Reb_Interv
Terr_Control
Dis2Cap_lag

M1: PMSC_Hired
-0.130
(-0.11)
0.426
(1.47)
-0.607
(-0.55)
2.071
(1.67)
1.637*
(2.23)
-0.553*
(-2.32)

M2: Military_Hired
0.838
(0.91)
0.414
(1.88)
-2.016*
(-2.21)
2.829*
(2.00)
1.765
(1.60)
-0.438
(-1.88)

M3: Police_Hired
0
(.)
0.890*
(2.20)
2.274
(1.68)
1.951
(1.05)
-1.062
(-1.83)
-0.404
(-1.22)

Threat_Index
Log_GDPpc
Gov_Mil_Aid
Gov_Interv
Free_Press
Democracy
War_Time
War_Time_sq
War_Time_cu
Log_Battrd_lag
WB_Debt
IMF_Debt
State_Failure

-0.685
(-1.73)
-0.0479
(-0.05)
0.781
(0.69)
1.089
(1.86)
-1.679
(-1.89)
-0.561
(-1.60)
0.0333
(1.46)
-0.000455
(-1.13)
0.197
(1.46)
1.339
(0.63)
-4.063*
(-2.05)
-1.003
(-1.38)

-1.092*
(-2.15)
-0.0674
(-0.09)
0.900
(1.18)
-0.352
(-0.35)
-0.181
(-0.12)
-0.402
(-0.93)
0.0216
(0.82)
-.0000236
(-0.53)
0.0161
(1.14)
1.052
(0.47)
-3.514
(-1.45)
-1.346
(-1.56)

-0.699
(-0.69)
-1.333
(-0.92)
1.982
(1.40)
3.111***
(3.59)
-2.394*
(-2.12)
-0.578
(-1.08)
0.0278
(0.75)
-0.000275
(-0.40)
0.390
(1.87)
0.625
(0.48)
-7.746***
(-4.28)
0.106
(0.06)

M4: Military_Hired

0.643*
(2.30)
-0.858
(-1.75)
0.429
(0.76)
0.399
(0.49)
0.0665
(0.08)
-0.934
(-0.70)
-0.349
(-1.04)
0.0146
(0.68)
-0.0000862
(-0.23)
-0.0749
(-0.59)
0.413
(0.21)
-3.375
(-1.73)
-0.848
(-1.42)
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Diamonds
Oil
_cons

1.802**
(2.65)
-2.540**
(-3.19)
3.735
(1.07
286

N
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

2.070***
(3.30)
-1.432
(-1.86)
6.770
(1.22)
286

2.070***
(3.30)
-7.348***
(-4.61)
4.563
(0.70)
276

2.444***
(4.09)
-0.548
(-0.63)
4.935
(1.42)
286

Hypothesis 1
In Hypothesis 1, I predicted that when states experiencing civil conflicts face more
threatening rebels, they should be more likely to work with PMSCs. This hypothesis receives
very little support from Model 1. Only two factors, whether rebels control territory, and the
distance between conflict zones and state capitals lagged by one year, have significant
relationships with whether states work with PMSCs. Moreover, the distance between conflict
zones and state capitals lagged by one year has the opposite effect that I expected. I predicted
that when conflict zones are closer to state capitals, this would indicate a higher level of threat
from rebels, motivating states to work with PMSCs out of desperation. Yet Model 1 suggests that
the opposite is true: the further conflict zones are from state capitals in the previous year, the
more likely states are to work with PMSCs. Examining the marginal effects that the indicator
dis2cap_lag has on the predicted probability of states working with PMSCs reveals that when
conflict zones are over 800 kilometers from capital cities, there is a twenty percent predicted
probability that states will work with PMSCs, while there is only a five percent predicted
probability when conflict zones are within one 100 kilometers of the capital city (see Figure 2).
Only rebels controlling territory increases the likelihood of states working with PMSCs in the
way I predicted. As can be seen in Figure 3, states fighting rebel groups that control territory are
predicted to be ten percent more likely to work with PMSCs.
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Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Dis2Cap_Lag on Probability of Hiring a PMSC
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Figure 3. Marginal Effects of Terr_Control on Probability of Hiring a PMSC

Model 2 suggests that when rebels receive military aid from foreign states, states are less
likely to work with PMSCs that perform military tasks. As can be seen in Figure 4, when rebels
receive military aid from foreign states, the predicted probability that states work with PMSCs
that perform military tasks declines from just under ten percent to under three percent. Model 2
also suggests that when a foreign state intervenes in a civil conflict on behalf of a rebel group,
states are more likely to work with PMSCs that perform military tasks. As can be seen in Figure
5, when foreign states intervene on behalf of rebels, the predicted probability that states work
with PMSCs that perform military tasks increases from just under six percent to over twentyeight percent. The remaining threat indicators are not significant in Model 2.
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Figure 4. Marginal Effects of Reb_Mil_Aid on Probability of Hiring a Military PMSC
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Figure 5. Marginal Effects of Reb_Interv on Probability of Hiring a Military PMSC

In Model 3, the variable reb_strong, which indicates whether the state is fighting a rebel
group that is relatively stronger than it, predicts states not working with PMSCs that perform
police tasks perfectly, and is thus omitted from the model. Otherwise, Model 3 suggests that the
more rebel groups a state is fighting, the more likely it is to work with PMSCs that perform
police tasks. As can be seen in Figure 6, the predicted probability that states work with PMSCs
that perform police tasks is under five percent when states are only fighting one rebel group, but
rises to over twelve percent when states are fighting three rebel groups, and almost twenty-five
percent when states are fighting five rebel groups. The rest of the indicators in Model 3 are not
significant.
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Figure 6. Marginal Effects of Reb_Num on Probability of Hiring a Police PMSC

In short, Hypothesis 1 is not strongly supported in Model 1, Model 2, or Model 3.
Whether the dependent variable indicates whether states worked with PMSCs in general, or only
indicates whether states work with PMSCs that perform military tasks or police tasks, most of
the indicators meant to reflect how threatening rebel groups are to states are either not
significant, or have the opposite type of relationship with states working with PMSCs than I
expected. Rebels controlling territory correlates with states working with PMSCs in Model 1, but
not Model 2 or Model 3. Foreign states intervening in a conflict on the side of the rebels
correlates with states working with PMSCs in Model 2, but not Model 1 or Model 3. Increases in
the number of rebel groups a state is fighting increases the likelihood that states will work with
PMSCs in Model 3, but not Model 1 or Model 2. Given these results, I cannot conclude that any
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one of the indicators I chose to reflect how threatening rebels are to states strongly predicts when
states fighting civil conflicts work with PMSCs.
Yet despite the fact that none of the six indicators related to how threatening rebels are to
states are consistently significant across all three models, the results do seem to suggest that rebel
characteristics and activities affect whether states work with PMSCs. As such, I also created an
index variable, called threat_index, by combining data from my six individual threat indicators
in order to test whether the overall threat level from rebels can predict when states work with
PMSCs. Creating threat_index was straightforward. Four of my six threat indicators are
dichotomous, so I just added their values. For my variable indicating how many rebel groups
states are fighting in a particular year, I added a 1 to threat_index if the state was fighting
multiple rebel groups, and a 0 otherwise. For my variable indicating the distance between
conflict zones and state capitals in the previous year, I added a 1 to threat_index if the conflict
zone was within 200 kilometers of the capital city, and a 0 otherwise. Although I chose the
distance of 200 kilometers because that is the maximum distance a conflict zone can be from a
capital city in order to receive a score of 4 or higher in dis2cap_lag (which ranges from 0 to 6), it
is ultimately an arbitrary distance. As such, threat_index ranges from 0 to 6, 0 being minimal
threat from rebels, and 6 being maximum threat from rebels, although no country-year in my
dataset ever scores higher than 5. As can be seen in Model 4 (see Table 7), the threat_index
variable has a positive statistically significant relationship with states working with PMSCs that
perform military tasks. The predicted probability that states work with PMSCs that perform
military tasks is under four percent when threat_index is at 0, and is over twenty-six percent
when threat_index is at 5 (see Figure 7). This result supports Hypothesis 1 as it pertains to
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PMSCs that perform military tasks. The threat_index variable does not have a significant
relationship with states working with PMSCs in general, or PMSCs that perform police tasks, so
I did not include these models in Table 7.
Figure 7. Marginal Effects of Threat_Index on Probability of Hiring a Military PMSC

Hypothesis 2
In Hypothesis 2, I predicted that states experiencing civil conflicts with fewer military
resources should be more likely to work with PMSCs. Model 1 offers no support for this
hypothesis. Indicators that measure states’ logged GDP per capita, whether a state receives
military aid from a foreign state, or whether a foreign state intervened in a conflict on behalf of
the state, do not have any significant relationship with whether states works with PMSCs. Model
2 suggests that the higher a state’s logged GDP per capita, the less likely it is to work with
PMSCs that perform military tasks. This result supports Hypothesis 2, since I use logged GDP
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per capita is a proxy measure for a state's level of military resources. Whether a state receives
military aid from a foreign state, or whether a foreign state intervened in a conflict on behalf of
the state, are not significant in Model 2. Like Model 1, Model 3 also offers no support for
Hypothesis 2, as none of the indicators are significant. Together, these results offer very little
support for Hypotheses 2, since most of the indicators meant to reflect variation in the level of
military capabilities available to states are not significant in any of the three models. The results
do support the theory that poorer states are more likely to work with PMSCs that perform
military tasks than are wealthier states.
Hypothesis 3
In Hypothesis 3, I predicted that states that face greater scrutiny from domestic actors for
their conduct in civil conflicts should be more likely to work with PMSCs. Model 1 does not
offer any support for this hypothesis. Indicators that reflect a state’s level of press freedom,
whether a state is a democracy, the number of years a state has been engaged in a civil conflict,
and the number of battle related deaths that occurred in the previous year, do not affect the
likelihood that states will work with PMSCs. Model 2 has substantively similar results. In Model
3, states with higher press freedom scores are more likely to work with PMSCs that perform
police tasks, and this relationship is significant past the .000 level. Figure 8 shows that increasing
a state’s press freedom score from 1 to 2 increases the predicted probability of states working
with PMSCs that perform police tasks from under five percent to over nineteen percent. In
addition, Model 3 also suggests that more battle-related deaths in the previous year make states
more likely to work with PMSCs that perform police tasks. As can be seen in Figure 9,
increasing the logged value of the number of battle related deaths that occurred in a country the
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previous year from 0 to 12 increases the predicted probability of a state working with PMSCs
performing police tasks from under two percent to over eighteen percent. Model 3 also suggests
that democratic states are less likely to work with PMSCs that perform police tasks, although
when one looks at the marginal effects the democracy indicator has on the predicted probability
of a state working with PMSCs that perform police tasks, it can be seen that the correlation
between being a democracy and whether a state worked with a PMSC is not significant (see
Table 8). Together, these results offer limited support for Hypothesis 3 when talking about
PMSCs that perform police tasks, but these findings do not apply to PMSCs in general or to
PMSCs that perform military tasks.
Figure 8. Marginal Effects of Free_Press on Probability of Hiring a Police PMSC
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Figure 9. Marginal Effects of log_BattRD_lag on Probability of Hiring a Police PMSC

Table 8. Effects Democracy has on Probability of State Working with Police PMSCs

Hypothesis 4
In Hypothesis 4, I predicted that states experiencing civil conflicts that receive aid from
actors committed to neoliberal norms should be more likely to work with PMSCs. Model 1 does
not support this hypothesis. Being indebted to the World Bank does not have a significant
relationship with states working with PMSCs, and being indebted to the IMF has a significant
relationship with states working with PMSCs, but in the opposite direction that I predicted. As
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can be seen in Figure 10, the predicted probability of a state working with PMSCs is over fortytwo percent when states are not indebted to the IMF, while it is under six percent when states are
indebted to the IMF. Looking at Model 2 and Model 3, we can see that this relationship is being
driven by PMSCs that perform police tasks. Model 2 suggests that being indebted to the IMF
does not have a significant relationship with states working with PMSCs that perform military
tasks, while Model 3 suggests that being indebted to the IMF makes states less likely to work
with PMSCs that perform police tasks. Indeed, this latter relationship is significant to past the
.000 level, and decreases the predicted probability of states working with PMSCs that perform
police tasks by over thirty-seven percent (see Figure 11). Together, these results offer no support
for Hypothesis 4.
Figure 10. Marginal Effects of IMF_Debt on Probability of Hiring a PMSC
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Figure 11. Marginal Effects of IMF_Debt on Probability of Hiring a Police PMSC

Controls
When including control variables, the three models give nearly identical substantive
results. In all three models, state failure does not correlate with states working with PMSCs,
while the presence of diamonds in a country correlates with states being more likely to work with
PMSCs. The presence of diamonds in a country increases the predicted probability of states
working with PMSCs by over thirteen percent in Model 1 (see Figure 12), over twelve percent in
Model 2 (see Figure 13), and over sixteen percent in Model 3 (see Figure 14). In Model 1 and
Model 3, the presence of oil in a country decreases the predicted probability of states working
with PMSCs by over twenty percent (see Figure 15) and thirty-four percent (see Figure 16),
respectively, while there is no significant relationship between the presence of oil in a country
and states working with PMSCs that perform military tasks in Model 2.
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Figure 12. Marginal Effects of Diamonds on Probability of Hiring a PMSC
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Figure 13. Marginal Effects of Diamonds on Probability of Hiring a Military PMSC
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Figure 14. Marginal Effects of Diamonds on Probability of Hiring a Police PMSC
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Figure 15. Marginal Effects of Oil on Probability of Hiring a PMSC
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Figure 16. Marginal Effects of Oil on Probability of Hiring a Police PMSC

Results Summarized
A breakdown of what indicators are significant in my models can be seen in Table 9.
Rebels controlling territory makes states more likely to work with PMSCs in general, but this
effect disappears in Models 2 and 3. Foreign states intervening in civil conflicts on the side of
rebels makes states more likely to work with PMSCs that perform military tasks, as do higher
levels of threat from rebels overall, as measured by threat_index. Fighting more rebel groups,
having a higher level of press freedom, and higher numbers of battle-related deaths in the
previous year make states more likely to work with PMSCs that perform police tasks. In all three
models, the presence of diamonds in a country also correlates with states being more likely to
work with PMSCs. Conflict zones being closer to capital cities in the previous year, being
indebted to the IMF, and the presence of oil in a country make states less likely to work with
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PMSC in general. Rebels receiving military aid from foreign states and higher logged GDP per
capita makes states less likely to work with PMSCs that perform military tasks. Being indebted
to the IMF and the presence of oil in a country make states less likely to work with PMSCs that
perform police tasks.
Table 9. Results for Hypotheses One Through Four Summarized

Factors that have a
positive relationship with
states working with
PMSCs.

Model 1: Military and
Police PMSCs
Rebels controlling
territory.
Presence of diamonds in
the country.

Model 2: Military PMSCs

Model 3: Police PMSCs

A foreign state
intervening in a conflict
on the side of the rebels.

More rebel groups.

Threat_Index

More battle related deaths
in the previous year.

Presence of diamonds in
the country.
Factors that have a
negative relationship with
states working with
PMSCs.

Conflict zones being
closer to state capitals.
Being indebted to the
IMF.

Rebel groups receiving
military aid from a
foreign state.
Higher logged GDP per
capita.

More press freedom.

Presence of diamonds in
the country.
Being indebted to the
IMF.
Presence of oil in the
country.

Presence of oil in the
country.

Discussion
Despite my expectation, my analysis only finds limited and inconsistent support for my
first four hypotheses. These results have implications for future research that seeks to explore
when states fighting civil conflicts to work with PMSCs. First, my results suggest that the factors
that cause states fighting civil conflicts to work with PMSCs likely vary a great deal depending
on what tasks states need PMSCs to perform. With the exception of the presence of diamonds in
a country, no indicators were significant across all models. This result suggests that there are not
many factors used in this study that consistently cause states fighting civil conflicts to turn to
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private actors for help managing their security in general. Rather, different factors likely make
states more or less likely to utilize PMSCs for different reasons. In future studies, researchers
should find new ways to differentiate PMSCs. In this study, I chose to differentiate PMSCs
according to whether they performed military tasks or police tasks. As a reminder, I included
participating in combat operations, providing military training, providing operational support,
and providing logistical support as military tasks. I included intelligence services, maintaining
public order, providing personal and mobile security, and police advising and training as police
tasks. While differentiating PMSCs according to whether they perform military or police tasks
may still be useful, tasks can also be differentiated according to other factors, such as technical
sophistication, proximity to combat zones, or lethality. Differentiating PMSCs according to these
factors may reveal stronger and more robust relationships between predictors and states working
with PMSCs.
My results also suggest that factors related to rebel activities and characteristics affect
whether states work with PMSCs, although not all factors affect state behavior in the same way.
Rebels controlling territory, a foreign state intervening in a conflict on the side of rebels, and
higher numbers of rebel groups in a country overall each increased the likelihood that states
work with PMSCs in one of my models, while the lagged distance conflict zones are from capital
cities, and rebels receiving military aid from a foreign state each decreased the likelihood of
states working with PMSCs in one of my models. Why each particular factor affects the
likelihood of states working with PMSCs the way they do is not clear. Yet when data from the
six separate threat indicators are combined into the threat_index variable, and this variable
replaces the six threat indicators, it has a significant positive relationship with states working
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with PMSCs that perform military tasks. This result suggests that how researchers measure threat
levels from rebels is important, and more refined measures than those used in this study need to
be developed. Future research on what causes states fighting civil conflicts to work with PMSCs
should work to identify what factors make rebels more threatening from the perspective of the
states fighting them, in order to develop more precise measures for testing how rebel activities
and characteristics affect whether states work with PMSCs.
My results suggest that four explanations for why states fighting civil conflicts work with
PMSCs have merit. First, whether states work with PMSCs that perform military tasks likely has
something to do with how threatening rebels are, and how well-equipped states are to handle
threats from rebels. This latter point is supported by the fact that my results suggest that states
with higher logged GDP per capita are less likely to work with PMSCs that perform military
tasks. Second, whether states work with PMSCs that perform police tasks may have something to
do with whether domestic actors are able and willing to scrutinize state leaders’ during civil
conflicts. This idea is supported by the fact that greater press freedom (providing opportunity to
scrutinize), and the number of battle-related deaths that resulted from a conflict in the previous
year (providing motivation to scrutinize) increased the predicted probability that states work with
PMSCs that perform police tasks. Third, my results suggest that fighting multiple rebel groups
also causes states to work with PMSCs that perform police tasks, as does being indebted to the
IMF. The former factor is related to how threatening rebels are, while the latter may reflect
whether a state is in poor economic condition. As such, these results also support the idea that
whether states work with PMSCs depends on how threatening rebels are, and how well-equipped
states are to handle threats from rebels. Lastly, the availability of certain types of natural
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resources likely affects whether states fighting civil conflicts work with PMSCs in general, but
whether they make states more or less likely to work with PMSCs depends on the type of natural
resource and the type of PMSC.
Despite the significant results I did find, my analysis ultimately did not strongly support
my hypotheses overall. There are several ways I can explain this general lack of support. First,
the proxy indicators I used might not be suitable for testing my hypotheses. The four concepts I
tried to capture with my indicators were the level of threat rebels present to states, the military
capabilities available to states, opportunities and motivations for domestic actors to scrutinize
state and military leaders, and the degree to which states are dependent on aid from actors
committed to neoliberal norms. These four concepts do not have direct indicators in my analysis,
both because some of the concepts are too abstract, and because there are not available data for
direct indicators for some of the states included in my data. This was the case for indicators such
as troop levels and military spending, which would have served as more direct indicators for the
military resources available to states. Second, my models may be missing important variables
that affect whether states fighting civil conflicts work with PMSCs that I simply did not consider.
Third, my hypotheses may just be wrong. Determining which of these explanations best explains
my results requires me to reexamine the theories underlying my hypotheses, and to find
alternative data to reflect the underlying concepts contained in my hypotheses. The second task
goes beyond the scope of this study. I can, however, reexamine the theories underlying my
hypotheses.
The theory underlying Hypothesis 1 is that states fighting civil conflicts prefer not to
delegate tasks essential to their national security to PMSCs unless they absolutely have to, and
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therefore, only work with PMSCs when rebels present such a great threat that states have to work
with PMSCs in order to survive. I assume that states want to maximize their degree of control
over the means of coercion within their borders, and that, given that states fighting civil conflicts
are already struggling to maintain that control, they will not want to give up any more of it to
foreign corporations only bound to them by financial incentives. Indeed, states fighting civil
conflicts are often poor, have weak militaries, and often struggle to control these militaries. As
such, I assume that states fighting civil conflicts likely know that they lack the resources to offer
sufficient positive and negative incentives to control PMSCs. Therefore, I expected states
fighting civil conflicts to work with PMSCs only when they are so desperate that they are willing
to further erode their degree of control over the means of coercion within their border in order to
prevent their immediate defeat.
One reason this theory may not have been as strongly supported in my analysis as I
expected is because PMSCs may not like to work with desperate states, because such states are
less likely to be able to pay for their services. This explanation suggests that in order to
understand when states fighting civil conflicts work with PMSCs, one must not only look at how
desperate states are for help, but the degree to which states can actually entice PMSCs to work
for them. However, the fact that states with higher’ logged GDP per capita were not more likely
to work with PMCSs in any of my models undermines this explanation. If PMSCs prefer to enter
conflicts when they are confident that the state can pay, then logged GDP per capita ought to
have a positive relationship with states working with PMSCs. This explanation is also
undermined by the fact that in two of my models, the presence of oil in a country correlated with
states being less likely to work with PMSCs. Here too, one would expect that if PMSCs only
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work for states when they are sure that the state can pay for their services, the presence of oil in a
country should attract PMSCs since it is a profitable natural resource that states can offer either
PMSCs or their corporate partners in exchange for help defeating rebels.
Another reason the theory underlying Hypothesis 1 may not have been as strongly
supported in my analysis as I expected is that states fighting civil conflicts might prefer to call
upon the services of other types of actors for help dealing with threatening rebels. Militias,
terrorist organizations, or mercenary-like actors that are not PMSCs all represent actors that
states might prefer to call upon. Such groups may have ethnic or ideational ties with the state,
may be more invested in defeating rebel groups than PMSCs would be, may be willing to utilize
tactics that PMSCs are unwilling to use, or may be weaker actors that states can better control.
Since my dataset does not include data on what other types of military/security actors are present
in those countries in my analysis, my models do not support or undermine this explanation.
A third explanation is that when states are on the brink of defeat, they may utilize
diplomatic tools instead of military ones. States may offer to start peace talks, promise to satisfy
some of the rebel’s demands, or may call upon powerful foreign actors to step in as peacekeepers
or mediators. Here again, my dataset does not contain data suitable for testing this explanation.
As such, future studies that seek to examine what factors cause states fighting civil conflicts to
work with PMSCs ought to check when states are able to call upon other military/security actors
besides PMSCs, and whether states tend to use diplomatic tactics tools when they are fighting
particularly threatening rebels rather than military tactics.
The theories underling Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 were developed by taking ideas from both
principal-agent theory and the existing literature on what factors causes states to work with
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PMSCs. Hypothesis 2 is grounded in the theory that principals prefer not to delegate tasks when
they are capable of performing the task themselves, because doing so requires them to pay
agency costs. Only when principals are not capable of performing tasks efficiently and/or
effectively on their own will they consider delegating to an agent. This theory fits well with the
functionalist explanation for why states work with PMSCs, which asserts that states work with
PMSCs in order to be more cost-effective. Hypothesis 3 is grounded in the theory that in addition
to financial costs, political principals have to consider the political costs of performing tasks
autonomously, and sometimes delegating a task to an agent allows political principals to distance
themselves from outcomes that might cost them support. This theory fits well with the politicalinstrumentalist explanation for why states work with PMSCs, which asserts that state leaders,
especially in democracies, like to use PMSCs instead of national soldiers in order to avoid
oversight from domestic actors. Hypothesis 4 is grounded in the theory that states more inclined
to view delegation as a more efficient means of accomplishing a task than performing the task
autonomously should be more likely to delegate tasks to PMSCs. This theory fits well with the
ideationist explanation for why wealthy democracies work with PMSCs, which asserts that states
committed to neoliberal norms are more likely to work with PMSCs because neoliberalism
emphasizes the efficiency of private actors over public.
While I tested these theories, I also argued in Chapter 2 that they were better suited to
explain why wealthy democracies work with PMSCs, and since wealthy democracies are very
unlike states that generally experience civil conflicts, they may not be able to explain why states
fighting civil conflicts work with PMSCs. Such states tend to be poorer, less democratic, and are
often ill disposed towards neoliberalism because they view it as an ideology imposed upon them
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by Western states. In addition, since states fighting civil conflicts are dealing with immediate
existential threats, which wealthy democracies rarely ever contend with, I argued that the
decision to work with PMSCs for states fighting civil conflicts has more to do with the
seriousness of the existential threat than any other factor. As such, while I am not surprised that
Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 were not strongly supported in my analysis, the fact that Hypothesis 1
was also not strongly supported makes it difficult to explain these outcomes on the basis that
threat levels from rebels overrides all other factors. Here again, future studies that seek to
examine what factors cause states fighting civil conflicts to work with PMSCs should check
when states are able to call upon other military/security actors besides PMSCs, and whether
states tend to use diplomatic tactics when they are fighting particularly threatening rebels rather
than working with PMSCs.
The literature on when states work with pro-government militia groups provides insights
that may be useful for explaining when states fighting civil conflicts work with military/security
actors besides PMSCs. The conventional wisdom in this literature suggests that states delegate
illicit, shameful, or unpopular tasks to militias (Cohen and Nordas 2015), and recent research has
found a relationship between the existence of militias and high levels of some forms of state
repression (Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014). In other research, scholars have argued that states
delegate atrocities to militias to avoid being held accountable and to escape being associated with
extreme violence (Ron 2002; Alvarez 2006). These types of explanations for why states work
with pro-government militias mirror political-instrumentalist explanations for why states work
with PMSCs. As such, the idea that states prefer to keep their hands clean during civil conflicts
by allowing other military/security actors to do their dirty work has empirical support. In order to
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determine why states might work with PMSCs over militia groups, or vice versa, future studies
need to identify the types of states that tend to work with these different types of actors and the
specific tasks that states ask them to perform.
The literature regarding when disputants use diplomatic tactics to end civil conflicts
instead on military tactics suggests that disputants engage in diplomacy when they calculate that
it will be difficult to achieve a military victory, and when institutions exist that make negotiating
easier. Mason and Fett (1996) find that civil wars are less likely to end in negotiated settlements
when states have larger armies, as larger armies make it easier to achieve a military victory, and
that civil wars are more likely to end in negotiated settlements the longer they go on, because as
conflicts drag on it becomes apparent that military victory is likely unattainable. Mason et al.
(1999) build on these arguments by developing an expected utility model that predicts that
peaceful settlements become more likely as the estimated probability and costs of achieving a
military victory increase. Cunningham et al. (2009) support Mason et al.’s (1999) expected
utility model, finding that when rebels are strong or are able to operate in areas beyond the reach
of the state, states are more likely to make concessions to rebels instead of trying to defeat them.
In addition, Cunningham et al. find that when rebels have opportunities to pursue their interests
peacefully, such as when they have ties to legal political parties, conflicts are more likely to end
in negotiated settlements. In turn, Grieg et al. (2016) find that states are more likely to pursue
negotiated settlements when rebels demonstrate an ability to operate over a large area of
territory, signaling that they will be difficult to defeat. These studies all suggest that when states
have reason to expect that achieving victory will be a long and costly process, they are more
likely to use diplomacy to resolve civil conflicts, especially when institutions exist that can
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facilitate negotiations. Regarding what factors cause states to work with PMSCs, these findings
suggest that states will pursue diplomacy rather than working with PMSCs to try and defeat
rebels when they expect that rebels will be difficult to defeat, and when it is easier to negotiate
with rebels rather than trying to enhance their military capabilities by working with PMSCs.
Taking these two factors into account may help explain why Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 were not
supported in my analysis, or alternatively, may reveal significant relationships that do not appear
in my models.
When Do PMSCs Help States Win Civil Conflicts?
In this section, I present and discuss the results from my competing risk hazard models
designed to test when PMSCs help states win civil conflicts. In all of these models, the
dependent variable is the years to state victory in civil conflict dyad-episodes. Dyad-episodes are
violent conflicts that occur between a state and a rebel group. The same state may be involved in
multiple dyad-episodes in the same year. Hazard models normally report the effects that
covariates have on hazard rates as hazard ratios. In this study, however, I convert hazard ratios
into coefficients to simplify interpretation. These coefficients reflect how variation in my
covariates affect the estimated hazard of states winning civil conflicts. Before reviewing the
models that test my hypotheses, however, I present the results from models meant to test how
working with PMSCs affects the risk of state victory in general, without including indicators and
interactions meant to test my hypotheses. This allows me to see how PMSCs in general, and
PMSCs that perform military or police tasks specifically, affect the risk of state victory alone
without considering factors that may make them more or less likely to help deliver victory to
states.
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Basic Models
In Model 5, I test how states working with PMSCs in general affects the risk of state
victory. In Model 6 and Model 7, I test how states working with PMSCs that perform military
tasks and police tasks, respectively, affect the risk of state victory. As in the previous section, I
do not include PMSCs that perform what I call periphery tasks in these models because such
tasks are rare. Results from all three models suggest that working with PMSCs delays state
victory (see Table 10). In all three models, the indicator for whether states worked with at least
one PMSC is significant past the .000 level. Working with a PMSC reduces the hazard of state
victory by over nineteen, or in other words, the states that do not work with PMSCs are nineteen
times more likely to win their civil conflict. Working with a PMSC that perform military tasks
reduces the hazard of state victory by over eighteen. Working with a PMSC that perform police
tasks reduces the hazard of state victory by almost twenty-three. The size of these coefficients,
compared to other significant factors in my models, suggests that not only does working with
PMSCs delay state victory by reducing the hazard that it happens in any particular year, but that
this effect is very strong. A closer look at my dataset reveals that no state that worked with
PMSCs won a dyad-episode within the eighteen-year period being studied. Out of the 157 dyadepisodes, thirteen cases (8.3 percent) ended in state victory between 1990 and 2007, but in none
of these cases did the state work with a PMSC. As such, any effects that PMSCs have on the
hazard of state victory in my models will be very large, so I will place more emphasis on the
direction coefficients take rather than their overall value when testing my hypotheses.
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Table 10. PMSCs Effects on the Hazard of State Victory
Variables
PMSC_Hired

Model 1
-18.55***
(-23.17)

Military_Hired

Model 2

-18.31***
(-27.47)

Police_Hired
logGDPpc
EthFrac
EthnicClaim
Terr_Conflict
AllDrugs
HydroD
AllGems
Democracy
Legal_Pol_Wing
Reb_Mil_Aid
Gov_Mil_Aid
Reb_Gov_Aid
Reb_Interv
Gov_Interv
Terr_Control

-1.258
(-1.94)
-3.317*
(-2.12)
-3.388**
(-3.15)
2.080*
(2.56)
0.405
(0.38)
-0.0935
(-0.12)
-1.603
(-1.71)
-18.91***
(-18.59)
-0.0101
(-0.02)
-14.20***
(-10.03)
-0.282
(-0.21)
23.12***
(7.77)
-15.98***
(-14.71)
0.374
(0.32)
-0.968
(-1.32)

Reb_Num
N
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Model 3

489

1.249
(-1.83)
-2.899*
(-2.17)
-3.624**
(-2.80)
2.402**
(2.80)
0.532
(0.55)
-0.306
(-0.42)
-1.399
(-1.76)
-18.36***
(-15.70)
0.0812
(0.15)
-14.25***
(-9.54)
-0.490
(-0.40)
23.44***
(8.19)
-16.29***
(-15.80)
0.217
(0.19)
-0.850
(-1.11)
-0.304
(-1.94)
489

-22.91***
(-21.73
-1.232
(-1.84)
-2.726*
(-2.12)
-3.691**
(-2.65)
2.366*
(2.52)
0.602
(0.63)
-0.411
(-0.60)
-1.365
(-1.77)
-23.05***
(-19.65)
0.140
(0.26)
-18.86***
(-12.16)
-0.705
(-0.59)
18.42***
(5.80)
-21.26***
(-18.49)
0.393
(0.32)
-0.865
(-1.08)
-0.299
(-0.89)
489

Hypothesis 5
In Hypothesis 5, I predicted that the easier it is to send information in and out of conflict
zones, the more likely hiring PMSCs will help states achieve victory. I test this hypothesis by
interacting each of my three PMSC indicators with three additional indicators: Electricity, which
indicates what percentage of a state’s population has access to electricity; Mountains, which
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indicates what percentage of a state’s territory is covered in mountainous terrain; and
Dis2CapKm, which indicates the distance conflict zones are from state capitals in kilometers. My
results do not support Hypothesis 5 (see Table 11-13). Interactions between states working with
PMSCs and those indicators meant to reflect factors that affect how well states can send
information in and out of conflict zones are not significant in any of my models. This is true for
PMSCs in general, and PMSCs that perform military tasks and police tasks.
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Table 11. (Hypothesis 5) PMSCs in General Interacting w/ Monitoring Factors
Variables
PMSC_Hired
PMSC_Electricity
Electricity

Model 1
-20.96***
(-18.29)
-0.0127
(-0.56)
0.0191
(1.58)

PMSC_Mountains

Model 2
-17.63***
(-17.94)

-0.0394
(-0.86)
0.0179
(1.31)

Mountains
PMSC_Dis2CapKm
Dis2CapKm
logGDPpc
EthFrac
EthnicClaim
Terr_Conflict
AllDrugs
HydroD
AllGems
Democracy
Legal_Pol_Wing
Reb_Num
Reb_Mil_Aid
Gov_Mil_Aid
Reb_Gov_Aid
Reb_Interv
Gov_Interv
Terr_Control
N
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Model 3
-19.31***
(-19.16)

-1.772**
(3.16)
-1.887
(-1.38)
-3.280**
(-2.73)
2.040*
(2.07)
0.552
(0.54)
-0.536
(-0.61)
-0.805
(-1.07)
-19.95***
(-19.85)
-0.497
(-0.55)
-0.338
(-1.04)
-18.46***
(-13.01)
-0.612
(-0.55)
27.98***
(11.94)
-19.27***
(-22.23)
0.0309
(0.03)
-1.062
(-1.37)
489

-0.922
(-1.39)
-2.621
(-1.54)
-3.911***
(-3.30)
2.697***
(3.35)
-0.287
(-0.21)
-0.308
(-0.39)
-0.855
(-0.86)
-18.39***
(-15.30)
-0.500
(-0.60)
-0.366
(-1.05)
-15.08***
(-10.98)
-0.172
(-0.14)
24.16***
(8.34)
-17.03***
(-15.92)
0.159
(0.14)
-0.895
(-1.15)
489

0.00349
(1.56)
-0.000138
(-0.08)
-1.241
(-1.85)
-2.928
(-1.83)
-3.605**
(-2.72)
2.409**
(2.68)
0.471
(0.45)
-0.241
(-0.27)
-1.391
(-1.61)
-18.16***
(-12.65)
0.0355
(0.06)
-0.283
(-0.85)
-14.05***
(-9.95)
-0.541
(-0.43)
22.38***
(6.88)
-16.07***
(-15.15)
0.306
(0.23)
-0.827
(-1.04)
489
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Table 12. (Hypothesis 5) Military PMSCs Interacting w/ Monitoring Factors
Variables
Military_Hired
Military_Electricity
Electricity

Model 1
-22.17***
(-20.12)
-0.00700
(-0.35)
0.0190
(1.59)

Military_Mountains

Model 2
-17.68***
(-18.24)

-0.0386
(-0.85)
0.0186
(1.37)

Mountains
Military_Dis2CapKm
Dis2CapKm
logGDPpc
EthFrac
EthnicClaim
Terr_Conflict
AllDrugs
HydroD
AllGems
Democracy
Legal_Pol_Wing
Reb_Num
Reb_Mil_Aid
Gov_Mil_Aid
Reb_Gov_Aid
Reb_Interv
Gov_Interv
Terr_Control
N
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Model 3
-19.61***
(-20.70)

-1.775**
(-3.07)
-1.809
(-1.40)
-3.299**
(-2.69)
2.071*
(2.09)
0.583
(0.57)
-0.579
(-0.66)
-0.789
(-1.06)
-21.03***
(-21.76)
-0.443
(-0.52)
-0.366
(-1.13)
-19.42***
(-13.60)
-0.562
(-0.52)
29.34***
(12.54)
-20.34***
(-23.21)
-0.0901
(-0.08)
-1.079
(-1.38)
489

-0.915
(-1.34)
-2.581
(-1.58)
-3.945***
(-3.30)
2.726***
(3.39)
-0.299
(-0.22)
-0.336
(-0.43)
-0.839
(-0.86)
-18.36***
(-15.86)
-0.512
(-0.62)
-0.381
(-1.12)
-15.11***
(-10.92)
-0.142
(-0.12)
24.48***
(8.48)
-17.05***
(-15.89)
0.103
(0.09)
-0.913
(-1.17)
489

0.00354
(1.63)
-0.000168
(-0.10)
-1.254
(-1.80)
-2.865
(-1.95)
-3.635**
(-2.68)
2.439**
(2.68)
0.495
(0.48)
-0.266
(-0.29)
-1.384
(-1.68)
-18.33***
(-13.53)
0.0563
(0.09)
-0.305
(-0.95)
-14.27
(-10.02)
-0.490
(-0.40)
23.17***
(7.13)
-16.32
(-15.33)
0.198
(0.16)
-0.840
(-1.05)
489
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Table 13. (Hypothesis 5) Police PMSCs Interacting w/ Monitoring Factors
Variables
Police_Hired
Police_Electricity
Electricity

Model 1
-16.62***
(-13.53)
-0.0166
(-0.62)
0.0166
(1.65)

Police_Mountains

Model 2
-17.69***
(-14.13)

-0.0374
(-0.25)
0.0188
(1.36)

Mountains
Police_Dis2CapKm
Dis2CapKm
logGDPpc
EthFrac
EthnicClaim
Terr_Conflict
AllDrugs
HydroD
AllGems
Democracy
Legal_Pol_Wing
Reb_Num
Reb_Mil_Aid
Gov_Mil_Aid
Reb_Gov_Aid
Reb_Interv
Gov_Interv
Terr_Control
N
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Model 3
-24.53***
(-11.11)

-1.767**
(-3.05)
-1.601
(-1.28)
-3.318*
(-2.54)
2.012
(1.87)
0.655
(0.68)
-0.687
(-0.84)
-0.739
(-1.02)
-15.69***
(-16.46)
-0.393
(-0.46)
-0.356
(-1.09)
-14.42***
(-9.86)
-0.750
(-0.70)
12.53***
(5.09)
-15.30***
(-15.98)
0.0892
(0.08)
-1.105
(-1.35)
489

-0.900
(-1.33)
-2.274
(-1.51)
-3.989**
(-3.18)
2.694**
(3.10)
-0.245
(-0.18)
-0.465
(-0.64)
-0.756
(-0.78)
-18.24***
(-16.73)
-0.429
(-0.53)
-0.390
(-1.12)
-15.01***
(-10.46)
-0.315
(-0.27)
15.06***
(5.23)
-17.37***
(-15.18)
0.211
(0.18)
-0.937
(-1.15)
489

0.00487
(1.01)
0.0000718
(0.04)
-1.230
(-1.81)
-2.743
(-1.85)
-3.688**
(-2.59)
2.351*
(2.41)
0.618
(0.59)
-0.427
(-0.48)
-1.374
(-1.67)
-23.06***
(-16.43)
0.150
(0.25)
-0.299
(-0.89)
-18.99***
(-12.69)
-0.704
(-0.59)
18.36***
(6.05)
-21.38***
(-18.61)
0.401
(0.31)
-0.870
(-1.04)
489

Hypothesis 6
In Hypothesis 6, I predicted that the higher the level of press freedom in a country
experiencing a civil conflict, the more likely hiring PMSCs will help states achieve victory. I test
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this hypothesis by interacting my three PMSC indicators with press freedom scores from
Freedom House. My results do not support Hypothesis 6 (see Table 14), as interactions between
states working with PMSCs and press freedom scores are not significant in any of my models.
This is true for PMSCs in general, and PMSCs that perform military tasks and police tasks.
Table 14. (Hypothesis 6) PMSCs Interacting w/ Press Freedom
Variables
PMSC_Hired
PMSC_Press

Model 1
-21.75***
(-10.93)
0.958
(0.65)

Military_Hired

Model 2

-21.79***
(-9.06)
1.010
(0.44)

Military_Press
Police_Hired
Police_Press
Press_Freedom
logGDPpc
EthFrac
EthnicClaim
Terr_Conflict
AllDrugs
HydroD
AllGems
Democracy
Legal_Pol_Wing
Reb_Num
Reb_Mil_Aid
Gov_Mil_Aid
Reb_Gov_Aid
Reb_Interv
Gov_Interv
Terr_Control
N
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Model 3

0.185
(0.24)
-1.275*
(-2.10)
-3.106
(-1.87)
-3.531**
(-2.71)
2.316**
(2.66)
0.473
(0.49)
-0.209
(-0.29)
-1.379
(-1.64)
-21.18***
(-11.45)
0.0634
(0.11)
-0.262
(-0.74)
-16.36***
(-10.89)
-0.554
(-0.43)
25.46***
(8.70)
-18.65***
(-18.16)
0.338
(0.27)
-0.791
(-1.06)
489

0.145
(0.19)
-1.279*
(-2.01)
-3.017*
(-2.01)
-3.575**
(-2.01)
2.353**
(2.69)
0.512
(0.54)
-0.255
(-0.35)
-1.381
(-1.73)
-21.03***
(-12.17)
0.0870
(0.16)
-0.289
(-0.85)
-16.35***
(-10.81)
-0.497
(-0.40)
25.62***
(8.91)
-18.68***
(-18.14)
0.226
(0.19)
-0.816
(-1.09)
489

-18.71***
(-6.37)
-0.618
(-0.30)
0.225
(0.28)
-1.279*
(-2.07)
-2.912
(-1.95)
-3.610*
(-2.53)
2.291*
(2.42)
0.563
(0.60)
-0.330
(-0.48)
-1.335
(-1.70)
-19.85***
(-10.96)
0.149
(0.27)
-0.276
(-0.78)
-15.00***
(-9.51)
-0.722
(-0.58)
14.51***
(4.53)
-17.67***
(-15.66)
0.415
(0.33)
-0.809
(-1.03)
489
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Hypothesis 7
In Hypothesis 7, I predicted that when PMSCs work for multiple states in the same civil
conflict, the less likely hiring PMSCs will help states achieve victory. I test this hypothesis by
comparing the effects two different types of PMSCs have on the hazard of state victory: PMSCs
that are both paid by and work for the state fighting the civil conflict, and PMSCs that work for
the state fighting the civil conflict while being paid by another state. My results ultimately do not
support Hypothesis 7, but they do show that PMSCs paid by foreign states also delay state
victory (see Table 15). In none of my models was there a substantive difference in how foreign
paid PMSCs and locally paid PMSCs affect the hazard of state victory. Yet in all of my models,
foreign paid PMSCs had a negative effect on the hazard of state victory, and these relationships
are significant past the .000 level. This is true for PMSCs in general, and PMSCs that perform
military tasks and police tasks. As such, while my results suggest that foreign paid PMSCs delay
state victory, they do not support the idea that foreign paid PMSCs delay state victory any more
than PMSCs that work for an are paid by the same state.
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Table 15. (Hypothesis 7) PMSCs Compared with Foreign Paid PMSCs
Variables
PMSC_Hired
Foreign_Paid_PMSC

Model 1
-17.49***
(-27.60)
-16.26***
(-14.18)

Military_Hired

Model 2

-19.18***
(-30.31)
-17.92***
(-18.75)

Foreign_Paid_Military
Police_Hired
Foreign_Paid_Police_
logGDPpc
EthFrac
EthnicClaim
Terr_Conflict
AllDrugs
HydroD
AllGems
Democracy
Legal_Pol_Wing
Reb_Num
Reb_Mil_Aid
Gov_Mil_Aid
Reb_Gov_Aid
Reb_Interv
Gov_Interv
Terr_Control
N
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Model 3

-1.219
(-1.86)
-2.907*
(-2.01)
-3.613**
(-2.79)
2.385**
(2.83)
0.559
(0.58)
-0.241
(-0.32)
-1.355
(-1.62)
-18.06***
(-14.43)
0.0654
(0.11)
-0.293
(-0.90)
-13.93***
(-9.14)
-0.418
(-0.28)
22.03***
(8.19)
-15.82***
(-18.28)
0.294
(0.22)
-0.841
(-1.12)
489

-1.163
(-1.72)
-2.861*
(-2.14)
-3.573**
(-2.87)
2.344**
(2.78)
0.518
(0.54)
-0.253
(-0.35)
-1.401
(-1.76)
-19.64***
(-16.52)
0.0261
(0.05)
-0.276
(-0.86)
-15.58***
(-10.52)
-0.517
(-0.40)
24.21***
(8.85)
-17.38***
(-19.98)
0.308
(0.26)
-0.820
(-1.07)
489

-14.85***
(-13.32)
-15.01***
(-6.59)
-1.232
(-1.84)
-2.721*
(-2.12)
-3.714*
(-2.57)
2.369
(2.50)
0.655
(0.70)
-0.383
(-0.55)
-1.338
(-1.73)
-16.30***
(-13.79)
0.153
(0.28)
-0.306
(-0.92)
-12.11***
(-7.50)
-0.552
(-0.41)
11.49***
(3.55)
-14.55***
(-13.10)
0.326
(0.25)
-0.867
(-1.09)
489

Hypothesis 8
In Hypothesis 8, I predicted that the more PMSCs operating in a conflict, the more likely
hiring PMSCs will help states achieve victory. I test this hypothesis by comparing the effects of
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hiring at least one PMSC with indicators that reflect the total number of PMSCs a state hired in a
particular country-year. In doing so, I reveal how hiring additional PMSCs affects the hazard of
state victory while controlling for the effect of hiring just one PMSC. My results do not support
Hypothesis 8 (see Table 16). In none of my models are the indicators that reflect how many
PMSCs a state worked with significant. This is true for PMSCs in general, and PMSCs that
perform military tasks and police tasks.
Table 16. (Hypothesis 8) PMSC Competition
Variables
PMSC_Hired
PMSC_Hired_Total

Model 1
-19.24***
(-29.11)
-0.156
(-0.42)

Military_Hired

Model 2

-19.64***
(-15.58)
-0.0421
(-0.06)

Military_Hired_Total
Police_Hired
Police_Hired_Total
logGDPpc
EthFrac
EthnicClaim
Terr_Conflict
AllDrugs
HydroD
AllGems
Democracy
Legal_Pol_Wing
Reb_Num
Reb_Mil_Aid
Gov_Mil_Aid
Reb_Gov_Aid
Reb_Interv
Gov_Interv
Terr_Control

Model 3

-1.238
(-1.88)
-2.957*
(-2.02)
-3.595**
(-2.84)
2.379**
(2.80)
0.501
(0.51)
-0.273
(-0.38)
-1.403
(-1.68)
-19.68***
(-15.72)
0.0561
(0.10)
-0.282
(-0.84)
-15.46***
(-10.51)
-0.540
(-0.43)
24.34***
(8.40)
-17.49***
(-17.00)
0.321
(0.26)
-0.836
(-1.10)

-1.249
(-1.83)
-2.899*
(-2.17)
-3.624**
(-2.80)
2.402**
(2.80)
0.533
(0.55)
-0.306
(-0.42)
-1.400
(-1.76)
-19.74***
(-16.88)
0.0814
(0.15)
-0.304
(-0.94)
-15.61***
(-10.45)
-0.489
(-0.40)
24.82***
(8.68)
-17.66***
(-17.13)
0.217
(0.19)
-0.850
(-1.11)

-22.29***
(-26.89)
-0.264
(-0.50)
-1.232
(-1.84)
-2.726*
(-2.12)
-3.691**
(-2.65)
2.366*
(2.52)
0.602
(0.63)
-0.411
(-0.60)
-1.365
(-1.77)
-23.05***
(-19.65)
0.140
(0.26)
-0.299
(-0.89)
-18.86***
(-12.16)
-0.705
(-0.59)
18.41***
(5.80)
-21.26***
(-18.49)
0.393
(0.32)
-0.865
(-1.08)
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N
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

489

489

489

Hypothesis 9
In Hypothesis 9, I predicted that PMSCs are less likely to help weaker states win civil
conflicts than they are stronger states. I test this hypothesis by interacting states working with
PMSCs with three variables: GovInterv, which indicates whether a foreign state intervened in a
conflict on behalf of the state; GovMilAid, which indicates whether a state received military aid
from a foreign state; logGDPpc, which indicates the log of a state’s GDP per capita in a
particular year; and Electricity, which indicates what percent of a country’s population has
access to electricity. My results offer partial support for Hypothesis 9 (see Tables 17-20). The
interactions with GovInterv and GovMilAid were not significant in any of my models. When
indicators measure whether states worked with a PMSC are interacted with logGDPpc, not only
is the interaction variable not significant, but the significance of the indicators that measure
whether states worked with at least one PMSC also disappear. This result suggests that variation
in logged GDP per capita influence the effects that PMSCs have on the risk of state victory. In
other words, PMSCs affect the risk of state victory differently depending on the wealth of the
client state. However, these results do not show that PMSCs are less likely to help weaker states
win civil conflicts than they are stronger states: they simply suggest that a state’s level of wealth
influences how PMSCs affect the risk of state victory. No matter if I’m testing how PMSCs in
general affect the risk of state victory, or if I’m testing how PMSCs that perform military tasks or
police tasks affect the risk of state victory, when Electricity is added to the model, logged GDP
per capita is significant to the .002 level, and has a coefficient of -1.7. These results support the
theory that wealthier states have a lower risk of state victory, and that this effect can be seen
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when variation in what percentage of a country’s population has access to electricity is
considered. In addition, when Electricity is added to my models, the PMSC indicators and the
interaction between PMSCs and logged GDP per capita remain not significant. These results
have two implications. First, that the effects a state’s level of wealth has on its risk of winning a
civil conflict are not straightforward. Other factors associated with how developed the state is
need to be considered. Second, even though the interaction between PMSCs and GDP per capita
are not significant, since I now know that GDP per capita does have a significant negative
relationship with the risk of state victory, and that including the interaction between PMSCs and
GDP per capita eliminates the significance of the PMSC indicators, I can assert more confidently
that having more wealth can eliminate the negative effects that PMSCs have on the risk of state
victory. In other words, my analysis supports the theory that PMSCs are less likely to delay
victory for wealthier states.
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Table 17. (Hypothesis 9) PMSCs in General Interacted with State Capacity to Punish
Variables
PMSC_Hired
PMSC_Gov_Interv

Model 1
-20.23***
(-32.89)
0.212
(0.11)

PMSC_Gov_Mil_Aid

Model 2
-21.41***
(-24.74)

1.135
(0.55)

PMSC_logGDPpc
logGDPpc
EthFrac
EthnicClaim
Terr_Conflict
AllDrugs
HydroD
AllGems
Democracy
Legal_Pol_Wing
Reb_Num
Reb_Mil_Aid
Gov_Mil_Aid
Reb_Gov_Aid
Reb_Interv
Gov_Interv
Terr_Control
N
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Model 3
-10.53
(-1.05)

-1.238
(-1.88)
-2.956*
(-2.02)
-3.595**
(-2.84)
2.379**
(2.80)
0.501
(0.51)
-0.273
(-0.38)
-1.404
(-1.68)
-20.31***
(-16.22)
0.0563
(0.10)
-0.282
(-0.84)
-16.08***
(-10.93)
-0.540
(-0.43)
25.23***
(8.70)
-18.11***
(-17.60)
0.321
(0.26)
-0.835
(-1.10)
489

-1.238
(-1.88)
-2.956*
(-2.02)
-3.595**
(-2.84)
2.379**
(2.80)
0.501
(0.51)
-0.273
(-0.38)
-1.404
(-1.68)
-21.31***
(-17.02)
0.0563
(0.10)
-0.282
(-0.84)
-17.12***
(-11.63)
-0.540
(-0.43)
26.57***
(9.17)
-19.14***
(-18.60)
0.321
(0.26)
-0.835
(-1.10)
489

-1.143
(-0.77)
-1.238
(-1.88)
-2.957*
(-2.02)
-3.595**
(-2.84)
2.379**
(2.80)
0.501
(0.51)
-0.273
(-0.38)
-1.403
(-1.68)
-18.43***
(-14.72)
0.0561
(0.10)
-0.282
(-0.84)
-14.16***
(-9.63)
-0.540
(-0.43)
23.15***
(7.99)
-16.21***
(-15.75)
0.321
(0.26)
-0.835
(-1.10)
489
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Table 18. (Hypothesis 9) Military PMSCs Interacted with State Capacity to Punish
Variables
Military_Hired
Military_Gov_Interv

Model 1
-20.35***
(-32.63)
0.673
(0.39)

Military_Gov_Mil_Aid

Model 2
-18.87***
(-25.82)

1.225
(0.65)

Military_logGDPpc
logGDPpc
EthFrac
EthnicClaim
Terr_Conflict
AllDrugs
HydroD
AllGems
Democracy
Legal_Pol_Wing
Reb_Num
Reb_Mil_Aid
Gov_Mil_Aid
Reb_Gov_Aid
Reb_Interv
Gov_Interv
Terr_Control
N
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Model 3
-11.10
(-1.32)

-1.249
(-1.83)
-2.898*
(-2.17)
-3.624**
(-2.80)
2.402**
(2.80)
0.533
(0.55)
-0.305
(-0.42)
-1.400
(-1.76)
-20.24***
(-17.31)
0.0814
(0.15)
-0.304
(-0.94)
-16.12***
(-10.79)
-0.489
(-0.40)
25.48***
(8.91)
-18.16***
(-17.63)
0.217
(0.19)
-0.850
(-1.11)
489

-1.249
(-1.83)
-2.899*
(-2.17)
-3.624**
(-2.80)
2.402**
(2.80)
0.533
(0.55)
-0.306
(-0.42)
-1.399
(-1.76)
-18.61***
(-15.92)
0.0813
(0.15)
-0.304
(-0.94)
-14.52***
(-9.72)
-0.489
(-0.40)
24.09***
(8.42)
-16.55***
(-16.06)
0.217
(0.19)
-0.850
(-1.11)
489

-1.106
(-0.90)
-1.249
(-1.83)
-2.899*
(-2.17)
-3.624**
(-2.80)
2.402**
(2.80)
0.533
(0.55)
-0.306
(-0.42)
-1.399
(-1.76)
-18.61***
(-15.92)
0.0813
(0.15)
-0.304
(-0.94)
-14.50***
(-9.71)
-0.489
(-0.40)
24.03***
(8.40)
-16.54***
(-16.05)
0.217
(0.19)
-0.850
(-1.11)
489
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Table 19. (Hypothesis 9) Police PMSCs Interacted with State Capacity to Punish
Variables
Police_Hired
Police_Gov_Interv

Model 1
-22.65***
(-21.29)
-0.415
(-0.17)

Police_Gov_Mil_Aid

Model 2
-23.06***
(-18.30)

0.711
(0.33)

Police_logGDPpc
logGDPpc
EthFrac
EthnicClaim
Terr_Conflict
AllDrugs
HydroD
AllGems
Democracy
Legal_Pol_Wing
Reb_Num
Reb_Mil_Aid
Gov_Mil_Aid
Reb_Gov_Aid
Reb_Interv
Gov_Interv
Terr_Control
N
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Model 3
-13.07
(-0.85)

-1.232
(-1.84)
-2.726*
(-2.12)
-3.691**
(-2.65)
2.366*
(2.52)
0.602
(0.63)
-0.411
(-0.60)
-1.365
(-1.77)
-23.05***
(-19.66)
0.140
(0.26)
-0.299
(-0.89)
-18.83***
(-12.14)
-0.705
(-0.59)
18.36***
(5.79)
-21.24***
(-18.48)
0.393
(0.32)
-0.865
(-1.08)
489

-1.232
(-1.84)
-2.726*
(-2.12)
-3.691**
(-2.65)
2.366*
(2.52)
0.602
(0.63)
-0.411
(-0.60)
-1.365
(-1.77)
-23.05***
(-19.65)
0.140
(0.26)
-0.299
(-0.89)
-18.86***
(-12.16)
-0.705
(-0.59)
18.43***
(5.81)
-21.26***
(-18.50)
0.393
(0.32)
-0.865
(-1.08)
489

-1.452
(-0.63)
-1.232
(-1.84)
-2.726*
(-2.12)
-3.691**
(-2.65)
2.366*
(2.52)
0.602
(0.63)
-0.411
(-0.60)
-1.365
(-1.77)
-23.04***
(-19.65)
0.140
(0.26)
-0.299
(-0.89)
-18.90***
(-12.18)
-0.705
(-0.59)
18.33***
(5.78)
-21.28***
(-18.52)
0.393
(0.32)
-0.865
(-1.08)
489
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Table 20. (Hypothesis 9) PMSCs Interacted with Logged GDP per capita, w/ Electricity
Variables
PMSC_Hired
PMSC_Hired_logGDPpc

Model 1
-13.92
(-1.49)
-1.121
(-0.81)

Military_Hired

Model 2

-16.45*
(-2.08)
-0.747
(-0.65)

Military_Hired_logGDPpc
Police_Hired
Police_Hired_logGDPpc
logGDPpc
Electricity
EthFrac
EthnicClaim
Terr_Conflict
AllDrugs
HydroD
AllGems
Democracy
Legal_Pol_Wing
Reb_Num
Reb_Mil_Aid
Gov_Mil_Aid
Reb_Gov_Aid
Reb_Interv
Gov_Interv
Terr_Control
N
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Model 3

-1.772**
(-3.16)
0.0191
(1.58)
-1.887
(-1.38)
-3.280**
(-2.73)
2.040*
(2.07)
0.552
(0.54)
-0.536
(-0.61)
-0.805
(-1.07)
-19.94***
(-19.84)
-0.497
(-0.55)
-0.338
(-1.04)
-18.49***
(-13.03)
-0.612
(-0.55)
27.85***
(11.89)
-19.32***
(-22.29)
0.0309
(0.03)
-1.062
(-1.37)
489

-1.775**
(-3.07)
0.0190
(1.59)
-1.809
(-1.40)
-3.299**
(-2.69)
2.071*
(2.09)
0.583
(0.57)
-0.579
(-0.66)
-0.789
(-1.06)
-20.03***
(-20.72)
-0.443
(-0.52)
-0.366
(-1.13)
-18.53***
(-12.99)
-0.562
(-0.52)
28.62***
(12.23)
-19.42***
(-22.16)
-0.0901
(-0.08)
-1.079
(-1.38)
489

-8.597
(-0.65)
-1.308
(-0.66)
-1.767**
(-3.05)
0.0196
(1.65)
-1.601
(-1.28)
-3.318*
(-2.54)
2.012
(1.87)
0.655
(0.68)
-0.687
(-0.84)
-0.739
(-1.02)
-15.70***
(-16.47)
-0.393
(-0.46)
-0.356
(-1.09)
-14.49***
(-9.91)
-0.750
(-0.70)
12.56***
(5.10)
-15.38***
(-16.06)
0.0892
(0.08)
-1.105
(-1.35)
489

Results Summarized
My most robust finding is that states working with PMSCs lowers the hazard of state
victory. This is true for PMSCs in general, for PMSCs that perform military tasks, and for
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PMSCs that perform police tasks. Indicators intended to reflect a state’s ability to monitor
PMSCs were not shown to influence how PMSCs affect the risk of state victory. The argument
that answering to multiple states cause PMSCs to delay state victory, and the argument that the
presence of competition causes PMSCs to hasten state victory, are also not supported. The only
factor that my analysis suggests might influence how PMSCs affect the risk of state victory is a
state’s level of wealth, as suggested by the fact that when the PMSC indicators are interacted
with logGDPpc, the PMSC indicators no longer have a significant relationship with the risk of
state victory. As such, my results offer strong support for the argument that working with
PMSCs delays victory for states fighting civil conflicts, and limited support for the argument that
PMSCs are less likely to delay victory for wealthier states fighting civil conflicts.
Discussion
Before discussing the implications of my two primary findings, I explore possible
explanations for why my hypotheses were largely not supported in my models. There may be
some overriding factor of set of factors that when controlled for, would reveal that my indicators
do indeed influence how PMSCs affect the risk of state victory. In principal agent theory, there
are three types of factors that influence how hard agents work to deliver positive outcomes to
their principals: those that influence the extent to which the principal’s and agent’s interests
overlap; those that influence the extent of the agent’s information advantage over the principal;
and those that influence the agent’s beliefs about whether and how severely they will be
punished for shirking. I did not include any indicators meant to reflect factors that influence the
extent to which the principal’s and agent’s interests overlap in my analysis, because I focused on
factors that states can influence, and I argued that there is little that states can do to align the
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interests of PMSCs with their own. Since PMSCs are motivated by a desire for higher profits, I
argued that the only way for states to align PMSC interests with their own is by offering them
performance-based incentives. Yet since there are so many factors that influence whether and
when states win civil conflict, it believed that PMSCs would not accept payments based on their
performance, because PMSCs do not want to end up not being paid if some factors outside their
control make state victory impossible to deliver. However, after seeing my results, I must
reconsider whether there are factors that influence how closely aligned PMSCs’ interests are
with those of their client state’s. One of these factors may be how much PMSCs rely on any one
state for payment. If PMSCs have personnel working for multiple clients, they may decide to
shirk smaller clients and focus their resources working for larger clients. Alternatively, PMSCs
are often closely associated with mineral extraction companies, so even if they agree to work for
states fighting civil conflicts, their true goals may be to preserve and increase these corporations'
access to natural resources rather than actually helping the state defeat rebels. It is also possible
that PMSCs are not strictly motivated by long term profits. I distinguished PMSCs from more
ad-hoc mercenary-like actors because I thought that as corporations, PMSCs would want to
survive as organizations. It may be possible, however, that PMSC personnel may not care about
the long-term interests of the corporations they work for, and are more interested in maximizing
their payout from a single job. For all of these reasons, future studies that seek to explore when
PMSCs help states win civil conflicts should take into account what percentage of PMSC income
comes from the state fighting the civil conflict, and how this income is paid out, in order to
capture how closely the PMSC financial interests align with the strategic interests of their client
state.
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Turning to the implications of my two primary findings, there are several explanations
why PMSCs would be less likely to delay victory for wealthier states. First, it could be because
wealthier states can monitor PMSCs more easily. Wealthier states have more material resources
at their disposal, and are better able to finance government institutions that can keep track of
what PMSCs are doing. Another explanation is that wealthier states have effective military
capabilities of their own, which can be used to hold PMSCs accountable. Alternatively, wealthier
states may have the resources to screen PMSCs before hiring them, and therefore, tend to hire
better quality PMSCs. Determining which of these explanations have merit requires researchers
in future studies to utilize case studies or small-n comparative studies in order to learn whether
there are differences in how poorer and richer states work with PMSCs and try to hold them
accountable. However, since the interactions between PMSC indicators and logged GDP per
capita were not themselves statistically significant in my models, but only eliminated the
significance of the PMSC indicators, future research should also find stronger evidence that a
connection between state wealth and PMSC performance even exists before investigating why it
exists.
The strongest finding in my analysis is that, with the exception of those that included the
interactions between PMSC indicators and logged GDP per capita, all of my models show that
PMSCs reduce the hazard of state victory. Moreover, with the possible exception of a state’s
level of wealth, my models do not provide evidence that any particular factor reduces this effect.
As such, my analysis suggests that turning to PMSCs for help defeating rebel groups is a
mistake. These findings support the critical view of PMSCs. As discussed in Chapter 2,
advocates of PMSCs claim that because they are professional market-oriented actors that deliver
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specialized military and security services, PMSCs should help states defeat rebel groups quickly
and efficiently. My analysis undermines this view. As such, if PMSC advocates want to maintain
their position, they need to explain why states working with PMSCs correlated with lower hazard
rates of state victory in my analysis.
Conclusion
My statistical analyses ultimately did not yield many positive findings, as most of my
hypotheses found little to no support. Nevertheless, my analysis offers guidance for future
research. First, in order to effectively utilize statistical analyses to investigate when states
fighting civil conflicts work with PMSC and whether doing so brings about positive outcomes
for states, new indicators for state and PMSC characteristics need to be developed. How
threatening rebels are to states, the degree to which states can fight rebels alone, the extent to
which domestic actors scrutinize and try to control state leaders, and the degree to which states
are influenced by neoliberalism are all factors that could affect when states work with PMSCs.
The feasibility of working with alternative mercenary-like actors or utilizing diplomatic
strategies to deal with rebels are other factors that could affect when states fighting civil conflicts
work with PMSCs. Without reliable and valid indicators that reflect these concepts, it is difficult
to utilize statistical analyses to determine when states fighting civil conflicts work with PMSCs.
In turn, precise indicators that reflect a state’s capacity to monitor PMSCs, punish PMSCs, and
align PMSC interests with their own also need to be developed. Without reliable and valid
indicators that reflect these concepts, it is difficult to utilize statistical analyses to determine
when PMSCs help states win civil conflicts.

176
In addition, new methods for distinguishing different types of PMSCs need to be
developed. While different indicators were significant in different models, my analysis did not
show that any factor consistently predicts when states work with PMSCs. This result suggests
that there likely are not many factors that cause states fighting civil conflicts to work with
PMSCs in general. Rather, different factors motivate states to work with different types of
PMSCs. As such, my analysis suggests that PMSCs need to be further differentiated in order to
identify what factors cause states to utilize PMSCs to perform specific types of tasks.
Lastly, my analysis does offer limited support for a few key arguments. First, that states
are more likely to work with PMSCs that perform military tasks when multiple factors make
states more threatening to states, and when states are poorer. Second, states are more likely to
work with PMSCs that perform police tasks when domestic actors have motivation and
opportunity to scrutinize state leaders. Third, that PMSCs tend to delay victory for states. Lastly,
that PMSCs are less likely to delay victory for wealthier states. Future studies that seek to
explore when states fighting civil conflicts work with PMSCs and when PMSCS help states win
civil conflicts should seek to confirm undermine these arguments.
In the next chapter, I seek to overcome some of the limitations of my statistical analysis
examining why states hire PMSCs by examining the Nigerian government’s decision to hire the
PMSC STTEP in 2015. This will allow me to test how well existing theories for PMSC hiring fit
the evidence from a specific case without relying on a broad set of indicators, as well as to
determine whether there are factors that affect when states fighting civil conflicts hire PMSCs
that my statistical analysis cannot detect. By looking closely at this specific case, I should be able
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to see what factors were important in motivating the Nigerian government to hire a PMSC,
which may reveal important factors that motivate PMSC hiring in general.

CHAPTER SIX
NIGERIA’S USE OF PMSCs IN 2015
In Chapter Two, I showed how most studies that examine why states hire PMSCs tend to
rely on evidence from cases of developed democracies. As such, I argued that existing theories
for PMSC hiring are not very applicable to developing states fighting civil conflicts. In Chapter
Five, I tested four hypotheses that attempt to explain when states fighting civil conflicts are more
likely to hire PMSCs using a broad statistical analysis. In this chapter, I examine the Nigerian
government’s decision to hire the PMSC STTEP in 2015 for help combating Boko Haram.
Examining this case in depth is useful because it allows me to look beyond the necessarily broad
indicators I used to test my hypotheses for PMSC hiring in my statistical analysis by examining
the specific historical context within which the Nigerian government chose to hire a PMSC. In
doing so, I will be better able to determine if my own hypotheses, as well as existing theories for
PMSC hiring, perform better when I can take into account important contextual factors that
cannot be detected in a broad statistical analysis. In addition, Nigeria is a developing state with
far more limited military capabilities than most developed democracies that work with PMSCs,
and in 2015 it was fighting a civil war against one of the most powerful insurgent groups in its
history. As such, since most of the evidence used to support theories for PMSC hiring come from
cases of developed democracies, this case has the potential to reveal new contexts within which
states hire PMSCs. Lastly, this case has been understudied in the PMSC literature, making it an
ideal case for expanding our understanding of why states hire PMSCs in general.
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In the remainder of this chapter, I use secondary sources to provide an overview of the
Nigerian government’s war with Boko Haram up to when it hired STTEP in early 2015. I then
discuss how well the functionalist, post-instrumentalist, and ideationist explanations for PMSC
hiring outlined in Chapter Two can explain why the Nigerian government hired STTEP. I
conclude by discussing how insights from this case can explain other instances of developing
states hiring PMSCs in civil conflicts, thereby providing evidence that such states hire PMSCs
not necessarily because they view them as reliable and cost-effective means for solving security
problems, but because their own forces have proved ineffective and they are desperate for help in
a war they might otherwise lose.
War with Boko Haram
At the start of 2015, the Nigerian government’s war with Boko Haram was approaching a
crisis point. Boko Haram killed 6,644 people in 2014,1 which was 5,049 more than in 2013, and
more than any other terrorist group in the world. In April 2014, the group kidnapped 276
schoolgirls and announced their intention to sell them into slavery. Five month later, they
announced that they were establishing an Islamic caliphate in northeastern Nigeria that would
enforce a strict version of Shariah law. By the end of 2014, their version of Shariah law was fully
established in nine and partially established in three of Nigeria’s thirty-six states (GTI 2015, 41).
Then, in the first week of 2015, Boko Haram attacked the town of Baga, the last town under
government control in the state of Borno and host to the Joint Task Force (JTF) responsible for
combating Boko Haram. Musa Alhaji Bukar, the senior government official in the area, told the
BBC that over 2000 people might have been killed in the attack, although later government
reports claim that the number was closer to 150. Regardless of the exact number of casualties,
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Baga and the surrounding villages were destroyed, all residents from the area including all JTF
personnel were forced to flee, and the Nigerian government had experienced one of the biggest
military defeats in its history.
While acknowledging ethnic and religious tensions in the country, Adesoji argues that the
success of Boko Haram “was an indictment of the state, whose seeming ineptitude was becoming
apparent with regular outbreaks of violence of many kinds despite the state’s continuous
promises to check them” (Adesoji 2010, 96). Indeed, the initial clash between the government
and Boko Haram occurred in July 2009 when police confronted several Boko Haram members
on their way to a funeral and ordered them to wear motorcycle helmets. In the confrontation that
followed several of the members were killed. Boko Haram’s leader at the time, Mohammed
Yusuf, responded by unleashing a wave of violence across five northeastern states. Bavier and
Kurzen describes the response from the Nigerian government:
Federal soldiers deployed to rein in the group were filmed summarily executing
suspected militants in the streets. Yusuf was killed while in police custody. His
body was discovered still wearing handcuffs. In total, over 1,000 people died in
the fighting. Boko Haram was subsequently banned by the government. Its
mosques were demolished, and its surviving members scattered and went
underground. (Bavier and Kurzen 2012)
Here we see the beginnings of what would become a pattern: Nigerian forces responding
to violence by Boko Haram with excessive force that ultimately sparks further violence. By
2010, Boko Haram had returned stronger than before. In September 2010, they attacked a prison
in Bachi and freed 721 prisoners. On Christmas Eve, they detonated four bombs in the city of
Jos. On New Year’s Eve, they attacked an army barracks Abuja. In June 2011, they bombed the
police headquarters in Abuja, and in September they bombed the U.N. headquarters in Nigeria.
These attacks, as well as the many others not listed here, highlight the fact that Nigerian security
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forces could not protect themselves from Boko Haram, let alone government officials or ordinary
civilians.
By 2011 there was growing suspicion that there were government officials helping Boko
Haram. In May, a spokesperson for Boko Haram reported to the BBC that members of the
Nigerian army had helped them carry out an attack on a barracks. A spokesperson for the army
rejected the allegations at the time, but in January 2012 President Goodluck Jonathan plainly
stated in a speech that “some of them [Boko Haram] are in the executive arm of government,
some of them are in the parliamentary/legislative arm of government while some of them are
even in the judiciary […] some are also in the armed forces, the police and other security
agencies” (Adetayo 2012). Yet for many civilians, whether there were officials inside the
government and military helping Boko Haram was a moot point, as Nigerian forces were
carrying out their own campaign of violence across the country. According to a report published
by Human Rights Watch in 2012:
Nigeria’s government has responded with a heavy hand to Boko Haram’s
violence. In the name of ending the group’s threat to citizens, security forces
comprising military, police, and intelligence personnel, known as the Joint
Military Task Force (JTF), have killed hundreds of Boko Haram suspects and
random members of communities where attacks have occurred. According to
witnesses, the JTF has engaged in excessive use of force, physical abuse, secret
detentions, extortion, burning of houses, stealing money during raids, and
extrajudicial killings of suspects. (HRW 2012)
According to a report published by the U.S. State Department in the same year:
Impunity remained widespread at all levels of government. The government
brought few persons to justice for abuses and corruption. Police and security
forces generally operated with impunity. Authorities did not investigate the
majority of cases of police abuse or punish perpetrators. Authorities generally did
not hold police accountable for the use of excessive or deadly force or for the
deaths of persons in custody. (U.S. State Department 2012)
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In May 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the
northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe. By September 2014, an estimated 430,000
people had fled those states, while an estimated 210,000 fled from neighboring states
(Information Nigeria 2014). In May of 2014, Amnesty International released a video showing
“what appear to be members of the Nigerian military and CJTF2 using a blade to slit the throats
of a series of detainees, before dumping them into an open mass grave” (Amnesty International
2014). Further investigation by Amnesty International confirmed that some of the men in the
video were Nigerian military personnel extrajudicially killing suspected members of Boko
Haram. In 2015, Human Rights Watch published a report outlining events in Nigeria in the
previous year, noting numerous atrocities being carried out by Nigerian security forces, including
the killing more than 600 detainees who fled from an attack by Boko Haram in the city of
Maiduguri (HRW 2015). Vigilante groups were also found to have participated in the
recruitment of child-soldiers and the extrajudicial killings of Boko Haram suspects. It was in this
violent and chaotic environment that the government decided to hire STTEP.
Hiring STTEP
The Nigerian government hired STTEP in December 2014 on a three-month contract.
STTEP’s personnel were incorporated into the Nigerian army, and its chairman Eeben Barlow
was appointed to the rank of major general (Nabiebu and Alobo 2019, 71). Comprised of former
Apartheid-era military personnel from South Africa, “STTEP brought a group of highly skilled,
trained and experienced soldiers who have conducted counterinsurgency warfare on the African
continent since the 1980s” (Nabiebu and Alobo 2019, 71). Initially, STTEP was hired for the

In response to the violence perpetuated by Boko Haram and Nigeria’s security forces, civilians joined militias to
protect themselves. In 2013, many of these militias joined together and formed the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)
(Nabiebu and Alobo 2019).
2
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specific purposes of training a Nigerian military unit “with its own organic air support,
intelligence, communications, logistics, and other relevant combat support elements” to rescue
the Chibok school girls (Murphy 2015). This unit was trained in tactics that emphasized
operational flexibility tailored toward a rescue mission (Murphy 2015). However, in response to
territorial gains by Boko Haram, in January the Nigerian government changed STTEP’s mission
from training a rescue unit to training a rapidly deploying mobile strike force. Barlow explained
in an interview that “the strike force was never intended to hold ground,” and instead operated
“on the principle of relentless offensive action” (Murphy 2015). Barlow went on to explain that
“holding ground was the responsibility of the division where we operated, as was the
exploitation of operational and tactical gains” (Murphy 2015). By eating on the go, attacking at
night, emphasizing communications, and using helicopters to cycle in fresh troops and leap-frog
ahead of insurgents, the mobile strike force maintained constant offensive pressure on Boko
Haram. STTEP even brought an air wing to “fly a variety of missions that include CASVAC3,
MEDVAC4, resupply runs, transporting troops, and even providing air support for the strike
force” (Murphy 2015).
It is difficult to discern how well STTEP served the Nigerian government, as its time in
Nigeria coincided with a multinational counteroffensive involving forces from Nigeria, Chad,
Cameroon, and Niger5. The purpose of this counteroffensive was to “facilitate the elimination of
safe havens and escape routes of terrorists in or out of Nigeria” (Odunsi 2015), and by these
standards it was largely successful. Barlow gives credit to the Nigerian army for the gains made
against Boko Haram during this time, claiming that STTEP acted as a force multiplier in support
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of the Nigerian army while it was present in the country (Murphy 2015). By March 2015,
STTEP’s contract had ended and most of its personnel had left the country.
Explaining the Decision to Hire STTEP
I will now examine how well functionalist, post-instrumentalist, and ideationist
explanations for why states hire PMSCs fit the case of Nigeria hiring STTEP. Based on the
information outlined above, the functionalist explanation seems to fit very well. Functionalists
argue that states hire PMSCs in order to perform specialized military tasks that would either be
too expensive or too difficult to perform autonomously. The Nigerian government initially hired
STTEP to train a military unit capable of rescuing the Chibok school girls, a task that Nigerian
security forces had not been able to perform. In response to territorial gains by Boko Haram, the
Nigerian government then asked STTEP to train a mobile strike force capable of helping
dislodge Boko Haram from the northeastern states, another task that Nigerian security forces had
been unable to perform. While in Nigeria, STTEP focused on these tasks, leaving other military
functions to the regular Nigerian army. As such, the argument that the Nigerian government
hired STTEP to perform highly specialized military tasks that it was not capable of performing
autonomously fits the evidence.
Yet there are differences between the case of Nigeria hiring STTEP and cases of
developed democracies searching for the most cost-efficient way to deal with a wide range of
evolving security threats. The single biggest security threat for the Nigerian government in 2015
was an insurgent group that had succeeded in breaking its internal monopoly over the use of
force, and in the process had demonstrated that the Nigerian government was not capable
defending itself or its citizens. Moreover, in declaring a new caliphate in the northeast, Boko
Haram had quite literally announced to the world that the Nigerian government no longer
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possessed sovereignty over part of its territory. Therefore, the case of the Nigerian government
hiring STTEP suggests that basing the functionalist explanation for PMSC hiring on evidence
solely from secure developed democracies misses the fact that states face different kinds of
security problems that cause them to hire PMSCs. When the Nigerian government hired STTEP,
it was not trying to find the most cost-efficient way to perform a wide range of specialized and
technical military tasks necessary for maintaining an effective military presence on multiple
continents like the U.S. or U.K.; it was trying to find a way to deal with an internal threat capable
of destabilizing the whole state. As such, this case provides evidence that while some states do
indeed hire PMSCs in order to enhance their capacity to respond to security problems, it is not
necessarily because they think that PMSCs are reliable or cost-efficient, but because they are
desperate to quickly enhance their military capabilities in the face of an immediate existential
threat.
Post-instrumentalist explanations for why states hire PMSCs focuses on military leaders’
desire to avoid domestic oversight, particularly in liberal democracies where actors outside the
military have the means to monitor military activity. As such, for post-instrumentalist
explanations to fit the case of Nigeria hiring STTEP, actors outside the military would need to
have the means and motivation to effectively monitor the military. And indeed, with the
founding of the Fourth Republic, Abdulsalami Abubakar enacted a series of democratic reforms
meant to give civilians more control over the military. Among these included retiring officers
who held political offices in the past, establishing a Human Rights Investigation and Violation
Commission, and initiating a program of re-professionalization for the military (Miller 2016).
Ukase (2014) even argues that the 1999 constitution ties to existence of the military to Nigeria’s
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National Assembly, as the Assembly has the right to legislate on all military matters including
the appropriation of resources.
Nevertheless, these reforms “have not led to a strong or comprehensive institutionalized
civilian control or to effective oversight of the armed forces in Nigeria” (Miller 2016, 1). One
reason for this is that after decades of military rule, most legislators lack the experience to check
military leaders (Lewis 2014). Defense committees largely rely on the expertise of those
legislators who are retired military personnel, and these members rarely act against the interests
of the military. This problem has not diminished with time due to the high turnover rate among
members of the National Assembly (Miller 2016, 38). In addition, the National Assembly
generally has limited funds to hire and equip staff (Lewis 2009), and most Nigerian political
parties lack any kind of comprehensive political agenda (Okoye and Nnabugwu 2008), making it
difficult to acquire the resources or political will necessary to check the military. Moreover, “the
National Assembly colludes with the executive to hide information on the defense sector from
the general public” (Omitoogun and Hutchful 2006, 175). Sessions of the defense committees are
not public, and there are several accounts used to augment military spending that the National
Assembly cannot regulate.6 As such, “since the return of democratic governance in 1999, the
legislature in Nigeria [has] been unable to demonstrate the capacity to effectively subordinate the
military to civilians in the areas of appropriation, constitutional reforms, lawmaking, oversight
functions, foreign policy, and national security” (Ukase 2014, 11).
Post-instrumentalists also argue that military leaders use PMSCs to avoid political
backlash caused by the media reporting on military casualties. Yet according to a study that
looks at how military casualties were reported in a sample of articles from four Nigerian
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newspapers7 from 2014 to 2016, the Nigerian media actually avoided reporting on military
casualties during that time (Ndinojuo et al. 2019). Out of the 185 articles on military operations
analyzed in that study, only 33 (18%) reported on military casualties at all, and of these a
majority hid the information in the body or conclusion of the article. In none of the articles was
the Nigerian military ever blamed for these casualties, and a majority of the images analyzed
depicted scenes that portrayed the military in a positive light without ever showing dead or
injured soldiers. As such, Ndinojuo et al. provide evidence that Nigeria’s media actually gave the
military favorable coverage regarding military casualties.
Post-instrumentalists also argue that military leaders hire PMSCs to perform illicit or
unpopular tasks in order to maintain a level of plausible deniability, but here again, this argument
does not fit the case of Nigeria hiring STTEP. It is difficult to imagine that the public would
condemn the Nigerian government for trying to rescue the Chibok school girls, and according to
a PEW Research survey conducted in the spring of 2014, 79 percent of Nigerians reported
having a very unfavorable view of Boko Haram (PEW 2014). As such, with the thousands of
people killed by Boko Haram, and the hundreds of thousands of people displaced by the conflict,
the idea that the Nigerian government would hire STTEP in order to distance itself from efforts
to rescue the Chibok school girls and defeat Boko Haram does not make much sense.
This takes us to discussing how well ideationist explanations fit the case of the Nigerian
government hiring STTEP. Ideationist explanations focus on how neoliberal norms influence the
extent to which states and their militaries are willing to delegate tasks to private actors. The
scholarship on the dominant political parties in Nigeria from 1999 to 2015 suggests that
Nigeria’s leaders were not particularly committed to a neoliberal worldview. Okoye and
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Nnabugwu argue that “most of the post-military political parties are not only non-ideological but
have comes to power without known manifestos or identifiable programs” (Okaye and
Nnabugwa 2008, 186). According to Omotola, “the dominant themes in Nigerian parties seem to
be ethnicity, religion and money at the expense of a steadfast dedication to well-defined beliefs
and principles of action” (Omotola 2009, 629). Katsina (2016) argues that the dominant political
party in Nigeria from 1999 to 2015, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP),8 also lacked a clear
political ideology. Based on an analysis of the PDP’s constitutions and manifestos, he finds that
the PDP “suffered from absence of coherent ideological principles” and acted more as a “catchall party quick to stretch its principles and policies to accommodate conflicting interests”
(Katsina 2016, 5).
However, from the 1980s into the 2000s the Nigerian government did enact a series of
reforms meant to reduce its role in the market and promote the privatization of state enterprises
(Donli 2004; Guseh and Oritsejafor 2007; Ekanade 2014). These reforms were initially triggered
in the early 1980s by a significant drop in oil prices, coupled with a spike in internal and external
debt, that forced the government to adopt aspects of a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)
sponsored by the IMF. Under this program, “the size of government was to be pruned to reduce
wastage and make it more efficient” (Donli 2004, 16). In 1982, President Shehu Shagari
introduced the Economic Stabilization Act to “control imports, introduce more discipline into the
monetary system, and narrow the gap between public expenditure and income through cuts in
government expenditure” (Ekanade 2014, 7-8). In 1985, President Ibrahim Babangida adopted an
adjustment program that dissolved many public enterprises, including the Nigerian National
Supply Company which had previously sold essential committees to Nigerians at below market
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prices (Ekanade 2014, 10). The SAP was eventually disbanded by President Sani Abacha in
1994, but Abacha’s own economic policies did not differ significantly from those contained in
the SAP (Guseh and Oritsejafor 2007, 144-5). In 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo “invited the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the Bretton Woods institutions
to advise the nation on privatization” (Ekanade 2014, 14). That year, the government enacted the
Public Enterprises (Privatization and Commercialization) Act, which created the National
Council on Privatization and the Bureau of Public Enterprises, the latter of which being tasked
with overseeing the privatization of public enterprises approved by as Council (Ehiorobo 2018).
By 2003, Obasanjo began implementing policies outlined in the National Economic
Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) document, which included “the renewal of
the privatization program, liberalization, de-regulation, infrastructural development, [and]
provision of strategic support to key productive sectors” (Donli 2004, 20). As such, while
Nigeria’s political leaders may not have been strongly committed to any particular ideology, in
the decades prior to hiring STTEP, the Nigerian government did undergo reforms that promoted
the privatization of state enterprises as a means for cutting government spending. This evidence
supports the ideationist view that states are more likely to hire PMSCs when they view
privatization as a legitimate and effective means for achieving their goals.
Ideationists also argue that the security challenges militaries face overtime shapes how
they define their core missions, which in turn influences the degree to which they are willing to
delegate tasks to PMSCs. For this type of ideationist explanation to fit the case of the Nigerian
government hiring STTEP, the tasks of training specialized military units to rescue the Chibok
school girls and dislodge Boko Haram from the northeastern states would need to fall outside the
Nigerian military’s historical role. Starting with the first of these tasks, rescuing hostages from
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militant groups did represent a relatively new security challenge for the Nigerian military in
2015. While kidnapping had been a problem in Nigeria for decades, kidnappings by militants
became a problem in June 2006 when members of the militant group MEND kidnapped foreign
oil workers to bargain with the government for the release of Mujahid Asari Dokubo
(Chinwokwu and Michael 2019). Instead of releasing Dokubo, the government paid MEND to
release the workers. Seeing this, later that year militants kidnapped four expatriates and
demanded the government pay them $1.5 billion for their release. The government paid this
ransom as well. According to Chinwokwu and Michael, “this payment led militants to believe
that they could become millionaires quickly by kidnapping individuals and demanding a ransom”
and represented “the beginning of modern kidnapping for ransom in Nigeria (Chinwokwu and
Michael 2019, 20). In the beginning, most of these kidnappings occurred the Niger Delta region,
and hostages were typically released after their captors received their ransom (Ngwama 2014).
With the resurgence of Boko Haram in 2010, kidnapping became a problem in the northeast as
well, only there it was not only a means to exploit the state, but a tactic “to expose the weakness
of the Nigerian state by showing its inability to protect both its citizens and foreigners alike”
(Mohammed 2014, 29). As such, rescuing the Chibok school girls did represent a relatively new
type of security problem for the Nigerian military, particularly when the government tended to
handle kidnappings by paying the ransom.
In turn, counter insurgency (COIN) was also a relatively new role for the Nigerian
military. For most of its history the Nigerian military’s internal role was largely defined by the
legacy of its war against Biafra separatists from 1967 to 1970 (Omeni 2018). Government forces
won a decisive victory in this war using conventional forces, with little need to develop COIN
capabilities. According to Omeni, “this victory […] would have implications for the military’s
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internal function and its perception of how best to deal with internal threats” (Omeni 2018, 14).
The decisive nature of the victory encouraged “institutional inertia against reform to the
militaries offensive thinking, doctrine and action set” while the conventional nature of the
victory “retarded the development of counter-insurgency” (Omeni 2018, 15). As such, “the
Nigerian military’s post-war action set suggested that offensive ideology, and the pre-eminence
of the infantry, insofar as both had proved instrumental to winning the war, should constitute the
Army’s underpinning approach – its doctrine – going forward” (Omeni 2018, 15). After the civil
war, the Nigerian government viewed neighboring Francophone states as major threats, as
France and former French colonies Ivory Coast and Gabon had supported the Biafra separatists
(Nwokedi 1985; Venter 2016). As such, during the 1970s, the Nigerian military shifted its focus
towards meeting conventional military threats from neighboring states. With the signing of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Defense Protocols between 1978 and
1981, “strategic culture remained outward-looking but was now leaning towards a role-playing
and collaborative posture within the region” (Omeni 2018, 24-5). The Nigerian military’s lack of
preparedness for domestic COIN operations manifested for the first time in the 1990s during its
conflicts with militant groups in the Niger Delta (Hill 2012; Ukeje 2011; Hazen 2009; Hazen and
Horner 2007; Okonta and Douglas 2003). During these conflicts the Nigerian military relied on
the use of overwhelming conventional military force, as it did during its earlier civil war, while
“such matters as the development of counter-insurgency as a response to a major irregular
domestic threat were swept under the carpet or poorly instituted” (Omeni 2018, 73). It was not
until 2011 that the Nigerian military began working with the U.S. and U.K. militaries to develop
COIN capabilities, and as described above, it was not until 2015 that the Nigerian military
started seeing sustainable success against Boko Haram. Thus, the tasks of training military units
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that could rescue the Chibok school girls and help dislodge Boko Haram from the northeastern
states did represent functions outside the Nigerian military’s historical role.
In sum, the narrative outlined above suggests that the Nigerian government hired STTEP
in order to perform a set of tasks that its own security forces had proved incapable of performing,
likely because these tasks fell outside the Nigerian military’s historical role. Despite the risks
that come with working with PMSCs, after years of failure by its own security forces, the
international outcry over the kidnapping of the Chibok, and the challenge Boko Haram presented
to its status as a sovereign state, the government had to do something to turn the tide of the war.
In contrast, the idea that the government hired STTEP in order to save money on training
specialized military units, or because it was trying to avoid domestic oversight, does not fit the
evidence. In turn, while Nigeria’s leaders were not particularly ideological, the government had
undergone decades of reform that legitimized the privatization of government functions, which
may explain why the government turned to a PMSCs instead of another type of actor.
Conclusion
The narrative outlined above supports the following conclusions. First, the broad
functionalist explanation for why states hire PMSCs fits the case of the Nigerian government
hiring STTEP, but it also fails to recognize that states face different kinds of security problems
that motivate them to hire PMSCs. In the case of Nigerian government hiring STTEP, the
security problem was an insurgent group that had killed thousands of people, displaced hundreds
of thousands more, and had claimed the northeastern part of the country as its own. In other
words, the Nigerian government was facing an immediate existential threat, not merely a
growing defense budget, which undermines the argument states hire PMSCs because they view
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them as a cost-effective means for solving security problems. In this case, the impetus was
desperation to avoid defeat, not efficiency.
Second, post-instrumentalist explanations for why states hire PMSCs do not fit the
evidence from this case. Nigeria’s civilian government did not have the resources, expertise, or
motivation to check the military, there is evidence that the media provided the military with
positive coverage of its war with Boko Haram, and the tasks that STTEP was hired to perform
would not have been unpopular or illegal. These facts challenge the narrative that PMSCs
become involved in civil conflicts because they are bad actors willing to help states get away
with unpopular or illicit tasks. The Nigerian government hired STTEP to help it rescue
kidnapped school girls and dislodge the deadliest terrorist group in the world from the
northeastern part of its territory, which are hardly tasks it would want to distances itself from.
Third, ideationist explanations do offer some insight into why Nigeria hired STTEP,
particularly the theory that states hire PMSCs to perform tasks that fall outside of the military’s
historical role. The theory that states embedded with a neoliberal ideology are more likely to hire
PMSCs also received limited support from this case, as the Nigerian government had
demonstrated a commitment to privatizing government industries, even though its leaders were
not particularly ideological. This evidence suggests that states fighting civil wars do not decide
whether to hire PMSCs based solely on material calculations; political and military ideology also
play a role.
These findings have implications for the debate between PMSC advocates and critics.
One of the biggest selling points that advocates emphasize when arguing for the utility of hiring
PMSCs is that market forces provide sufficient incentives for PMSCs to act as reliable and costeffective alternatives to using national troops (Brooks 2000a; 2000b; Shearer 2001; McCoy
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2010; McFate 2014). Acting in any other way would supposedly be bad for business. But what if
the client is a developing state weakened by civil war that only hired a PMSC out of desperation
to save itself from an immediate existential threat? Under such conditions, the PMSC would
have significant leverage over the state, because the state needs the PMSC more than the PMSC
needs the state. Moreover, states weakened by civil war are less likely to have the resources to
make hiring PMSCs cost-effective, as they lack the resources to monitor and provide PMSCs
with incentives to work hard. As such, the case of the Nigerian government hiring STTEP
demonstrates that states sometimes hire PMSCs when they are least capable of controlling them,
and under such conditions, PMSCs have may ignore market forces and exploit states.
For PMSC critics, the case of the Nigerian government hiring STTEP shows that any
push to persuade states to not hire PMSCs needs to consider the fact that some states do so
because it may be the only means they have to avoid losing a civil war. As PMSC advocate
Shearer asks, “if a private force, operating with international authority and within international
law, can protect civilians, how moral is it to deny people protection just because states can’t or
won’t find the forces to do it?” (Shearer 2001, 30). PMSC critics need to be able to answer this
question. For years, the Nigerian military failed to stop the rise of Boko Haram, and by 2015
Boko Haram was the deadliest terrorist organization in the world with control of a significant
portion of Nigerian territory. If hiring a PMSC was the only way the Nigerian government could
develop military units capable of rescuing the Chibok school girls and dislodging Boko Haram
from the territory it controlled, then the decision seems justified.
Indeed, the idea that states fighting civil conflicts tend to hire PMSCs out of desperation
rather than because they view them as reliable or cost-effective actors fits the evidence from
other famous cases. In March 1993, the Angolan government was losing a conflict with the rebel
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group UNITA, had succeeded in capturing several provincial capitals as well vital government
oil facilities in the town of Soyo (Singer 2003, 108). Without aid from its old Soviet allies, and
with its own military unable to take back the territory, the government turned to the PMSC
Executive Outcomes, which formed an 80-man commando unit and retook the town Soyo by the
end of March. By September, the government had signed a one-year contract with Executive
Outcomes to help train its army and to direct front-line operations. In the beginning of 1995, the
newly formed government of Croatia was losing its war against Serbian rebel groups supported
by the Serbian government in Belgrade, which held approximately thirty percent of Croatian
territory (Avant 2005, 103). In January, the government hired the PMSC MPRI to help retrain
and restructure its army. By the end of the year, the newly trained and equipped Croatian army
had taken back all but four percent of its territory in operations Flash and Storm, and later that
year the government signed the Dayton Accords and ended the war. Also, in 1995, the
government of Sierra Leone was out of money, most of the countries diamond mines were under
RUF control, and the RUF was advancing towards the capital. Then in April, the government
hired Executive Outcomes, and within nine days they had helped Sierra Leone’s army turn the
tide of the conflict and pushed the RUF back 126 kilometers into the country’s interior (Singer
2003, 113). In all of these cases, the government turned to PMSCs for help when they were close
to losing their respective conflicts, which are not conditions under which leaders can weigh all of
the financial and moral implications of their decision to hire a PMSC. As such, this case study
supports insights from the previous chapter which indicate that some security problems, such as
lacking sufficient military capabilities to combat an increasingly aggressive insurgency,
outweigh the risks that come with hiring PMSCs, which can explain why some states hire
PMSCs even though there are considerable risks to doing so.

CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
In the preceding chapters, I sought to answer two questions: what factors influence
whether states fighting civil conflicts work with PMSCs, and when do PMSCs help states win
civil conflicts. These questions must be addressed together. If PMSCs consistently help states
win civil conflicts, then this fact would go a long way towards explaining why states work with
them. If PMSCs tend to delay state victory, then the fact that states fighting civil conflicts have
and continue to work with them becomes all the more puzzling. In turn, whether or not PMSCs
help states win civil conflicts likely depends on the conditions under which they are hired. As
such, although I have approached each question separately so far, the results of each of my two
analyses offer insights into how I should interpret the results of the other. In this concluding
chapter, after reviewing the preceding chapters, I examine the results of each of my two analyses
in light of the other in an attempt to offer more complete answers to my two questions. In doing
so, I discuss the implications of my research for both academics and policymakers.
The Puzzle of PMSCs in Civil Conflicts
Modern states are usually defined by the institution of sovereignty, possessing a formal
monopoly over the right to use force within a defined territory. The genesis of state sovereignty
is traditionally understood to be found in the Peace of Westphalia, which includes a set of
treaties that ended the Thirty Years War and enshrined state sovereignty as the organizing
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principal for European politics (Krasner 1988; 1993; 1995/96; Reus-Smit 1999; Ruggie 1983;
1993; Teschke 2003). Over time, due to the success European states had in consolidating power
both within their borders and across the globe, state sovereignty eventually becoming the
dominant organizing principal for global politics. In practice, states’ monopolies over the right to
use force have and continue to be challenged by a host of various actors, including states
themselves. After the Cold War, many IR scholars recognized that state-centric theories were too
narrow in scope and made efforts to conduct research that recognized the power non-state actors
wield in the international system (Risse et al. 1995; Rosenau 1995; Moravcsik 1997; Finnemore
and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Price 1998). Nevertheless, the idea that states are
defined by the extent to which they maintain their monopoly over the right to use force within
their territory remains powerful. Moreover, regardless of how well states manage to maintain
their monopolies over the use of force in practice, the idea that they have a strong interest in
doing so remains the conventional wisdom. In a system where states are the dominant political
actors, state leaders have strong incentives to consolidate power and eliminate rival actors that
might weaken their claim to be the sole legitimate governing authority within a territory.
Here we arrive at the puzzle that inspired this dissertation. If modern states have such
strong interests in maintaining their formal monopolies over the right to use force, why are so
many states outsourcing military and security services to entities generally known as PMSCs?
PMSCs are private military and security actors that are not under the permanent control of any
state, have their own leaders, possess interests different from those of states, and often possess
military capabilities that rival and sometimes even surpass those of states. If one accepts the
conventional wisdom regarding states’ interests in consolidating military power, particularly
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within their own borders, the act of states choosing to weaken their monopoly over the use of
force by delegating military and security tasks to private actors is puzzling. Yet since the early
1990s, states have been turning to PMSCs for help managing their national security (Kinsey
2006; Stranger 2009; Dunigan 2011; Kruck 2014; McFate 2014; Krahmann 2016). This trend is
not limited to any particular region or type of state. Two general questions follow from this
observation: why do states hire PMSCs to manage aspects of their national security, and what are
the consequences of this decision for states’ national security interest.
I narrowed my focus to the relationship between PMSCs and states fighting civil
conflicts. I did this to simplify contrasting arguments for why states should or should not work
with PMSCs. States fighting civil conflicts stand to gain more than other states from working
with PMSCs because they are generally weaker and dealing with existential threats from rebels.
For such states, working with PMSCs could greatly enhance their military capabilities and help
preserve their existence. However, such states also face greater risks than other states when
working with PMSCs, because ongoing civil conflicts inhibit their ability to hold PMSCs
accountable. If states cannot offer PMSCs sufficient incentives to follow orders, and cannot
credibly threaten punishment for PMSCs that work against their interests, there is a real risk, as
my study suggests, that PMSCs will pursue their own interests in the conflict at the expense of
their client. In addition, while states’ broad national security interests are often difficult to
discern, during civil conflicts one can assume that states have an interest in winning the conflict.
This assumption allows me to test whether working with PMSCs helps states achieve a
measurable desired outcome. For these reasons, I have chosen to investigate why states hire
PMSCs and what the consequences of this decision are for states’ national security interest by
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focusing on states fighting civil conflicts. As such, I ask two specific questions: what factors
influence whether states experiencing civil conflicts work with PMSCs, and when do PMSCs
help states win civil conflicts.
Theories and Hypotheses
The current literature on why states work with PMSCs does not offer sufficient
explanations for why states fighting civil conflicts would work with PMSCs. This literature tends
to focus on the hiring practices of secure developed democracies, particularly in the context of
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The theories developed from these cases tend emphasize costeffectiveness, the desire for military leaders to avoid political oversight, and the strength of
neoliberal norms in a country (Kruck 2014; Cusumano 2015; Fahn and Hadjer 2015). I believe
that such theories are difficult to apply to states fighting civil conflicts. Secure states fighting
foreign wars can base their decisions on whether to delegate tasks to PMSCs on expected costseffectiveness. States fighting civil conflicts face more immediate existential threats that require a
different kind of decision-making calculus, whereby the desire to survive in the short-term can
override concerns about cost-effectiveness. A desire by military leaders to avoid political
oversight also does not serve as a strong explanation for why states fighting civil conflicts work
with PMSCs, because such states tend to be relatively weak and non-democratic. In such states,
actors outside the executive branch and the military tend to lack the opportunities and
capabilities to scrutinize military decision-making. States fighting civil conflicts also tend to be
located outside of the West, where neoliberal norms are not as influential and are often viewed as
a continuation of European imperialism rather than as a legitimate political ideology. For these
reasons, I argue that the theories developed to explain military and security outsourcing by
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developed democracies fighting in foreign wars do not offer strong explanations for why states
fighting civil conflicts work with PMSCs.
Using principal-agent theory, I developed four hypotheses that can plausibly explain
when states fighting civil conflicts work with PMSCs. Principal-agent theory was developed to
explain relationships between actors that want a particular task completed, called principals, and
actors that principals delegate tasks to, called agents. In every principal-agent relationship,
agents are expected to try and get away with some amount of shirking, or behavior that advances
their interests over those of their principal’s. The fundamental explanation for why principals
delegate tasks to agents when they know that agents always have motives and opportunities to
shirk is that delegating a task sometimes offers a better chance that the task will be successfully
carried out, even though the agent gets away with some shirking. In the context of states trying to
win civil conflicts, delegating military or security tasks to PMSCs may offer a better chance that
the state will win the conflict than if the state tries to fight without the help of PMSCs. I offer
four conditions under which states fighting civil conflicts should be more likely to view working
with PMSCs as a more viable means for winning civil conflicts than not working with PMSCs:
(Hypothesis 1) when rebels are more threatening to states; (Hypothesis 2) when states have fewer
military capabilities of their own; (Hypothesis 3) when domestic actors have more motivation
and opportunity to exercise political oversight over military leaders; and (Hypothesis 4) when
states are reliant on aid from actors committed to neoliberal norms. These hypotheses are all
grounded in the logic that states fighting civil conflicts will delegate tasks to PMSCs when they
believe that it is more likely that a task will be successfully carried out if it is delegated, rather
than if they try to handle the task autonomously. The second, third, and forth hypotheses also
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represent modifications of the theories developed to explain military and security outsourcing
among developed democracies fighting foreign wars.
The current literature also does not sufficiently answer whether and when PMSCs help
states win civil conflicts. Most scholars that study PMSCs tend to either be advocates, who
believe that PMSCs can help states defeat rebels quickly at relatively little cost, or critics, who
believe that PMSCs prey on weak states by shirking their responsibilities and prolonging
conflicts to increase profits. Yet few scholars on either side of this debate have attempted to test
their arguments against actual evidence, and those that have tend to rely on anecdotal evidence or
small-n comparative studies. As such, while the current literature has overviewed different cases
where PMSCs can be seen helping or hindering states fighting civil conflicts, we still lack
general theories regarding when PMSCs can be expected to help states win civil conflicts. I have
therefore used principal-agent theory to develop hypotheses that can plausibly explain when
PMSCs are more likely to help states win civil conflicts. In principal-agent theory, there are three
types of factors that influence how much shirking agents try to get away with: those that
influence how well principals’ and agents’ interests align; those that influence how well agents
can maintain information advantages over principals; and those that influence agents’ beliefs
about how they will be punished for shirking. I argue that when PMSCs are motivated to shirk,
they will be more likely to do so, and thus be less likely to help states win civil conflicts. As
such, I offer five conditions under which PMSCs should be more likely to help states win civil
conflicts: (Hypothesis 5) when states are better able to monitor PMSCs; (Hypothesis 6) when
media organization have more freedom to monitor PMSCs; (Hypothesis 7) when PMSCs do not
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have to answer to multiple states; (Hypothesis 8) when PMSCs face competition from other
PMSCs; and (Hypothesis 9) when states have greater capacities to punish PMSCs.
Analysis and Results
I tested my hypotheses using statistical analyses that utilized data from the Private
Security Database, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, and the Non-State Actors Dataset. Using
these data, I constructed two datasets, both of which contains information on thirty-one states
that fought civil conflicts between the years 1990 and 2007. The first dataset contains data for a
set of 286 unique conflict-years regarding what states worked with at least one PMSC in a
country-year, as well as indicators meant to reflect the underlying concepts contained in
Hypotheses 1 through 4. With this first dataset, I utilized logit models to test what factors
correlate with state working with at least one PMSC in a conflict-year. The second dataset
contains data for a set of 157 dyad-episodes (containing 489 unique dyad-years) regarding how
many years dyad-episodes lasted, whether they ended in state victory within the time period
being studied, as well as indicators meant to reflect the underlying concepts contained in
Hypotheses 5 through 9. With this second dataset, I utilized competing risk hazard models to test
what factors correlate with PMSCs being more or less likely to delay or hasten state victory.
The results of my analyses offer limited support for a few theories. First, that states are
more likely to work with PMSCs that perform military tasks when they face greater threats from
rebels, and when they have limited capabilities of their own. Second, that factors related to how
much motivation and opportunity domestic actors have to scrutinize state leaders during civil
conflicts influence when states work with PMSCs that perform police tasks. My results can also
support the argument that states are more likely to work with PMSCs that perform police tasks
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when they face greater threats from rebels and when they have limited capabilities, but the
indicators that support this argument are rather indirect. Third, that the presence of valuable
natural resources in a country can affect whether PMSCs to work for states, but whether
resources attract or repel PMSCs depends on the type of resource. Forth, that working with
PMSCs tends to delay victory for states. Lastly, that PMSCs are less likely delay victory for
wealthier states.
However, while these theories find some support in my analysis, this support is limited,
as most of the indicators meant to reflect the underlying concepts contained in my hypotheses
were either not significant or significant in the opposite direction that I predicted. I used multiple
models to test each of my hypotheses, and these different models did not offer consistent support
for any of my hypotheses. As such, I believe the best way to view my results are as the product
of a first attempt to use statistics to test newly developed general theories regarding how PMSCs
become involved in civil conflicts and how their involvement affects civil conflict outcomes. I
leave it to future studies to develop more refined methods and measures.
I also examined the decision by the Nigerian government to hire the PMSC STTEP in
2015 to help carry out military operations against Boko Haram, in order to look beyond the
necessarily broad indicators I used to test my hypotheses for PMSC hiring in Chapter Five by
examining the specific historical context within which a specific government chose to hire a
PMSC. I also wanted to see how well functionalist, post-instrumentalist, and ideationist
explanations designed to explain PMSC hiring by secure developed democracies fits a case of a
developing state hiring a PMSC during a civil conflict. This case study provides evidence that
supports the general functionalist explanation for PMSC hiring, but it also reveals that the
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security problems that motivate states like Nigeria to hire PMSCs are different from those faced
by secure developed democracies. The Nigerian government hired STTEP to help manage an
immediate existential threat that it was incapable of handling on its own, not because it was
searching for the most cost-effective way to meet a wide range of global security threats. In
addition, this case supports the ideationist arguments that states hire PMSCs when the tasks it
needs completed fall outside of their own military’s historical role, and when they view
privatization as an effective means to carry out government tasks in general. Post-instrumentalist
explanations, in contrast, do not fit the evidence from this case at all, as the tasks the Nigerian
government hired STTEP to perform had broad domestic support. Therefore, this case
undermines both the advocates’ view that states hire PMSCs because they view them as reliable
cost-effective means for solving security problems, and the critics’ view that there is no place for
PMSCs in the world today. Rather, this case supports the view that developing states fighting
civil conflicts hire PMSCs because the security problems they face are beyond their capabilities
to handle alone, and they are desperate for help. Recognizing this point, both sides of the debate
over the use of PMSCs can come together around the argument that hiring PMSCs may be a
serious risk for developing states fighting civil conflicts, but in some cases, it is still the best
option available to states at risk of losing a civil conflict.
Implications for Scholars and Policymakers
I conclude this dissertation by discussing implications my study has for policymakers and
scholars. Regarding the implication for policymakers, I have argued that how PMSCs perform in
civil conflicts likely affects when states choose to work with them, and the conditions under
which states work with PMSCs undoubtedly affects how PMSCs perform. One of the
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implications of this line of reasoning is that, if states tend to work with PMSCs when they lack
the capabilities to handle threats from rebels by themselves, and PMSCs tend to delay state
victory, especially if the state is relatively poor, then the critic’s view of PMSCs seems to be
correct. My findings suggest that PMSCs offer their services to states that are desperate for help,
and once involved in a civil conflict, they make it harder for states to win. If this conclusion is
true, then the use of PMSCs by states fighting civil conflicts ought to be discouraged by policymakers in the international community. If states work with PMSCs when they are desperate and
cannot find other means to defend themselves, then in order to keep PMSCs out of civil conflicts,
the international community needs to help resolve civil conflicts before the states fighting them
get so desperate that they turn to PMSCs.
Following this argument, an implication for scholars is that my analysis undermines the
view that PMSCs operate in competitive well-regulated markets that provide strong incentives to
deliver positive outcomes for clients. In my own literature review, I differentiated PMSCs from
other mercenary-like actors on the basis that they are legal corporations with long-term interests
operating within relatively powerful regulatory systems, as opposed to ad-hoc groups of soldiers
with no interest in maintaining the professional reputation of their group. Were this the case
though, one would expect working with PMSCs to correlate with positive outcomes for states,
such as winning conflicts more quickly. Yet since my analysis supports the view that PMSCs
tend to prey on weak states, I cannot conclude that market forces or the existence of multiple
regulatory systems cause PMSCs to behave any differently than other mercenary-like actors.
One reason market forces and regulations may not shape PMSC behavior to the same
extent that they would other types of corporations is that PMSCs are not normal corporate actors.
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As Carmola has observed, PMSCs are “ambiguous or polymorphous entities – a mix of old and
new, public and private; slippery, and hard to pin down analytically” (Carmola 2010, 9). PMSCs
differ from normal corporations in that they are experts in providing military and security related
services, often possess military capabilities of their own, and often work for clients that are
materially weaker than themselves. These differences mean that PMSCs often have the option to
operate more like rival states or rebel groups rather than as corporations. By possessing and
exercising the right to wield force in countries governed by weak states, PMSCs do not have to
remain in the good graces of their clients to make money. They can ignore the needs of their
clients, work with other actors, and use violence to maintain access to profitable natural
resources, oftentimes without fear of their client state being able to sanction them. As such, the
advocates view that PMSCs respond to market forces and deliver quality specialized military and
security services to clients seems to be incorrect. Scholars with an interest in understanding the
causes and outcomes of PMSCs working for states need to understand this point: PMSCs are not
normal corporations, and as such they cannot be relied upon to behave like other corporations.
PMSCs can possess military capabilities greater than those of their client states, and as such,
often display behavior more akin to states and rebel groups.
A final implication of this dissertation is that we need to refine how we define and
categorize PMSCs. The category of PMSC was developed to include a large and diverse group of
actors that do not fit neatly into any other established categories. But if PMSCs perform a range
of different tasks, are hired based on a variety of factors, affect conflict outcomes differently
under different circumstances, and in general do not respond to market forces in the same way
other corporations do, then lumping all of these actors together and calling them private military
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and security corporations does not tell us much about any particular PMSC. To study the causes
and effects of PMSC involvement in global politics further, and to develop policies based on
these studies, this group’s unique interests and capabilities need to be identified. Are PMSCs like
normal corporations in that they pursue long-term profits, or are they more interested in
increasing the payouts from one job? Are PMSCs like agents from conventional principal-agent
theory, or does their military expertise and capabilities give them a level of freedom that other
agents do not enjoy? Labelling PMSCs as corporations leads to the expectation that they will
respond to market forces and regulations like other corporations do. Since my analysis suggests
that this is not the case, it may be time to look at PMSCs from outside the neoliberal worldview
and recognize that as military and security actors, they often have more in common with states
and rebel organizations than they do with corporations. This is not to say that PMSCs cannot
have a role in making the world a more peaceful place, but before that can happen, PMSCs need
to be understood for what they are rather than assuming they behave like normal corporations.
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